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Abstract 
 This thesis is aimed to empirically investigate the performance impact of 
frequent acquisitions as an aggressive merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy for an 
acquiring firm. In literature related to the study of M&A, a common question is whether 
acquisitions improve the performance of acquirers. Neither theoretical nor empirical 
studies have a clear view on the performance effect of M&A. Some argue positively and 
some are opposite. Although existing research are mixed for their arguments, a takeover 
is commonly perceived as a shock to the firm with a constant effect on changing 
business performance. This static perception of M&A creates a difficulty in explaining 
why firms acquire others when the performance effect is negative. To address the issue, 
this thesis examines the M&A effect dynamically with taking into account the role of 
merger frequency in affecting performance. 
 On the basis of a large sample that consists of about 14,000 acquisitions from 
more than 100 countries over last 12 years, the thesis finds that the investors perceive a 
lower value if the acquiring firm is involved in frequent mergers. This is because more 
mergers are expected to attract considerable amount of management attention away 
from profitable activities in order to digest the challenges of new business integration at 
least in the short run. This “digesting constraint” argument is evident by our estimations. 
Firm becomes less profitable in the short run after a merger shock, and this adverse 
effect can be more severe if the firm is involved in more frequent mergers. 
 Evidence of the thesis further show that, the effect of merger shocks is not static 
and persistent, and it changes with time. The shock affects adversely profitability in the 
short run, usually lasting a couple of years, and then the negative effect on performance 
could be turned either oppositely if the firm digests the shock successfully, or otherwise, 
continuously but diminishing over time if the digestion takes longer such as for frequent 
acquisition. This finding implies that the pace of firm resilience to a merger shock can 
be affected by its merger strategies. The pace can be slow if the firm pursues frequent 
mergers aggressively. 
 The performance effect of a merger shock is dynamic and changes with time. 
The dynamic view for merger shocks from this study opens a new vision for literature in 
merger studies. Overall the market expectation to a merger effect on changing firm 
performance is quite consistently related to what has actually happened to the firm after 
the merger shock. 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1.  General concept of merger and acquisition 
 The compacting globally drives companies to grow rapidly, to act efficiently and 
effectively, to be profitable and to develop a competitively dominant position in the 
world. As a result, the mergers and acquisitions are inevitable for corporations to pursue 
in order to restructure a more competitive business for growth. 
 
 
1.1.1. The type of M&As 
 Merger and acquisitions (M&As) are often classified as horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate mergers. A horizontal merger and acquisition occurs when two 
corporations in similar lines of business or competitors combine. In general, horizontal 
merger causes the combined firm to obtain synergy and increases the market power by 
merging and acquiring related business. Apart from this, firms can also benefit both 
economies of scale and diversification by providing different products or services for 
risk reduction.  
 
 
 Vertical mergers are a combination of companies involved in different levels of 
production or business for producing a good. Combined companies usually have a 
buyer-seller relationship. The main reason for vertical merger, by directly merging with 
suppliers, is to increase synergies, decrease reliance and increase profitability. In 
general, vertical M&As can be classified into two types. Firstly, a backward vertical 
merger, which usually refers to the purchase of suppliers of the raw material in the chain 
of production and attempts to achieve production cost-saving and efficiency 
improvement. Secondly, a forward acquisition, which is usually a takeover of the 
acquirer’s consumer and attempts to reduce marketing and delivering costs.  
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 Conglomerate acquisition will create a combination of companies that have 
different or unrelated fields of business, which extends and diversifies an acquiring 
firm’s product mixes (Mueller, 1977). In addition, Brealey et al. (2006) suggest that this 
type of M&A is the least popular one. The main motive for conglomerate M&A is 
efficient capital allocation and to enter a new emerging market to seek diversification of 
risks (Marks and Mirvis, 1998). 
 
 
1.1.2. Development of M&A 
 There are six periods of intense merger activity, which are often called merger 
waves, driven by prevailing business growth imperatives since 1893 (e.g., Mitchell and 
Mulherin , 1996; Brealey and Myers, 2003).  
 
 
 The First Wave (1893-1904) included many horizontal mergers, creating many 
giants of the manufacturing and transportation industries in the US. Stigler (1950) 
described this as a wave of monopoly and oligopoly by merger. The wave stopped due 
to World War I. The Second Wave (1919-1929), was a wave of vertical merger and 
further consolidation in the principal industries formed by the First Wave, which was 
triggered by the application of radio technology and the development of automotive 
manufacturers. The Third Wave (1955-1970) was a wave of diversified conglomerate 
mergers, which mainly occurred between US firms and helped firms to enter a new 
market. This wave is ended because of the stock market crash in the early 1970’s. The 
Fourth Wave (1974-1989) was an era of co-generic mergers, hostile takeovers and 
corporate raiders, which is also named the “highly leveraged takeovers” era. This era 
ended with the collapse of banks. The Fifth Wave (1993-2000) was the era of cross-
border mergers. The rise of globalization has exponentially increased the competition, 
therefore, this era emphasized larger economies of scale and global economics to 
achieve competitive advantage in the global market. The fifth wave came to an end with 
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the bursting of the “Millennium Bubble”. The Sixth Wave (2003-2008) was the era of 
globalization, private equity and shareholder activism.  
 
1.2. Research context  
1.2.1. Background  
 Several decades ago, mergers and acquisitions1 seldom dominated the headlines 
as much as at present. It has been widely documented that nowadays many economies 
(e.g. USA) have witnessed a dramatic increase in merger activities. This is because of 
M&As, as an important strategy for business growth, are increasingly influential for 
corporations. A glance at existing literature indicates substantial mergers and 
acquisitions in a wide range of sectors, such as finance, steel, pharmaceuticals and gas. 
 
 
 An increase in M&A activity is often referred to either a wave of merger or 
merger clustering in the literature. Several waves of M&As have led to substantial 
industrial restructuring in different parts of the world. According to data from Thomson 
One Banker, aggregate transaction value has sharply increased from £1.95 billion in 
1968 to £2,354 billion in 2013. Over the past decades the USA, UK and Continental 
Europe have made their FDI predominantly through cross-border M&As rather than 
greenfield investment. In addition, emerging countries, such as China and India, have 
witnessed a rapid growth of market for corporate control, taking up roughly 30% of 
overall global M&As in 2013.  
 
 
 Mergers and acquisitions decisions are critical to the success of corporations. In 
a dynamic economic environment, acquiring firms are often faced with strategic 
decisions concerning growth by acquisitions, or by internal investment. After all, 
                                                 
1 Mergers and acquisitions are both aspects of strategic management, corporate finance and management dealing with 
the buying, selling, dividing and combining of different companies and similar entities that can help an enterprise 
grow rapidly in its sector or location of origin, or a new field or new location, without creating a subsidiary, other 
child entity or using a joint venture. Mergers and acquisitions activity can be defined as a type of restructuring in that 
they result in some entity reorganization with the aim to provide growth or positive value. 
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through those takeovers, a decision maker is able to develop a competitive advantage 
and ultimately increase and maximize (at least in theory) the actual benefits generated 
by takeovers to improve company fundamentals. Many acquiring firms realize that 
M&As could be an efficient way to expand ownership boundaries, create corporate 
synergies, gain economies of scale, expand operations and reduce production costs. In 
theory, the effects of M&A are controversial for changing firm performance. In practice 
also, experiences are unclear. Literature suggests that many of mergers were 
disappointing since the motivations behind the takeover were probably flawed, and 
efficiency and synergy gains from economics of scale were somewhat ambiguous.  
 
 
 Empirical evidence has provided many possible M&A motivations, which can 
be briefly summarized as follows: resource-seeking, technology-seeking, market-
seeking, diversification-seeking and asset-seeking (Andrade et al., 2001; Deng, 2004). 
Even though different companies have various reasons for engaging in mergers and 
acquisitions, the main purpose is to improve shareholders’ value or firm fundamentals 
over and above that of the sum of two companies (Sudarsanam, 1995). Therefore, 
finance scholars have primarily focused on study of the issue of whether acquisitions 
are wealth creating or wealth reducing events for the acquiring firm. 
 
 
 The predominant focus of literature has focused on individual acquisitions and 
their performance implications. Many studies just simply and deliberately eliminate 
firms that undertook frequent acquisitions which may confoundingly occur during the 
pre- or post-acquisition window of a focal takeover. However, this would be 
problematic. Extensive empirical studies (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Conn et al. 2004; 
Ismail, 2008), which attempt to explain the causes and effects of takeovers on 
performance of acquiring firms, suggest that a large share of global acquirers has carried 
out multiple acquisitions during a specific short period, some of them even within the 
same year. When an acquirer performs frequent acquisitions, the overall impact of those 
8 
takeovers on its performance could not be attributed to the characteristics of 
individual/single merger case.  
 
 Although frequent mergers have become an increasingly important strategy 
widely adopted by firms, there is little evidence reported on how a frequent-merger 
strategy affects firm performance. For instance, from the short-run perspective, Conn et 
al. (2004) found a negative impact when the acquiring firms pursue frequent 
acquisitions. In contrast, Fowler and Schmidt (1989) suggest that frequent acquisition 
could enhance acquirer’s expertise in M&As, which improves merger performance. 
From a long-run perspective, it is found that most of the existing work is either 
theoretical, based on game theory models (e.g., Nilssen and Sorgard, 1998; Fumagalli 
and Vasconcelos, 2009), or just pursuing simple statistical tests, except for a few papers 
that have explored this issue theoretically from the empirical corporate finance 
perspective. For, instance, Capron (1999) suggests a positive relationship between 
merger frequency and acquirer’s performance in the long-run, in contrast to the 
prevalent view of the negative relationship (See for example, Bertrand and Betschinger, 
2012).  
 
 
 In the existing studies, there are many limitations. For instance, Kusewitt (1985), 
Fowler and Schmidt (1989), Conn et al.(2004), Billett and Qian (2008) and Laamanen 
and Keil (2008) show some limitations in their studies, such as geographically biased 
samples, missing account of the effect of a time interval between takeovers or merger 
shocks in the estimation, only focusing on the market reaction; failure to find out the 
actual benefit of frequent acquisition and the link between it and investor expectation; 
and at least in the case of Conn et al. (2004) an inappropriate model specified for 
estimation. Overall, these limitations call for further research. 
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1.2.2.  Motivation and aims 
 The main focus of the thesis is on the theme of “does an aggressive merger 
strategy with frequent acquisitions outperform the infrequent strategy for acquiring 
firms”. In particular, it aims to examine a) how the different acquisition frequency 
patterns of acquirers affect their performance; b) whether the time interval between 
mergers or merger shocks can affect the relation between merger shocks and the post-
merger performance; c) whether acquisitions by frequent acquirers have more favorable 
impacts on the performance of acquiring firms than do single takeovers. 
 
 
 There are three reasons for this choice of topic. Firstly, to gain a thorough 
understanding of frequently acquisitive behaviour and its impact on company 
performance. This understanding will help firms to develop either a short-run or a long-
run acquisition strategy for growth, and also help investors to re-evaluate companies 
that become addicted to acquisition. 
 
 
 Secondly, although the effect of mergers on firm’s performance has drawn a 
large amount of attention, relatively few published studies that associated with frequent 
acquisition could be found. So far, there is a lack of empirical research in the nexus 
between a frequently acquisitive strategy and acquirer’s performance: this thesis aims to 
fill in the gap. 
 
 
 Thirdly, scholars in financial studies have a high concentration of interest in the 
USA, UK or any other single market (Cartwright, 2005), while few studies use 
worldwide sample of data for M&A studies. 
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1.3.  Research method 
1.3.1. Event-study approach 
 The thesis starts with an event-study chapter which explores the effect of merger 
frequency on performance by looking at the announcement effect of M&A on investors’ 
perception on acquiring firm’s value. The methodology of event study is widely applied 
to pursue this investigation. Generally, this methodology assumes that the market is 
informatively efficient, and price changes could effectively reflect new information. In 
merger and acquisition research, the events are assessed by a change in stock price 
during the period in which the event occurs.  
 
 
 The thesis follows the mainstream studies (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Conn et al, 
2004) and takes the simplified method to evaluate impact of a merger announcement. 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) cumulates abnormal returns (ARs) over a 
“window” period or days around the event date which is set to be the date of 
announcement of an M&A event. The CAR is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1−𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑇1
= ∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡)
𝑡=𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
 
 To investigate the sensitivity of the empirical results to different lengths of event 
window, this study first employed a 5-day event window which is commonly applied by 
existing studies (e.g. Faccio et al., 2006; Boubakri et al., 2012; Gaur, et al., 2013). To 
reduce the probability of capturing confounding events in CAR calculations, the event 
window was reduced from five days to three days to conduct the robustness checks.  
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1.3.2. Panel data estimation 
 The panel data estimation is applied to examine the static relation between 
announcement returns and merger frequency and the dynamic effect of merger shocks 
on firm fundamentals. With a panel estimation, econometric issues relating to the 
specific effect such as unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity, which may arise from 
the estimation of the relation between merger frequency and firm performance, have 
been thoroughly explored in various chapters. 
 
 To make potential econometric concerns less severe and full use of the available 
rich dataset, the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) and the system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) panel estimators are applied. These techniques are further 
complemented by various robustness checks to ensure that the empirical results of the 
respective approaches are consistently estimated. 
 
 
1.3.3. Data 
 Compared to the existing studies, the dataset used in this thesis are substantially 
larger than those found in published M&A studies, and are more internationally 
representative. This allows a detailed analysis of the role that merger strategy or merger 
frequency plays. The dataset includes the most up to date and comprehensive worldwide 
firm-level data, which consists of two parts. 
 
 
 Firstly, the acquisition data used for both univariate and multivariate analysis are 
collected from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC)’s Global Mergers & Acquisitions 
database. All sample acquisitions are announced and completed during the period from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. The dataset covers a larger amount successful 
acquisitions and tender offers of public, private and subsidiary target firms. All 
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acquiring firms included in the dataset are public companies. After a filtering process, 
the acquisition dataset ends up with more than 6,800 unique firms undertaking over 
14,000 takeover transactions throughout 117 countries with a total transaction value of 
$4.49 trillion. Secondly, an accounting and a stock dataset of acquirers based on the 
merger dataset discussed above are used. The accounting information was retrieved 
from the Thomson Financials and Worldscope database. The stock data were obtained 
from Datastream,  
 
1.4.  Major contributions 
 The section is a brief summary of the major contributions in the thesis.  
 
 
1.4.1. Chapter 2 
 The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is threefold. Firstly, this 
chapter examines the impact of the merger frequency on the acquirer’s performance by 
using a large and diverse sample of 14,103 takeover deals worldwide. Secondly, it 
contributes to the existing literature on corporate finance by distinguishing the creation 
of synergy, and division of gains between acquirers with different merger frequencies. 
Thirdly, it extends M&A literature by recording that the greater negative effect on the 
announcement returns usually appears in subsequent deals for acquirers associated with 
higher merger frequency. Significantly, it shows that the negative effect of a merger on 
performance becomes lower when the time intervals between subsequent deals are 
longer. 
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1.4.2. Chapter 3 
 This chapter makes four significant contributions to the existing literature on 
corporate merger strategy. Firstly, the study develops a new method of defining the 
merger frequency that interacts the number of mergers with the time that a merger effect 
may last after the event occurrence. Secondly, this study adds to the literature on how 
acquisitions affect the acquiring firm’s stock performance in both the temporal and 
quantitative perspectives. Thirdly, it builds upon studies about the different implications 
to relationship between the aggressiveness of merger strategy and market expectation. 
Fourthly, a new argument is posited that the larger deal size produces a more positive 
impact on performance improvement for the acquiring firms due to the risk pressure on 
management.  
 
 
1.4.3. Chapter 4 
 The research design developed in this chapter enables four new contributions to 
the literature. Firstly, this chapter is innovative because it systematically analyzes the 
operational performance implications of the frequent acquisition by employing a large 
global sample of acquiring companies. Secondly, this chapter introduces a new 
argument that the number and time of a merger shock matter simultaneously for the 
fundamental performance of the acquiring firm. Thirdly, it contributes to the literature 
by distinguishing effects between frequent acquirers and single acquirers: an area 
neglected in the literature. Fourthly, it extends the existing digesting theory (McCarthy, 
1963) and the chewing theory (Kusewitt, 1985) into a dynamic context. It argues that 
the effect of merger shocks or frequency changes with time. As a result, the existing 
process of “Need to Chew” needs to be followed by a new process “Chew to Change”.  
 
 
McCarthy (1963) suggests that the presence of the clash of cultures and conflicts of 
objectives between the acquirer and the acquire leads to inefficiency in digestion and 
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absorption of the “nutrition”. Kusewitt (1985) refers to this indigestion issue as “biting 
off more than you can chew”. Both of these arguments suggest that the negative effect 
of merger frequency is attributable to the number of acquisitions. However, when time 
is taken into account in the process of digestion, the longer process helps the firm to 
gradually absorb the shocks of frequent acquisition, and then allows it to gain more 
corporate synergies for business operation. 
 
 
1.5.  Thesis structure and highlights 
 This thesis consists of five chapters as shown below. 
 
1.5.1. Introduction (Chapter 1) 
 This chapter includes the background, research motivation and aims, research 
methods, major contributions and arguments and outlines the structure of the research 
thesis.  
 
 
1.5.2. Short-term univariate analysis (Chapter 2) 
 Chapter 2 seeks to examine the effect of merger frequencies on the expectation 
of investors to the integration of new business for their performance in the future. Given 
this objective, the chapter focuses on performance assessment from an investment 
perspective.  
 
 
 By using a sample of 14,103 acquisitions collected from different countries over 
11 years from 2000 to 2010, a univariate analysis is delivered to explore the effects of 
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frequent acquisition on announcement returns for three groups of acquirers: infrequent, 
frequent and highly frequent acquirers. The comparative results of announcements show 
that the low frequent acquirers outperform the highly frequent ones, in which this 
finding is consistent and robust across different time lengths, different regions, different 
time periods, different ownerships of target firms, different size of deals and different 
payment methods made by acquirers. 
 
 
 The significant findings of this chapter provide clear evidence on which the 
acquiring managements or firms have developed the hubris from their previously 
successful experiences on mergers and acquisitions. The development of hubris with 
more mergers drives down the expectation of investors for better performing in the 
future of the new integration and so lowering the value of the firm. Although the 
acquiring managements are expected to have declined performance after their first deal 
or second deals of mergers due to growing hubris in M&A, this does not mean that the 
management learning effect will be rejected. The chapter shows evidence about the 
learning effect that drives up the market expectation for the future improvement of new 
integration if the time interval between the two mergers pursued by the acquiring firm is 
longer. 
 
 
1.5.3. Short-term multivariate analysis (Chapter 3) 
 This chapter aims to extend the existing studies of the frequent acquisition by 
using a more internationally representative sample with control of firm specific fixed 
effects, but also by defining merger frequency in terms of how merger effect can last, in 
the short-term, medium-term or long-term. Splitting frequency into these three terms 
enables interaction between time interval and frequency as a joint effect for estimations 
of how frequency affects stock performance in two dimensions: number and time. 
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 Based on multivariate approach, it is found that if the number of merger 
repetitions presents “hubris”, then it is expected that the frequency is negatively related 
to the market performance of acquiring firms. For a given number of mergers, if the 
length of time after the event occurrence reflects the amount of learning time which the 
management needs to digest opportunities and changes from new integrated business for 
more learning, then the longer time of an event repeating is expected to be positively 
related to performance. However, the estimation in this chapter of the interaction of 
frequency with time shows that the two managerial behaviours co-exist and offset each 
other.  
 
 
 In addition, the study shows that the larger size of a merger has a positive effect 
on performance.  This supports the argument about “risk pressure” on the management 
of the acquiring firm. The estimation results are robust in two senses: firstly, controlled 
firm fixed effects in estimation, and secondly, a larger sample provides the consistency 
of estimation across different economies.  
 
 
1.5.4. Long-run empirical analysis (Chapter 4) 
 The final empirical chapter starts with a question: Can market expectation of 
merger events on the announcement time be consistent with what would happen to a 
firm’s operational performance in a later period? This chapter focuses on how the 
operational performance changes as an acquirer makes a different frequency of 
acquisition in a different time interval. If the acquiring firm can properly digest acquired 
assets and absorb “nutrition” from those assets, then the profitability of the acquiring 
firm will be improved, or at least, not damaged. 
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 In Chapter 3, it is found that the investors perceive a lower value if the acquiring 
firm is involved in frequent mergers. This is because more mergers are expected to 
attract a considerable amount of management attention away from profitable activities 
in order to digest the challenges of new business integration at least in the short run. 
This “digesting constraint” argument is evident in the estimations reported in this 
chapter. Firms becomes less profitable in the short run after a merger shock, and this 
adverse effect can be more severe if a firm is involved in more frequent mergers. 
 
 
 Evidence in this chapter also shows that the effect of merger shocks is not static 
and persistent, and it changes with time. The shock adversely affects profitability in the 
short run, usually lasting a couple of years, and then the negative effect on performance 
could be turned either oppositely, if the firm digests the shock successfully, or 
continuously but diminishing over time if the digestion takes longer such as for frequent 
acquisition. In sum these findings imply that the pace of firm resilience to a merger 
shock can be affected by its merger strategies. The pace can be slow if the firm pursues 
frequent mergers aggressively. 
 
 
1.5.5. Conclusion (Chapter 5) 
 The last chapter summarizes the major findings and contributions of the thesis, 
its limitations, and provides recommendations for future research. Having presented the 
structure of the thesis, the next chapter will provide an event study on the impact of 
merger frequency through a univariate analysis. 
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2. Do more mergers and acquisitions create value for 
shareholders? A univariate analysis 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Merger and acquisitions (M&A) are strategically important for firms to grow. 
Some firms engage in frequent merger and acquisition and some do not. From the 
perspective of performance improvement, it is important to consider if growth by 
merger and acquisition outperforms growth without M&A activities or if more 
acquisitions produce better performance. Existing literature can be summarized, firstly, 
according to the impact of M&A on announcement returns, and secondly, on changing 
the fundamentals of an acquiring firm. For the first school of studies about the impact 
of M&A on announcement returns, it is evident that the market responds to the merger 
announcement positively (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; 
Andrade et al. 2001; Moeller et al., 2004). These papers take an event study approach 
to examine a change in the market-perceived value of the acquiring firm from pre-
announcement of the M&A to post-announcement of the event. These event-studies 
identify a positive change. Based on their evidence, can this study extends that the 
positive experience of M&As on improving performance of acquiring firms will result 
in higher announcement returns with more and more frequent M&As?  
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 Fuller et al. (2002) note that frequent acquirers are able to release more 
information about their own characteristics to the public due to repetitive corporate 
activities in the market. The released information is helpful because it causes the stock 
market to perceive or expect the future stock returns that can be delivered or improved 
by acquiring firms. This suggests that stock market reaction to a frequent acquirer may 
be different from the stock market reaction to an infrequent acquirer. Indeed, following 
Fuller et al. (2002), Ismail (2008) analyses a sample of 16,221 US takeovers between 
1985 and 2004 and finds that single acquirers outperform frequent acquirers. However, 
Ismail (2008) limited his research to the US market. 
 
 
 This chapter examines the effect of merger frequency on the expectation of 
investors about the integration of new business for their performance in the future. 
Given this objective, the chapter focuses performance assessment from an investment 
perspective. If acquisition announcements are positively perceived by investors, then 
the announcement returns for acquiring firms will rise, at least in the short run. In order 
to examine the of the relation between acquisitions and announcement returns in the 
worldwide context, a large sample is collected from different countries, which includes 
6,836 acquirers and 14,103 takeovers during the period 1st January 2000 to 31st 
December 2010. Among 6,836 acquirers, 2,842 carried out more than one acquisition 
across the sample span. The sample used in this chapter consists of public acquirers 
that have acquired $4.49 trillion worth of foreign and domestic companies over the 
sample period. It is worth noting that there are few existing studies, which use global 
data.  
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 Following Fuller et al. (2002) and Billett and Qian (2008), merger frequency is 
defined as the number of acquisitions undertaken by an acquirer during a specific time 
horizon in this study. Given this definition, acquiring firms are classified according to 
infrequent, frequent and highly frequent M&A activities. Infrequent activity is defined 
as an acquiring firm that has acquired only one firm over the time period of an 
observed window. In contrast, frequent activity is defined as an acquirer that has 
pursued 2-4 M&As, and the highly frequent activity is defined as an acquirer that has 
pursued five or more than five M&As during the time period. 
 
 
 This study begins by comparing bidder’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
with the firm’s acquisition frequency at one day surrounding the announcement time. 
Four distinct results are identified. Firstly, the merger frequency is negatively related to 
acquirer’s stock performance. Secondly, the cumulative abnormal returns diminish in 
subsequent deals. More particularly, the diminishing pattern is more marked for 
bidders with a higher frequency of mergers. Thirdly, past takeovers affect CARs in a 
timely fashion because very short temporal intervals between mergers may not be long 
enough for acquirers to learn from the past experience and inferences. Fourthly, the 
size of acquisition or deal size matters for the cumulative abnormal returns. The 
infrequent and frequent acquirers gain higher CARs in the larger size than in the 
smaller size. These findings imply that the management of acquiring firms is perceived 
to develop their hubris from the previous success in M&As.  
 
 
 The contribution of the study to the existing literature is three fold. Firstly, this 
chapter makes a new attempt to examine the impact of the merger frequency on the 
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acquirer’s performance by using a sample of 14,103 takeover deals worldwide. 
Secondly, it contributes to the existing literature of corporate finance by distinguishing 
the creation of synergy, and division of gains between acquirers with different merger 
frequencies. Thirdly, it extends M&A literature by recording that the greater negative 
effect on the announcement returns usually appears in subsequent deals for acquirers 
associated with higher merger frequency. However, this negative effect becomes lower 
when the time intervals between subsequent deals are longer.  
 
 
 The chapter is organized in four sections. Section 2.2 reviews the related 
empirical evidence and the theoretical literature on the performance of frequent 
acquirers. Section 2.3 and 2.4 state research setup and data. Section 2.5 presents the 
empirical results. Section 2.6 presents robustness checks. Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
 
2.2. Literature review 
2.2.1. Theory 
 Current literature explores how past deals influence current acquisition (Bower 
and Hilgard, 1981) and how the accumulated experience of firms on acquisition can 
enhance management's acquisition expertise (Kusewitt, 1985; Fowler and Schmidt, 
1989; Bruton et al. 1994; Barkema et al. 1996; Ashkenas et al., 1998; Hitt et al., 1998). 
These studies find that an acquirer with a higher merger frequency will experience a 
positive impact on performance. Specifically, they argue that later acquisitions can 
generate higher cumulative abnormal returns than earlier acquisitions. Fowler and 
Schmidt (1989) and Bruton, Oviatt and White (1994) study the CARs associated with 
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acquisition announcements. They find that the acquiring firms’ prior experience of 
mergers is a predictor of success in subsequent acquisitions. In summary, acquirers 
with a lot of experience are likely to succeed.  
 
 
 This finding can be linked with the Organizational Learning Hypothesis. 
Argyris and Schon (1978) were the first to develop the Organizational Learning 
Hypothesis. The argument is that the number of acquisitions positively influences 
performance and the returns will rise with the number of acquisitions over time. That is, 
an experienced acquirer would be more successful than the less experienced in M&As. 
The organizational learning theory also suggests that the learning impact of any takeovers 
on acquiring firm performance would be related to how many acquisitions that have been 
carried out previously, have the same characteristics as the current one. Conn et al. (2004) 
follow the argument and state that firms making multiple acquisitions are expected to 
improve their absorptive capacity for innovative change (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) 
and to choose more efficient investment (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). In 2008, 
Laamanen and Keil (2008) further point out that frequent acquirers would potentially 
become superior performers because more acquisition experience can lead to more 
success in subsequent deals. 
 
 
 Fuller et al. (2002) give the empirical evidence in support of the organization 
learning argument. They find higher CARs for more frequent acquisitions of private 
target firms based on a sample of acquisition announcements between 1990 and 2000. 
An acquirer firm can learn valuable lessons from the repeated process of mergers and 
integration (Paine and Power, 1984; Amburger and Miner, 1992 and Pablo, 1994). 
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They gain increasingly market power from more acquisitions (Conn et al., 2004), and later 
or subsequent acquisitions will perform better than earlier ones (Vermeulen and Barkema, 
2001).  They argue for a correlation between the number of acquisitions and the success of 
the outcome.  The later the occurrence in the deal order position in the sequence of 
acquisitions then the more successful the acquirers' performance. In a follow-up piece, 
Kamien and Zhang (1993) turn to the effect of endogenous mergers, defined as a 
merger and acquisition that occurs between identical firms selling a homogeneous 
product. They argue that, if a firm makes a series of endogenous mergers, the firm may 
monopolize the industry. As a result, the performance of an acquiring firm would be 
improved with the number of acquisitions due to the dominant market power.  
 
 
 The Managerial Hubris Hypothesis, proposed by Roll in 1986, argues that some 
optimistic managerial behaviour leads to corporate decisions that destroy the value of 
the firm.  It suggests that the management may pay less attention to the current merger 
than to the previous ones because an overly optimistic confidence develops. In addition, 
the overconfidence would cause overpayment for the targets or higher leverage being 
taken on to pay for subsequent acquisitions (Moeller et al., 2004; Malmendier and Tate, 
2008). Billett and Qian (2008) test the managerial hubris hypothesis.  They look at 
whether a self-attribution bias (Daniel et al., 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001) leads to 
overconfidence by the acquirers' decision makers over the sequence of acquisitions. 
Billett and Qian (2008) indicate that managerial overconfidence may distort managerial 
decisions so that "the subsequent acquisitions may tend to be value destructive" (Conn 
et al. 2004). A number of articles also find evidence in support of the hubris argument, 
which generally involves data from, for instance,the U.S.: Billett and Qian(2008), 
Bruner (2002), Hietala et al. (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2003); and the U.K.: Doukas 
and Petmezas (2007). However, overconfidence proxies used in those earlier studies, 
such as frequent acquisition or multiple acquisition are subject to criticism. 
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 In M&A, the Agency Problem Hypothesis occurs when there is conflict between 
management and shareholders. Management may maximize their own interests at the 
expense of shareholders' wealth (Jensen, 1986). The agency view divides the firm's 
directors into two groups: insider and outsider. Many articles employ an empirical test 
on the agency theory (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1978), but results are mixed (e.g. 
Hoskisson et al., 1993; Wright et al., 1996; Sanders, 2001; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; 
Wright et al. 2002; Wright et al., 2007). From the perspective of managerial decision-
making, agency issues (Eisenhardt, 1989) might cause the size effect (Moeller et al., 
2004). Using a sample of US listed frequent acquirers over the 1990-2002, Croci (2005) 
investigates why managers make serial acquisitions. His empirical test on building 
empire cooperation suggests the motivation for conducting multiple acquisitions is that 
the management serves its reputation and interests and sidelines the shareholders’ value.   
 
 
 Apart from the above arguments, the Diminishing Returns Theory predicts the 
diminishing efficiency of investment for frequently acquisitive firms. In the M&A 
literature, Schipper and Thompson (1983) first introduce the argument. They argue that 
the best investment opportunities are taken first. The latest acquisition, by contrast, will 
be the worst. The decreasing attractiveness of an investment opportunity set, therefore, 
means that subsequent takeovers are bound to decrease in value over time. It may not have 
to predict a negative CAR but does predict a lower return in subsequent acquisitions. 
Using a sample of US listed firms between 1982 and 1999, Klasa and Stegemoller (2007) 
explore the relationship of acquisition sequences and acquisition performance. They 
find that the attractiveness of the investment opportunity decreases when sequence 
increases. Consequently, the higher sequence of acquisitions would more negatively 
affect the acquisition performance (Conn et al., 2004). 
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 The Capitalization Hypothesis of Schipper and Thompson (1983) suggests that 
cumulative abnormal returns at a merger programme to an acquirer performing serial 
takeovers should be capitalized at or prior to the announcement of the program. This 
means the market views most favourably the first announcement of a merger 
programme, and a zero effect on share returns of later acquisitions or, at least, their 
magnitude, will be relatively small because subsequent takeovers are now events 
known by the market. Both Schipper and Thompson (1983) and Loderer and Martin 
(1990) provide evidence in support of this hypothesis.  Schipper and Thompson (1983) 
examined 55 US firms that engaged in acquisition programs during the period 1952-
1968. They find that stock prices react positively to the announcement of the 
acquisition for up to 12 months. However, they find little market reaction to the later 
acquisition announcements. In addition, Loderer and Martin (1990) find a significantly 
larger return in the first announcement of the program than in the later acquisitions. In 
contrast, other authors reject the hypothesis (Asquith et al., 1983; Croci, 2005; Ismail, 
2008). For instance, Asquith et al. (1983) found that cumulative abnormal returns of 
roughly comparable size are observed for the bidding firms’ first through fourth 
merger bids. 
 
 
 The valuation hypothesis indicates that if an acquiring firm's stock were 
overvalued, the firm would make an acquisition (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Shleifer 
and Vishny also point out that the periods of high market valuations would cause 
merger waves. Based on the hypothesis, Ismail (2008) uses P/E ratio to examine the 
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difference between single and multiple acquirers' return. He finds that the valuation of 
frequent acquirers is significantly higher than that of single acquirers. 
 
 
 Apart from the above argument hypothesises, there are some other researches 
document that the timing of acquisitions or temporal intervals as an extension to the 
organizational learning theory is also one factor for investor’s returns (Hayward, 2002). 
Appropriate temporal intervals could benefit the acquiring firms because an 
appropriate time interval provides sufficient time to allow the building processes of 
inference and experience from previous acquisitions to take place. However, very short 
or very long temporal intervals are all have negative influence for investors’ returns 
due to insufficient time of learning or ineffectiveness of inference and experience 
(Hayward, 2002). 
 
 
 In summary, evidence about the impacts of frequent acquisition on 
announcement returns is mixed. Some are positive with frequency and some are 
opposite in stock markets. The two opposite arguments call for further research on the 
issues related to merger frequency effects on stock performance. 
 
 
2.2.2. Empirical evidence of frequent acquisition 
 Research with discussion of an immediate effect by an M&A event on 
company performance is called a short-run study on M&A. Most of the existing short-
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run studies (For example Fuller et al., 2002; Billett and Qian, 2008) found a negative 
impact of takeovers on the announcement returns of acquiring firms on stock markets 
if  acquiring firms pursue more acquisitions. This suggests that the first or single 
acquisition creates the highest announcement returns, but two or more acquisitions 
deteriorate the returns. A few studies argue oppositely about the negative relationship 
between merger frequency and stock performance of acquiring firms in the short run 
(For example, Rovit and Lemire, 2003). 
 
 
 Asquith et al. (1983) is the very first study to identify that many acquiring firms, 
accounted 45% of their sample, are highly frequent acquirers, performing four or more 
subsequent takeovers from 1963 to 1979. Following Asquith et al (1983), Fuller et al. 
(2002) first examine the pattern of announcement returns for frequent acquirers based 
on a sample of 3,135 acquisitions by 539 US acquirers from 1990 to 2000. They define 
a frequent acquirer as a firm that acquires at least five target firms during the sample 
period. They found that the acquirers' announcement returns are negatively related to 
the frequency. Additionally, their study suggests that the announcement returns are 
improved when privately held targets are acquired. As a limitation, the study did not 
investigate differences in announcement returns between acquirers with different 
merger frequencies. 
 
 
 By using a UK sample of acquiring firms, Conn et al. (2004) examine the 
impact of merger frequency on acquirers’ performance. They found that infrequent 
acquirers gain higher announcement returns than the highly frequent ones. Ismail 
(2008) extends Conn et al.'s study by examining a U.S. sample over the period between 
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1985 and 2004. He classified 5,655 unique U.S. acquiring firms according to single 
acquirers and multiple acquirers who acquire two or more target firms during the 
sample period. Ismail shows that the announcement returns of single acquirers 
outperform multiple ones. Additionally, he found that the privately held targets 
generate higher returns for the single acquirers than the multiple acquirers. 
 
 
 Billett and Qian (2008) is the first study that investigates both the effects of 
individual CEOs and firms’ acquisition decisions on announcement returns. They 
define a frequent acquirer as a firm that acquires at least two target firms within a five-
year period. Based on a sample of 3,795 US acquisitions, they found that a negative 
announcement effect was concentrated in subsequent acquisitions of public targets. 
Billett and Qian argue that a CEO who is subject to self-attribution is more likely to 
overestimate their managerial ability. This suggests that a CEO tends to make more 
value-destroying takeovers if the CEO develops his hubris from previous successful 
acquisition experience. 
 
 
 From an organizational learning perspective, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
define a merger frequency as the experience of organizational acquisition by counting 
the number of deals that a sample acquirer made prior to current event year. They 
found both positive and negative impacts of merger experience based on a sample of 
449 US large takeovers2. They argued that a dissimilar prior merger experience leads 
to a negative effect on performance of the current acquisition. In contrast, a similar 
prior acquisition makes positive influences on the current acquisition. 
                                                 
2 They defined large acquisitions that have an excess value greater than $10 million. 
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 For the study of subsequent acquisitions, Schipper and Thompson (1983) 
investigate announcement returns by using a sample of 55 firms in the period from 
1952 to 1968. They found that cumulative abnormal returns for the first mergers of 
acquiring firms are much higher than subsequent acquisitions, supporting both the 
capitalization hypothesis3 and the diminishing returns hypothesis4. 
 
 
 Furthermore, Loderer and Martin (1990) explore acquisition series5 by using a 
sample of 5,172 M&A deals occurred between 1966 and 1984. They found that the 
first takeover creates the highest cumulative abnormal returns to acquirer shareholders. 
In addition, the study found a significant declining trend in abnormal returns of 
subsequent takeovers for acquiring firms. For a high frequency, recent literature 
suggest a strong declining trend in cumulative abnormal returns which decrease from -
0.045% to -1.96 % (Firth, 1980; Dodd, 1980; Bradley et al., 1983; Lang et al., 1989; 
Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Smith and Kim, 1994; Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Higson and 
Elliot, 1998; Walker, 2000; Sud Gupta and Misra upta and Misraarsanam and Mahate, 
2003; Gupta and Misra, 2007; Song and Walking, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2004). 
 
 
                                                 
3 The capitalization hypothesis suggests that the first acquisition yields positive returns and then no returns for later 
acquisitions since the gain of the second acquisition is partly discounted in the share price.   
4 The diminishing returns hypothesis suggests that the acquiring firm always choose the best investment opportunity 
first, and the latest investment will be the worst.  
5 An acquisition series starts after a two-year or more non-acquisition hiatus and ends with an analogous 2-year or 
more no-acquisition hiatus.  
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 Overall, all the above cited studies either gave a definition of the frequent 
acquirers or distinguished between frequent and infrequent acquirers. Most of the 
studies emphasized the effects of merger activities on the performance of acquiring 
firms; however, they ignored the direct effect of merger frequency on the performance 
of acquiring firms. More specifically, merger is a process of accumulating; it also 
needs to consider the timing of acquisitions as a significant factor. 
 
 
2.2.3. Empirical evidence of other determinates on merger impact 
 There are also many other factors that can influence the outcome of an 
acquisition for an acquirer, such as the order of a merger in a series, in addition to the 
number of acquisitions. For instance, the corporate status of the target (e.g. Officer et 
al., 2009), the payment method used (e.g. Healy et al., 1992) and the degree of 
relatedness between acquirers and targets (e.g. Palich et al., 2000), can also affect the 
performance of announcement returns. 
 
 
2.2.3.1. Target type 
 A large body of existing studies investigates the post-merger performance of 
acquiring firms who take both publicly and privately held targets. Most of these studies 
reveal that acquisitions of non-public firms significantly improve bidders’ value. 
(Chang, 1998; Koeplin et al., 2000; Andrade et al., 2001; Fuller et al., 2002; Kooli et 
al., 2003; Moeller et al., 2004; Shen and Reuer, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; and Officer 
et al., 2009). 
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 Using a sample of 3,135 U.S domestic takeovers during the period 1980 to 
2001, Fuller et al. (2002) examine 539 frequent acquirers and a -1.02% of significant 
negative change in abnormal returns on average for firms that acquired public held 
targets. In addition, John et al. (2010) found that returns for bidders in the 
announcement period (-1 to 1) are significantly positive for the sample of acquisitions 
of public traded firms with low-shareholder protection, but returns are significantly 
negative for takeovers of public targets in high-shareholder protection countries. 
Bargerona et al. (2008) found that publicly held acquirers pay 63% higher premium to 
shareholders of public targets than to shareholders of private targets. 
 
 
 One explanation for positive market reaction to the acquisitions of non-public 
firms is that bidders purchase at a substantially discounted price when acquiring non-
public companies because the illiquidity nature of non-public targets. Koeplin et al. 
(2000) state that private targets are purchased at, on average, 18% (by using earnings 
multiples) or 20% to 30% (by using book multiples) discount in comparison to public 
firms. In studies about subsequent acquisitions of non-public targets, they reported 20% 
(by using cash flow multiples) and 34% (by using earnings multiples) median discount. 
Officer (2007) suggests that private targets are sold at an average discount from 15% to 
30%. 
 
 
 Alternatively, the transparency of information explains differences in 
performance of acquisitions between publicly and privately held targets. Based on the 
monitoring hypothesis, the lack of information on non-public firms leads to a difficulty 
for the acquirers to evaluating targets (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008). However, 
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acquirers would receive more opportunities to gain significant abnormal returns from 
the takeovers of non-public firms by exploiting private information situations. The 
asymmetry of information causes private companies to suffer low market liquidity. In 
contrast, public targets are more visible and transparent to investors, in which this is 
positively perceived by investors (Deeds et al. 1999). Hence, the classic reaction to the 
risk of adverse selection for bidders is to reduce the offer price (Akerlof, 1970). 
Moreover, there is a possibility that the target will turn out to be a lemon and this may 
lead to a reduction of value on its offer, even though the bidder has private information 
on a specific target. 
 
 
2.2.3.2. Payment method 
 The literature in the study of the M&A performance suggest that the selection 
of payment method is also a factor which affects acquirer’s abnormal returns (e.g. 
Fuller et al., 2002). 
 
 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) indicate that the presence of asymmetric information 
between acquirers and targets allows bidders who believe that their shares are 
overvalued to use stock as a medium of exchange. Within the context of managerial 
control, the use of stocks payment method can dilute the existing shareholders’ control 
power over the company. Faccio and Lang (2002) suggest that an acquirer will choose 
cash payment rather than stock payment if retaining control of target firms in post-
merger is more important. However, without sufficient size and concentration of 
ownership, the acquiring firm is likely to be less apprehensive about the stock offer. 
There are some studies which support the managerial control argument, for instance, 
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Harris and Raviv (1988), Eckbo et al. (1990), Travlos et al. (1990), Cornu and Isakov 
(2000) and Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
 
 
 Alternatively, an acquiring firm inclines to finance an acquisition by cash in 
which the acquirer’s shares are undervalued and thus will overpay the deal (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Fishman, 1989; Linn and Switzer, 2001; Fuller et al., 2002). Travlos 
(1987) suggests that acquirers always finance an acquisition in the most profitable way. 
He found that acquiring firms experience significant losses when making pure stock 
offers, but gain regular rates of returns for pure cash bids. In addition, scholars suggest 
that the effects of payment method on abnormal returns are independent of the type of 
acquisitions. For instance, Ghosh (2001) and Carline et al. (2002) suggest a consistent 
result that the all-cash offer leads to a significant improvement in the post-merger 
performance. In contrast, the tax-based hypothesis is often cited in favour of stock 
offers, which suggests that shareholders of target firms will immediately experience a 
tax loss if bidders pay them with cash, but tax implications are deferred (Fuller et al., 
2002). This taxation hypothesis or argument is supported and evident by studies, such as 
Yang et al. (1983), Fuller et al. (2002), Ismail and Krause (2010) and Ayers et al. 
(2004). 
 
 
 The use of all-cash or higher proportion of a cash offer may send a positive 
signal of a bidder’s value to the market. If the acquiring firm is uncertain about the real 
value of a target firm, the acquiring firm is more likely to make a stock offer since the 
target only accepts cash offers with the value, at least, as much as its true value. The 
issue of this uncertainty in target valuation indicates that bidders force target firms to 
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share the financing risk of overpaying. Therefore, the higher the uncertainty on an 
acquirer’s own firm value is, the more the preference for a cash offer to be made; the 
higher the uncertainty on the target’s firm value is, the more the preference for a stock 
offer value (Martin, 1996)). Hansen (1987) defines this as a contingency pricing effect. 
A number of studies show that the contingency pricing effect plays a role in 
determining payment method. These studies suggest that acquirers who make cash 
offers gain higher abnormal returns than those who make stock offers within the 
announcement period (e.g. Brown and Ryngaert, 1991; Martin, 1996).  
 
 
 Furthermore, a number of empirical studies demonstrate that the mix of cash 
and stock as a medium of exchange in merger and acquisition activities between large 
firms is increasingly selected (Betton et al., 2008). For example, Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) collect a larger sample of 3,667 deals occurred between European firms during 
the 1990s. They found that only 414 takeovers are paid by the mixed method of 
payment, accounting for 11.3% of the whole sample. Among those deals, an average 
proportion of 57% in cash and 43% in stock. However, transaction value of takeovers 
paid by the mixed-payment is five times higher than all-cash offers. In addition, all of 
these studies found that acquirers are more likely to take relatively smaller firms with 
cash rather than stock. 
 
2.3. Research setup 
2.3.1. Define performance measurement: Abnormal Returns 
 To investigate market reactions to the announcement of M&A deals, the 
methodology of event study is widely applied. Event studies can evaluate the effect of 
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merger announcements on shareholder value from both sides: the target firm and the 
bidder. The evaluation is made by comparing the stock value of a firm during the 
specific period before and after the announcement of a merger. The event study 
methodology assumes that the market is informatively efficient, and price changes 
reflect new information. Indeed, Haleblian et al. (1999) suggest that the event study 
methodology is related to the market efficiency assumption. In addition, evidence from 
Elton and Gruber (1987) shows that the market does react to the new information 
rapidly.  
 
 
 Beginning with Dolley (1933), event study was firstly used to investigate the 
relationship between stock splits and stock price. Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et 
al. (1969) then introduced modern methodology of event studies in their studies, which 
is essentially the same as today. They made two major improvements by considering 
the information content of earnings announcements (Ball and Brown, 1968) and the 
split of effects of stock after eliminating the effects of increasingly simultaneous 
dividend (Fama et al., 1968). In 1980, Brown and Warner further developed a simple 
event study methodology based on the market model, which performs well under a 
wide variety of conditions. The main purposes of this methodology are: firstly to 
capture ‘abnormal returns’ attributed to the event from the difference between the 
‘actual returns’ and ‘normal returns’, secondly to test the existence of information 
effect, and thirdly to detect the factors that can explain changes in firm value at the 
event date (Prabhala, 1997). 
 
 In merger and acquisition research, the events are assessed by a change in stock 
price during the period in which the event occurs. The price change is called 
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“abnormal returns” and is calculated as the difference between the observed returns 
and the returns that would be predicted for given the performance of the market. Healy 
et al. (1992), Kapland and Weisbach (1992) and Harrison and Godfrey (1997) show 
supportive evidence of predictive validity, which justifies the study to apply abnormal 
returns to measure acquisition performance. The abnormal returns are defined as 
follows: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)                                                                                                ⑴ 
 
where t is the time, i= 1, 2, ..., n stands for a stock; 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the observed returns on stock 
i for day t; 𝛼𝑖  = Intercept; 𝛽𝑖  =Beta of stock i (measure of non-diversifiable risk); 
𝑅𝑚𝑡=Returns on the market portfolio at day t.  𝛼 is a measure of the amount of return 
produced by a stock's inherent factors rather than market sensitivity factors. The 
calculation of 𝛽 is improved by Kroll and Caples (1987) and may be expressed as the 
covariance of stock returns and market returns, divided by the variance of market 
return, which can be defined as follows:   
𝛽𝑖 =
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑚)
𝜎𝑚
2  .                                                                                  ⑵ 
 
 As document in Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), the abnormal returns 
equation above is adjusted for both market performance and individual stock risk. 
Healy et al. (1992), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Sirower (1997), Harrison & Godfrey 
(1997) and Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999) find that market beta is related to security 
returns.  
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On the contrary, Brown and Warner (1985) developed another standard event 
study methodology by comparing the market model with the market-and-risk-adjusted 
model in their previous study (Brown and Warner 1980). It has been verified that 
market returns based on the beta, does not significantly improve estimation in the 
short-window event study. Based on Brown and Warner’s (1980 & 1985) studies, 
Fama and French (1992) conduct their own analyses and find the relation between firm 
beta and stock returns is flat, which further supports Brown and Warner’s argument.  
 
 However, Beta estimation is possibly less meaningful since: firstly, previous 
takeover attempts would be more likely to be included in the estimation period (Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller, 2002); and secondly, according to Haleblian and Finkelstein 
(1999) the abnormal returns equation presented above assumes that abnormal returns 
are adjusted by both market performance and individual stock risk. However, Fama 
and Frech (1992) suggest that this is not a case. A preferable method of measuring the 
stock market reaction to M&A announcements, as argued by Brown and Warner’s 
(1985), is applied to compute abnormal returns (AR) and the model is stated as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡                                                        ⑶ 
 
where t is the time of an acquisition and i stands for a firm or stock;   𝑅𝑖𝑡  is acquiring 
firm’s daily stock returns on security i for day t; 𝑅𝑚𝑡is daily stock market returns (for 
the market on which the acquiring firm is listed) on security i for day t. 
 
 This study follows Brown and Warner’s (1985) measurement of abnormal 
returns and further accumulates the daily abnormal returns to measure cumulative 
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abnormal returns (CARs) which is a measurement of the total abnormal returns during 
the event window: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1−𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑇1                                              ⑷ 
where the T1 is the start date of the event window, T2 is the end date of the event 
window.  
 Average cumulative returns of N firms for the period from T1 to T2 days can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑇1−𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1−𝑇2)/𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1                                    ⑸ 
 
 Finally, the t-statistics of  𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑇1−𝑇2) is calculated by  
 
𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑇1−𝑇2)) = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1−𝑇2)/S[𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1−𝑇2)))                            ⑹ 
 
where S(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1−𝑇2)) is the standard deviation. 
 
 
 The event day (day 0) is defined as the announcement day of an event. 
Predictive power will decrease when more days are added into the event window in the 
short-term research (MacKinlay, 1997), due to the likelihood of confounding effects 
from other events. A number of authors conduct a 3 days event window (-1, +1) and 
explain that one day after the event day (day +1) can reflect the market reaction when 
event occurs after trading hours (Ma, Pagan and Chu, 2009). If information leaked 
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before the announcement date of the official deal, it can capture the market reaction in 
day -1 (one day before the event day).  
 
 However, a longer window can capture more economic impact of the 
acquisition since the initial stock market reaction, to the announcement of an 
acquisition, is often incomplete or biased (Harrison, Oler, and Allen, 2008). To 
investigate the sensitivity of the empirical results to different lengths of an event 
window, a five-day event window (-2, +2) around the announcement day (day 0) is 
used, which is consistent with prior studies (Cox and Portes, 1998; Fuller, Netter and 
Stegemolloer, 2002; Faccio et al., 2006; Boubakri, Chan and Kooli, 2012; Gaur, 
Malhotra and Zhu, 2013). To reduce the probability of capturing confounding events in 
CAR calculations, the event window is reduced from five days to three days to conduct 
the robustness checks (See Appendix A). 
 
 
2.3.2. Define merger frequency for acquiring firms 
 How to define merger frequency in event study is a common concern for the 
research of impact of frequent acquisition. Existing studies count a number of mergers 
emerged during a specific period as “frequency”, and some split or classify acquiring 
firm according to the single acquirer for the firm that acquired only one target during 
the sample period, and the frequent acquirer that severed multiple acquisitions in the 
sample period. Fuller et al. (2002) studied the performance of firms involved in 
mergers by defining a firm performed at least five acquisitions as a frequent acquirer. 
The definition of frequent acquirers by Fuller et al. (2002) has been widely cited by 
existing studies for merger frequency studies. For instance, Ismail (2008) broadly 
groups US acquisitions according to single and multiple (at least two acquisitions) 
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acquirers. Similarly, Billett and Qian (2008) define a firm as a frequent acquirer if the 
firm acquired at least two public targets during the sample period. Additionally, 
Combined their approach, Conn et al. (2004) further separate their sample and group 
UK acquisitions according to single acquirers, moderately (2-3 acquisitions) and 
highly (at least four acquisitions) acquisitive over the sample period. 
 
 To follow the studies above, in this chapter, the merger frequency is defined as 
the number of acquisitions that occurred during the sample span. Then acquiring firms 
are further classified according to infrequent, frequent and highly frequent acquirers 
over a specific time period. Infrequent merger means that a firm that has acquired only 
one target firm over this period. In contrast, the frequent means the firm that has 
pursued two to four M&As during the period, and the highly frequent have five M&As 
or more over the same span as infrequent and frequent ones. 
 
 According to Equation (4) that defines cumulative abnormal returns to an 
announcement of takeover over a specified window, calculation of the CARs for an 
acquiring firm with f frequency can be specified as follows. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓 =
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑚
𝑓
𝑚=𝑖
𝑓
                                                  ⑺ 
 
where, CAR is cumulative abnormal returns defined by (4), f is a merger frequency 
that counts a number of mergers made by 𝑖𝑡ℎ acquiring firm during the time period t; m 
indicates the 𝑚𝑡ℎ  merger of 𝑖𝑡ℎ  firm during the same period of time t. Apparently, 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ acquirer’s average returns earned from its f number or frequency of the 
mergers and acquisitions over the period from the sample starting year to year t.  
41 
 
 
 
2.3.3. Empirical predictions 
 The section 2.2.1 surveys several theories in relation to frequent acquisition. It 
is found that merger motives have attracted far less theoretical attention than merger 
consequences or effects themselves. At the most general level, those theories are 
considered as merger motives which is the moving cause behind merger impacts. 
However, the research settings of the chapter aim to give an exploration of potential 
impacts that are born or developed from repetitive and frequent acquisitions. It may not 
be appropriate to use some of these theories to explain the impacts of frequent 
acquisition. For example, diminishing returns theory and valuation theory may not be 
relevant.  
 
 
 In addition, capitalization theory is considered inappropriate. Because there is a 
big uncertainty concerning the magnitude, success, timing of a merger program and 
whether a series of mergers is a merger program. This is not done to refute or prove a 
single theory. Most scholars agree that merger and acquisitions are a complex process 
and that there may not be a single approach that could offer a full explanation (e,g. 
Steiner, 1975; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Trautwein, 1990).   
 
 Therefore, by comparing 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑓
 with different f, this chapter will test several 
arguments that are more likely to be associated with frequent acquisition: 
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 Firstly, the organizational learning hypothesis (OLH) (Argyris and Schon, 1978) 
that expects higher 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 with increasing f, which means  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓 ⎢𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟
𝑓=1 < 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓 ⎢𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟
2≤𝑓≤4 < 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓 ⎢ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟
𝑓≥5
[rank one] 
 
and the opposite arguments of the Managerial Hubris Hypothesis (MHH ) (Roll, 1986) 
or Agency Theory (Jensen, 1986)  that expects lower 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 with increasing f:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓 ⎢𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟
𝑓=1 > 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓 ⎢𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟
2≤𝑓≤4 > 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓 ⎢ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟
𝑓≥5
[rank two] 
 
 Secondly, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 can be specified as 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐹  with F indicating 𝐹𝑡ℎ merger made 
by the acquiring firm i. By ranking 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐹  with different F, a stronger claim against 
each hypothesis can be obtained if  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐹 ⎢𝐹=1 < 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐹 ⎢𝐹=2 < … < 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐹 ⎢𝐹=𝑛…………………………….[rank three] 
 
 
in support of the OLH, otherwise, if  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐹 ⎢𝐹=1 > 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐹 ⎢𝐹=2 > … > 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐹 ⎢𝐹=𝑛………………….………….[rank four] 
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in support of the Managerial Hubris or Agency Theory. 
 
 
 This is because when the management of the acquirer undertakes its first bid, 
they will be more careful in choosing a target and investing in the business of the target, 
thus making a successful decision for the acquisition. However, according to the hubris 
theory, once the management develops hubris from initially successful merger 
experience, the management of the acquiring firm will be less careful about target 
selection and risk assessment of an acquisition. This could result in paying excessive 
takeover premiums and thus leading to the value losses for subsequent deals. 
 
 
 Thirdly, timing of acquisitions or temporal intervals theory predicts that if an 
acquirer performs frequent acquisition within a longer time period, the acquirer is 
expected to have higher CARs than the one undertaking frequent acquisition within a 
shorter time period. Further it can be expected that the former has a longer average 
time interval between mergers that the latter. The longer break between deals will 
benefit acquirers since learning depends on the time between two acquisitions. Short 
periods do not allow acquiring firms to draw inferences and experience from past 
takeovers (Hayward, 2002). 
2.4. Data 
 The sample used for this study includes all completed M&As and tender offers 
to public, private and subsidiary target firms completed by worldwide public 
companies over 11 years from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. During the 
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sample period, acquiring firms are classified as follows: infrequent acquirers acquired 
only one firm, frequent acquirers acquired two to four firms, and highly frequent 
acquirers acquired five firms or more. The M&A data is collected from the Thomson 
Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Database and stock and other financial 
data related to acquiring firms are collected from DataStream. In line with existing 
studies (Fuller et al., 2002; Billett and Qian, 2008; Ismail, 2008; Boubakri et al., 2012; 
Rahahleh and Wei, 2012), the sample takeovers are selected based on the following 
conditions. 
 
 
1. The acquisition has been completed between the sample spans.  
2. Deals completed longer than 1,000 days after the announcement date are 
removed.  
3. An acquiring firm is publicly traded on either a domestic or a foreign stock 
exchange, which has three days (-1, +1)6 and five days (-2, +2) of return data 
around the announcement of a takeover held on the DataStream database.  
4. The target firm is one of these three: public, private or subsidiary. 
5. The target is purchased at a disclosed dollar value for at least $1 million. 
6. The bidder owns either nothing or less than 50% percent of the target’s voting 
rights before the acquisition. Then transfer of the control rights to the acquirer to 
at least 50% of shares or ownership after takeover. 
7. Utilities (with a primary SIC code between 4900 and 4999) and financial 
institutions (with a primary SIC code between 6000 and 6999) are not included. 
8. Acquiring two or more than two targets during the event window period is 
regarded as an extreme case for exclusion from the sample. 
                                                 
6 Within empirical studies related to merger and acquisitions, a period measures the impact of takeover activities on 
a firm’s performance over time is defined as event window. 
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 Furthermore, in line with Martin (1996) and Fuller et al. (2002), methods of 
payment used in transactions are categorized into three groups: (1) transactions made 
by pure cash from the firm’s own earning, borrowing or from mixed earning and 
borrowing; (2) transactions made by pure stock in a form of common or ordinary 
shares (for public targets), options, warrants or stock (for private targets); and (3) 
transactions made by a mixture of cash and stock. 
 
 
 After filtering from the initial set of 339,640 acquisitions, a final sample is 
yielded, consisting of 14,103 acquisitions by 6,836 acquirers across 117 countries. The 
full sample is then divided into sub-samples according to methods of payment, 
ownership status of target firms, geography and industry, respectively. In Table 2-1, 
acquiring firms are classified by the number of acquisitions over the sample span. 
Acquiring firms which acquired single, two to four, and at least five acquisition(s) 
during 2000 to 2010 are classified as an infrequent acquirer, a frequent acquirer and a 
highly frequent acquirer, respectively. 
 
 Table 2-1 presents the sample statistics of 14,103 acquisitions which occurred 
during the period 2000 to 2010. 3,994 sample acquisitions were made by infrequent 
acquirers, 5,820 deals were made by frequent acquirers, and the rest of the 4,289 deals 
were made by highly frequent acquirers. Over the time, the total number of 
acquisitions increased from 825 in 2000 to 1,483 in 2010. However, the increasing 
trend is not monotonically up over these years. For instance, merger activities 
decreased in 2008. The median values of transactions were almost stable at around $23 
million over an 11-year period. The huge difference between the mean and the median 
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averages of acquisition values suggest that some outliers exist in the sample of 
transaction values. Interestingly, the total value of transactions is only around $2 
trillion in 2002 and 2003, which is much lower than the rest of the years. 
 
Table 2-1. Sample statistics of 14,103 takeovers from 2000 to 2010. 
 
 
 Table 2-2 presents the sample distribution by payment methods, ownership 
status of targets, geography and industry. In the table, Panel A shows the number of 
acquisitions in terms of target ownership status. The publicly owned target firms take 
20% of the total sample deals and this group of deals has the highest mean value of 
transactions, although it show the lowest number of takeovers. In contrast, acquisitions 
of privately owned targets account for 49%, the highest proportion, of the full sample 
but the lowest deal value. This pattern is consistent in sub-samples of infrequent, 
frequent and highly frequent acquirers. In other words, non-public traded targets are 
more attractive to the bidders than public targets. Previous literature (Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2004) explains that acquirers will get more opportunities to gain 
significant abnormal returns from takeovers of privately owned firms from exploiting 
private information.  
 
Year
Number 
of Deals
Number of 
Acquirers
Deals by 
infrequent 
acquirer
Deals by 
frequent 
acquirer
Deals by 
High 
frequent 
acquirer
Mean Value 
of 
Transactions
Median 
value of 
Transactions 
Total Value of 
Transactions
($Million) ($Million) ($Million)
2000 825 640 192 339 294 676.73 23.18 558303.00
2001 616 382 143 236 237 500.89 31.23 308549.15
2002 765 476 173 315 277 243.45 23.18 186235.71
2003 914 516 199 380 335 223.27 24.56 204065.70
2004 1259 612 290 533 436 235.04 20.11 295910.79
2005 1629 755 374 699 556 295.03 21.4 480602.28
2006 1770 771 473 780 517 318.82 22.69 564316.63
2007 2010 849 589 826 595 278.14 23.1 559051.67
2008 1564 672 536 629 399 298.84 20.83 467387.72
2009 1268 562 462 527 279 344.93 17 437375.48
2010 1483 601 563 556 364 290.88 25.67 431376.16
Total 14103 6836 3994 5820 4289 322.87 23.36 4493175.42
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 The Panel B of the table provides details on payment methods. 
Overwhelmingly, there are 7,772 transactions accounting for 55% of the total deals 
made by pure cash. In contrast, the stock financing only accounts for 19%. Apparently, 
the cash offers are popular in acquiring small targets. Acquisitions financed by 
combination of stock and cash are often used to acquire large corporations. It is found 
that the infrequent bidders are more likely to use equity as the method of payment in 
acquiring targets. Although stock takeovers have a lower proportion than cash ones, 
the mean value of transactions financed by stock is higher than deals financed by cash 
for frequent and highly frequent acquirers. 
 
 Panel C reports that 73% of targets are domestic companies and only 27% of 
targets are foreign firms, which suggests that domestic targets are more favourable to 
acquirers than cross-border targets. This is possibly due to the information asymmetry 
between acquirers and foreign target firms. Panel D reveals that 64% of total deals are 
stretched out beyond acquirers’ core business, and the rest of 36% deals originate in 
bidders’ own industry. However, the mean value of transactions for related 
acquisitions is much greater than for conglomerates even after controlling for the 
number of mergers. This suggests that the acquiring firms are more confident in 
pursuing horizontal mergers due to the advantage of information and controlling 
capability. 
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Table 2-2. Sample statistics for payment method, target ownership and types of acquiring firms 
 
All 
 
Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
   
Mean Value of deals 
   
Mean Value of deals 
   
Mean Value of deals 
   
Mean Value of deals 
 
Deals % ($Million) 
 
Deals % ($Million) 
 
Deals % ($Million) 
 
Deals % ($Million) 
Full Sample 14103 
 
318.6 
 
3994 28% 164.01 
 
5820 41% 291.9 
 
4289 30% 512.84 
Panel A: Target listing status 
Public 2799 20% 1092.34 
 
1177 8% 669.12 
 
919 7% 1097.37 
 
703 5% 1794.34 
Private 6842 49% 64.28 
 
3133 22% 45.4 
 
2047 15% 64.71 
 
1662 12% 99.33 
Subsidiary 4462 32% 223.2 
 
2346 17% 159.59 
 
1262 9% 322.53 
 
854 6% 251.19 
Panel B: Payment method 
        
Cash 7772 55% 239.47 
 
3147 22% 163.45 
 
2440 17% 250.63 
 
2185 15% 336.5 
Stock 2738 19% 308.55 
 
1698 12% 134.07 
 
671 5% 491.99 
 
369 3% 777.86 
Mixed 3593 25% 497.41 
 
1811 13% 310.42 
 
1117 8% 542.79 
 
665 5% 930.43 
Panel C: Cross-border 
Domestic 10302 73% 297.55 
 
4847 34% 172.19 
 
3146 22% 337.54 
 
2309 16% 506.22 
Foreign 3801 27% 375.64 
 
1809 13% 259.59 
 
1082 8% 449.22 
 
910 6% 518.84 
Panel D: Industry Relatedness 
Related 5018 36% 411.53 
 
2458 17% 243.01 
 
1527 11% 443.42 
 
1033 7% 765.37 
Conglomerate 9085 64% 267.27 
 
4198 30% 168.38 
 
2701 19% 322.43 
 
2186 16% 389.15 
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2.5. Empirical results 
 In this section, two questions are addressed: the first is about how merger 
frequency affects cumulative abnormal returns for shareholders of the acquiring firm; 
and the second is how CARs differ between the first and subsequent acquisitions. Then 
the section explores whether these differences can be explained by the hubris or the 
organization theory. 
 
 
2.5.1. The impact of frequency on announcement returns 
 Table 2-3 reports univariate analysis of the five-day cumulative returns of 
acquisitions made for different merger frequencies. In the row “within sample span” of 
Table 2-3, the overall CARs for three subsamples are all significantly positive at the 1% 
level: a 3.97% CAR for infrequent bidders, a 2.12% CARs for frequent acquisitions 
and a 0.79% CAR for highly frequent bidders, respectively. It is found that the 
infrequent acquirers outperform frequent acquirers7, clearly suggesting that the CARs 
decline as the merger frequency increases. 
 
 
 As stated in Huber (1991), there invariably exists a temporal interval between 
two acquisitions. During this interval, an acquirer is able to facilitate organizational 
learning in integrating new business with existing one for more efficient utilization of 
new acquisitions through sufficient digestion of acquisition assets and integration of 
cost and risk. To take into account the performance effect of time interval between 
                                                 
7 For robustness, infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidder are re-defined as a firm undertaking one to two, 
three to five and greater than five acquisitions during 2000-2010. The results remain qualitatively unchanged (See 
Appendix A). 
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acquisitions pursued by the acquiring firm, acquisitions are grouped according to one-
year interval and four-year interval and the sample span in which an acquirer performs 
frequent acquisitions. In this context, a frequent acquirer with one-year interval means 
that the acquirer completes two to four acquisitions within one year, or the firm 
completes two to four acquisitions within four years if it has four-year interval. Based 
on the argument of the learning effect (OLH), the market expects a better performance 
for the longer interval. 
 
 
 As reported in Table 2-3, there is a clearly increasing trend in CARs as time 
interval becomes longer, which ranges from 2.25% to 3.97% for infrequent acquirers, 
0.91% to 2.12% for frequent acquirers and 0.17% to 0.79% (insignificant) for high-
frequent acquirers, respectively. The results suggest that CARs are higher when 
acquirers take longer time to break from the last acquisition to next one. One 
explanation for this finding is that acquirers need time to learn from previous 
acquisition experience and to digest newly acquired business. This shows clear 
evidence in support of OLH as the longer interval helps the acquiring firm with more 
time to learn and improve integration of new business to the existing one. Time for 
learning matters for improvement of acquisition quantity (Hayward, 2002). 
 
 
 In short, Table 2-3 provides a clear ranking of CARs that decrease with the 
increasing number of acquisitions, supporting the hubris or agency argument. However, 
the hubris effect can be mitigated or weakened by the learning effect when the 
frequency appears slowly, such as increasing time-break length between mergers. 
Further, a variety of robustness checks were introduced, including the analysis was 
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repeated by splitting the full sample by different regions and economies and redefining 
the length of time intervals (See, Appendix B). These results were also robust and 
consistent 
 
Table 2-3. Cumulative abnormal returns for infrequent, frequent and highly frequent across 
different time interval 
 
Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
Temporal interval CAR(+2,-2) N# 
 
CAR(+2,-2) N# 
 
CAR(+2,-2) N# 
 
within one year 2.25%*** 10009 
 
0.91%*** 3818 
 
0.17% 276 
 
(23.36) 
  
(7.96) 
  
(0.40) 
 
within Four years 2.81%*** 6831  1.10%*** 5685  0.39%*** 1587 
 (22.18)   (10.97)   (2.64)  
within sample span 3.97%*** 3994  2.12%*** 5820  0.79%*** 4289 
 (18.63)   (17.50)   (7.43)  
Note: This table reports five-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for infrequent, frequent and high 
frequency acquirers across different time interval. Infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidder is defined as an 
acquirer undertaking one, two to four and more than four acquisition(s), respectively. To take into account the 
performance effect of time interval between acquisitions pursued by the acquiring firm, acquisitions are grouped 
according to one-year interval and four-year interval, and the sample span in which an acquirer performs frequent 
acquisitions. The t-statistic is in bracket. N# reports the number of takeovers. ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
**Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
2.5.2. The impact of frequency on subsequent acquisition 
performance 
 To further check the finding shown in Table 2-3, CARs are ranked according to 
the occurrence orders of acquisitions. The full sample is divided into two subsamples: 
single acquirers and frequent acquirers. This will lead us to see if the Rank Four can be 
established empirically. Table 2-4 presents evidence on CARs of acquiring firms 
declining after the first deal, indicating that the market reacts more strongly to the first 
deal. The results are consistent with Conn et al. (2002) who find that the announcement 
return decline rather than improve in subsequent acquisition, using a sample of 4,344 
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UK acquisitions during 1984-1998. The Rank Four is clearly evident in Table 2-4. 
Further, the evidence is consistent with the notion that acquirers with no acquisition 
history show no evidence of hubris or learning impacts. 
 
 
 The Panel A and B of Table 2-4 explore whether the merger impacts of first 
takeovers differ between frequent acquirers and infrequent acquirers. It is found that 
for the 3,994 of 6,836 first acquisitions made by infrequent acquirers, the average CAR 
is 2.53%, statistically distinguishable from zero. For frequent and highly frequent 
acquirers, the average of first deal abnormal return is 2.41%, also statistically 
significant. The difference between the first takeover CARs for is also insignificantly 
different from zero. It appears that the negative effects of mergers only found in high-
order deals (see Panel A), where previous merger experience may lead to the 
development of hubris.  
 
 
 The Panel C of Table 2-4 compares CARs with different time intervals between 
one and another. The results still strongly suggest that CARs increase with slower pace 
of merger, which is consistent across different intervals in support of the learning 
hypothesis. CARs for a shorter interval are lower than one with a longer interval. For 
instance, the CAR increases from 1.15% with a one-year interval to 2.08% with a two-
year interval for the overall subsample, 2.07% with a one-year interval to 3.38% with a 
two-year interval for the first deal, and 1.31% to 1.75% for the second to third deal. 
These results are consistent with Hayward (2002) which argues that acquirers need 
more time to draw adaptive inference from prior experience on subsequent deals.  
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 In sum, findings in Table 2-4 provides further evidence on which increasing 
merger frequency decreases CARs returns, but the decrease can be mitigated if the 
acquiring firm slows its pace of merger frequency. The evidence of Table 2-4 to 
support this argument is consistent with the evidence of Table 2-3. In addition, a 
positive relationship between CARs and the time interval is highlighted in Figure 2-1 
which illustrates CARs against time intervals from completion of the 1st deal to start 
2nd deal (TI between 2nd and 3rd). Overall, the findings of value destructive subsequent 
acquisitions are robustly shown to support the hubris hypothesis. In addition, it is 
found that managerial hubris (negative effect) and organizational learning (positive 
effect) coexist in frequent acquisition, but among the contrasting effects, the latter is 
much dominated by the former.  
 
Table 2-4. Cumulative abnormal returns by the deal order and different average temporal intervals 
between deals 
Panel A: Subsample of frequent and highly frequent acquirers 
 
Overall 
 
1st  
 
2nd -3rd  
 
>=4th  
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
1.24%*** 10109 
 
2.41%*** 2842 
 
1.23%*** 4353 
 
0.29%** 2914 
 
(16.17) 
  
(13.35) 
  
(10.83) 
  
(2.54) 
 
Panel B::merger effects of first acquisitions between frequent and infrequent acquirers 
 Infrequent  Frequent and Highly frequent  Difference  
Deal order CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N#     CAR[+2,-2]  
1st deal 2.53%*** 3994  2.41%*** 2842     0.12%  
 (18.25)   (13.35)      (-0.53)  
Panel C: avg. of temporal intervals between deals 
 Overall  1st  2nd -3rd  >=4th 
Temporal interval CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N# 
< one year 1.15%*** 6545 
 
2.07%*** 1684 
 
1.31%*** 2565 
 
0.28%** 2296 
 
(12.67) 
  
(10.33) 
  
(8.78) 
  
(2.21) 
 
one to two year(s) 2.08%* 2726 
 
3.38%*** 813 
 
1.75%*** 1325 
 
0.49%* 588 
 
(1.78) 
  
(8.25) 
  
(5.03) 
  
(1.72) 
 
> two years 2.78%*** 742 
 
4.94%*** 297 
 
2.13%*** 415 
 
-0.63% 30 
 
(7.17) 
  
(5.54) 
  
(4.80) 
  
(-0.55) 
 
Note: This table reports five-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for subsample consisting of frequent 
and highly frequent acquirers across different average temporal intervals between deals and deal order. Frequent and 
highly frequent bidders are defined as an acquirer undertaking two to four and more than four acquisition(s), 
respectively. The t-statistic is in bracket. N# reports the number of takeovers.***Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
**Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Figure 2-1. The relationship between CARs and the time interval 
 
 
 
2.6. Robustness check 
 
2.6.1. Robustness tests for merger frequency by deal-characteristics 
 A large body of early research documented the importance of the deal 
characteristics, especially in determining the probability of a merger or acquisition 
(Kuehn, 1975; Singh, 1975; Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Palepu, 1986; Chatterjee, 
2000; Alcade and Espitia, 2003; Siriopoulos et al., 2006). Thus, in this section, target 
type and the method of payment are employed as comparative controls. 
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2.6.1.1. CARs by frequency for public, private and subsidiary targets  
 Panel A of Table 2-5 reports that after controlling the effect of target ownership 
on analysis, the CARs are still higher for infrequent acquirers than frequent acquirers. 
(0.67% vs. -1.03% CAR for public targets, 4.74% vs. 0.55% CAR for private targets 
and 4.51% vs. 0.56% CAR for subsidiaries respectively) 8. When focusing on public 
targets, the evidence on infrequent acquisitions outperforming highly frequent ones is 
more obvious: the CARs change from positive to negative with increasing the merger 
frequency, see row ”Public” in Table 2-5.  
 
 
Unlike prior evidence by Ismail (2008), it is found that firms are break even when 
moderately acquiring public held targets. The finding that the high-frequency yields 
lower returns, particularly for public acquisitions is consistent with Fuller et al. (2002). 
In addition, acquisitions of private targets are found to generate superior performance, 
which is possibly attributed to the fact that the acquirer takes over a privately held 
target at a discounted price due to illiquidity nature of private targets. 
 
 
2.6.1.2. CARs by frequency for cash, stock and mixed payment deals 
 Panel B of Table 2-5 presents that when the full sample is further classified 
according to the method of payment, the results still show that the higher merger 
frequency leads to more negative effects on CARs. For instance, for using stock 
payment, it is found that the returns drop from the positive to the negative with 
                                                 
8  The mean CAR of infrequent bidder of public targets is significant at the 10% level. All other results are 
significant at the 1% level. 
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increasing frequency, see row “Pure stock” in Table 2-5. Findings in other rows in 
Table 2-5 show a similar pattern: the infrequent outperforms the highly frequent across 
different methods of payment. Furthermore, by control of frequency, it is found that 
stock offers outperform cash offers for infrequent and frequent acquirers. Also, unlike 
the previous research9, this study shows that stock offers generate highest CARs for a 
group of the infrequent bidders. 
 
 
Table 2-5. Cumulative abnormal returns sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
acquirers based on the target ownership (Panel A) and payment method (Panel B).  
 
Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Deal-Specification 
Panel A: By target ownership 
Public 0.67%* 673 
 
0.04% 2792 
 
-1.03%*** 963 
 
(1.69) 
  
(0.15) 
  
(-5.18) 
 Private 4.74%*** 1890 
 
2.65%*** 1163 
 
0.55%*** 2160 
 
(13.77) 
  
(14.43) 
  
(4.52) 
 Subsidiary 4.51%*** 1431 
 
2.64%*** 1865 
 
0.56%*** 1166 
 
(13.72) 
  
(12.67) 
  
(3.50) 
 Panel B: By payment method 
Pure cash 2.10%*** 1778 
 
1.65%*** 3148 
 
0.47%*** 2846 
 
(9.69) 
  
(12.34) 
  
(5.19) 
 Pure stock 5.84%*** 1158 
 
2.41%*** 1047 
 
-1.03%*** 533 
 
(11.48) 
  
(6.84) 
  
(-3.08) 
 Combination 5.07%*** 1058 
 
2.86%*** 1625 
 
0.07% 910 
 
(11.50) 
  
(10.83) 
  
(0.29) 
 Note: This table presents five-day (-2,+2) CARs sorted across target ownership status and payment method. 
Infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidder is defined as an acquirer undertaking one, two to four and more than 
four acquisition(s), respectively. The target public status is public, private or subsidiary of a public firm. The method 
of payment is pure cash, pure equity or mixed. The t-statistic is in bracket. N# reports the number of takeovers. 
***Denotes significance at the 1% level. **Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% 
level. 
 
                                                 
9 See for example, Travlos (1987 )and Change (1998). 
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2.6.2. Robustness tests for merger frequency by firm-characteristics 
 In this section, P/E ratio and relative size are employed as firm-specified 
controls to examine the sensitivity of the results in section 2.5.  
 
 
2.6.2.1. CARs by frequency for valuations 
 Fama and French (1992) tested the relationship between stock returns and P/E 
ratio and point out firms with low P/E ratios outperform those with high P/E ratios. 
This is possibly due to the fact that firms with higher value may develop more 
hubristic behaviours in acquisition (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Following their 
arguments, CARs with different levels of P/E ratios for each group of acquirers are 
compared and the results are reported in Table 2-6. It is found that the frequent and 
highly frequent acquirers exhibit the higher average P/E ratio and lower CARs than 
infrequent acquirers. The results consistently suggest that the infection of hubris could 
be a main driver that explains the findings that the higher the merger frequency the 
lower the CAR. 
 
 
2.6.2.1. CARs by frequency for relative acquisition size 
 Table 2-7 presents CARs sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
acquirers across the relative acquisition size which is calculated as the deal value 
divided by the acquirer's total assets. Robustly, Table 2-7 provides clear evidence in 
support of the argument that acquirers with lower merger frequency outperform ones 
with higher merger frequency. In addition, Table 2-7 provides clear evidence in 
support of Moller’s theory: CARs are larger for the higher relative size. Moeller et al. 
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(2004) addressed the question from the point of view of acquiring firms and find that 
the smaller the acquirer size relatively to deal size generates a higher return. They offer 
an explanation that the larger size of acquirer relatively to the target firm leads to e 
managerial hubris which reduces announcement returns.  
 
 
Table 2-6. Cumulative abnormal returns sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
acquirers based on P/E ratios 
Panel A 
Infrequent 
Panel B 
Frequent 
Avg. P/E CAR[-2,+2] N# Avg. P/E CAR[-2,+2] N# 
Low P/E 0-10 6.45 3.47%*** 474 
 
7.04 2.99%*** 576 
  
(7.27) 
   
(7.43) 
 
Mid P/E 10-17 13.51 2.19%*** 560 
 
13.53 2.06%*** 1040 
  
(6.28) 
   
(8.80) 
 
High P/E 17-25 20.55 2.07%*** 462 
 
20.50 1.45%*** 895 
  
(5.79) 
   
(6.30) 
 
P/E 25+  75.44 1.66%*** 1251 
 
80.31 0.86%*** 1801 
  
(7.41) 
   
(4.99) 
 
Panel C 
Highly frequent 
Panel D 
All 
Avg. P/E CAR[-2,+2] N# Avg. P/E CAR[-2,+2] N# 
Low P/E 0-10 7.34 0.99%** 254 
 
6.89 2.25%*** 1304 
  
(2.50) 
   
(10.85) 
 
Mid P/E 10-17 13.96 0.99%*** 794 
 
13.67 1.58%*** 2394 
  
(5.06) 
   
(11.98) 
 
High P/E 17-25 20.47 0.57%*** 985 
 
20.5 1.12%*** 2342 
  
(3.54) 
   
(9.02) 
 
P/E 25+  91.84 0.40%** 1564 
 
87.87 0.92%*** 4616 
  
(2.40) 
   
(8.61) 
 Note: This table presents five-day (-2,+2) CARs sorted across P/E ratios. Infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
bidder is defined as an acquirer undertaking one, two to four and more than four acquisition(s), respectively. The t-
statistic is in parentheses. N# reports the number of takeovers.***Denotes significance at the 1% level. **Denotes 
significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2-7. Cumulative abnormal returns sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent acquirers based on the relative acquisition size 
 
Overall  Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
Relative Size(R.S) Avg. of R.S CAR[-2,+2] N# 
 
Avg. of R.S CAR[-2,+2] N# 
 
Avg. of R.S CAR[-2,+2] N# 
 
Avg. of R.S CAR[-2,+2] N# 
<5% 1.83% 0.54%*** 5832 
 
2.20% 0.51%** 986 
 
1.99% 0.47%*** 2142 
 
1.57% 0.30%*** 2704 
  
(6.22) 
 
 
 
(2.19)  
  
(3.16)  
  
(2.83)  
5% to 15% 9.14% 1.98%*** 3379 
 
9.26% 2.27%*** 944 
 
9.19% 2.09%*** 1532 
 
8.94% 1.50%*** 903 
  
(12.60) 
 
 
 
(6.51)  
  
(9.03)  
  
(6.18)  
15% to 25% 19.54% 2.49%*** 1350 
 
19.66% 3.40%*** 476 
 
19.49% 2.25%*** 635 
 
19.41% 1.29%** 239 
  
(8.38) 
 
 
 
(5.48)  
  
(5.94)  
  
(2.55)  
> 25% 124.11% 7.10%*** 3542 
 
184.60% 10.00%*** 1588 
 
127.06% 5.84%*** 1511 
 
86.74% 2.01%* 443 
  
(20.63) 
 
 
 
(15.53)  
  
(14.76)  
  
(1.96)  
Note: This table presents five-day (-2,+2) CARs sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent acquirers across the relative acquisition size. Infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidder 
is defined as an acquirer undertaking one, two to four and more than four acquisition(s), respectively. The relative acquisition size is calculated as the deal value divided by the acquirer's total 
assets. The t-statistic is in bracket. N# reports the number of takeovers.***Denotes significance at the 1% level. **Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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2.6.3. Robustness test for merger frequency by economic concerns 
 Furthermore, by controlling regional and macro effects a various robustness tests 
are conducted. Alexandridis et al. (2010) suggest that acquirers come from the most 
competitive M&A markets (U.S. and E.U.), realizing higher gains. Since the greater 
degree of competition for corporate control could make acquisitions costly.  To test this 
argument in the context of different frequencies, the full sample thus split into three 
regional subsamples: Asia, Europe and U.S. (Panel B of Table 2-8), and further break 
down the sample for developing or developed countries in order to see how the hubris 
effect is dominant on merger consistently across different regions over the world. The 
results of Table 2-8 suggest that the results of section 2.5 are unchanged and robust: the 
market perceives the low frequent better than the highly frequent. This finding is also 
consistent for pre-crisis and crisis period, respectively. 
 
Table 2-8. Cumulative abnormal returns sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
acquirers based on economic concerns 
Merger frequency Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Timing-specification 
Panel A: By time period 
        
2000-2005 2.97%*** 2149 
 
1.40%*** 2604 
 
0.41%** 1255 
 
(12.87) 
  
(8.71) 
  
(2.12) 
 
2006-2010 3.02%*** 3377 
 
1.28%*** 3470 
 
0.53%*** 1248 
 
(16.34) 
  
(9.92) 
  
(3.63) 
 
Economic-specification 
Panel B: By regions 
Asia 2.11%*** 1260 
 
1.37%*** 1074 
 
-0.10% 348 
 
(8.78) 
  
(5.95) 
  
(-0.28) 
 
Europe 2.14%*** 561 
 
1.62%*** 1180 
 
1.24%*** 974 
 
(6.96) 
  
(7.80) 
  
(7.00) 
 
U.S. 2.55%*** 1573 
 
1.84%*** 2419 
 
0.78%*** 2035 
 
(10.40) 
  
(10.15) 
  
(4.98) 
 
Panel C: By economic development 
Developing economies 2.57%*** 540 
 
2.26%*** 314 
 
1.29% 39 
 
(6.81) 
  
(5.26) 
  
(1.19) 
 
Developed economies 2.58%*** 3441 
 
1.83%*** 5490 
 
0.72%*** 4237 
 
(15.34) 
  
(15.50) 
  
(6.61) 
 
Note: This table presents five-day (-2,+2) CARs sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent acquirers and by 
the relative acquisition size. Infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidder is defined as an acquirer undertaking one, 
two to four and more than four acquisition(s), respectively. The t-statistic is in parentheses. N# reports the number of 
takeovers.***Denotes significance at the 1% level. **Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 
10% level. 
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2.6.4. Robustness test for subsequent acquisitions 
 Following Conn et al. (2004) and Billett and Qian (2008), an initial successful 
acquisition is defined as a first deal exhibiting positive abnormal return. Table 2-9 
reports the CARs for initially successful deal (CARs>0) and subsequent deals according 
to frequency. The results are consistent with the findings of Table 2-4 that CARs are 
higher for the first deal than subsequent deals or high-order deals, suggesting that 
bidders could develop’ hubris after making the first successful acquisition, explains 
lower returns for subsequent acquisitions. Overall, the hubris phenomenon is consistent 
across three merger-frequency groups of firms. 
 
 
In table 2-10, the performance of subsequent deals is further tested against different 
regional samples, target ownerships, pre-crisis and the crisis period, respectively. The 
results remain consistently robust: the management develops hubris significantly for 
subsequent acquisitions after the first deal.  
 
 
Table 2-9. Cumulative abnormal returns for infrequent, frequent and highly frequent acquirers 
firms associated with the initial success  across deal order  
Deal Order 
Infrequent  Frequent  Highly Frequent 
CAR[-2,+2] N#  CAR[-2,+2] N#  CAR[-2,+2] N# 
1st 8.29%*** 2338  7.87%*** 1365  8.63%*** 333 
 
(55.55) 
 
 (43.04) 
 
 (15.54) 
 2nd-3th 
  
 1.57%*** 2124  1.15%*** 999 
   
 (8.93) 
 
 (4.85) 
 >=4th 
  
 
  
 0.54%*** 1154 
   
 
  
 (2.94) 
 Overall 8.29%*** 2338  4.03%*** 3489  1.87%*** 2486 
 
(55.55) 
 
 (29.08) 
 
 (11.86) 
 Note: This table reports five-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) associated with the initial success 
across deal order. The initial success is defined as the first acquisition generates CAR greater than zero. Infrequent, 
frequent and highly frequent bidder is defined as an acquirer undertaking one, two to four and more than four 
acquisition(s), respectively. The t-statistic is in parentheses. N# reports the number of takeovers. ***Denotes 
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2-10. Robustness checks for cumulative abnormal returns based on deal order across 
different comparative controls 
Deal order 
Overall 
 
1st 
 
2nd -3rd 
 
>=4th 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Timing-specification 
Panel A:By time period 
2000-2005 1.67%*** 4637 
 
2.43%*** 2010 
 
1.41%*** 1802 
 
0.25% 
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(15.91) 
  
(13.93) 
  
(8.81) 
  
(1.11) 
 
2006-2010 1.34%*** 5472 
 
1.63%*** 1513 
 
0.59%** 1166 
 
0.46%* 
39
1 
 
(15.09) 
  
(6.30) 
  
(2.51) 
  
(1.80) 
 
Economic-specification 
Panel B: By regions 
Asia 0.90%*** 1422 
 
1.68%*** 488 
 
1.01%*** 694 
 
-1.03%** 
24
0 
 
(4.82) 
  
(5.09) 
  
(3.87) 
  
(-2.45) 
 
Europe 1.38%*** 2154 
 
2.22%*** 580 
 
1.16%*** 906 
 
0.95%*** 
66
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(10.26) 
  
(7.18) 
  
(5.67) 
  
(4.87) 
 
U.S. 1.19%*** 4454 
 
1.99%*** 1212 
 
1.17%*** 1876 
 
0.50%*** 
13
66 
 
(10.46) 
  
7.95) 
  
(6.61) 
  
(3.01) 
 Panel C: By economic development 
Developing economies 2.12%*** 353 
 
2.04%*** 139 
 
2.02%*** 179 
 
-0.15% 35 
 
(5.36) 
  
(2.80) 
  
(4.73) 
  
(-0.18) 
 
Developed economies 1.27%*** 9727 
 
2.72%*** 2695 
 
1.13%*** 4161 
 
0.11%*** 
28
71 
 
(15.94) 
  
(14.36) 
  
(9.75) 
  
(1.00) 
 
Deal-specification 
Panel D: By target ownership 
Public -0.33%** 2126 
 
-0.12% 610 
 
-0.14% 908 
 
-0.98%*** 398 
 
(-2.03) 
  
(-0.33) 
  
(-0.15) 
  
(-3.14) 
 Private 2.01%*** 4952 
 
4.24%*** 1344 
 
1.67%*** 2099 
 
0.46%*** 1052 
 
(16.13) 
  
(13.27) 
  
(9.53) 
  
(2.63) 
 Subsidiary 2.00%*** 3031 
 
3.33%*** 888 
 
1.94%*** 1346 
 
0.48%** 539 
 
(13.52) 
  
(10.04) 
  
(9.17) 
  
(1.99) 
 Panel E: By payment method 
Pure cash 1.23%*** 5994 
 
2.33%*** 1413 
 
1.27%*** 2499 
 
0.47%*** 1452 
 
(14.29) 
  
(10.31) 
  
(9.75) 
  
(3.80) 
 Pure stock 1.59%*** 1580 
 
3.28%*** 602 
 
1.27%*** 705 
 
-1.45%** 169 
 
(5.72) 
  
(6.30) 
  
(3.31) 
  
(-2.33) 
 Combination 2.13%*** 2535 
 
4.02%*** 827 
 
1.75%*** 1149 
 
-0.26% 368 
 
(10.75) 
  
(9.45) 
  
(6.63) 
  
(-0.64) 
 Note: This table shows robustness checks for cumulative abnormal returns by different comparative controls. The t-
statistic is in parentheses. N# reports the number of takeovers. ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. **Denotes 
significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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2.7. Conclusions 
 
 By using a sample of 14,103 acquisitions collected from different countries over 
11 years from 2000 to 2010, this study examines the effect of merger frequency on the 
expectation of investors to the integration of new business for their performance in the 
future. A univariate analysis is taken to explore the effects of merger frequency on 
cumulative abnormal returns for three groups of acquirers, respectively, the infrequent, 
the frequent and the highly frequent. 
 
 
 The comparative results of CARs show that the low frequent acquirers 
outperform the highly frequent ones, in which this finding is consistent and robust 
across different time length, different regions, different time periods, different 
ownerships of target firms, different size of deals and different payment methods made 
by acquirers. 
 
 
 The significant findings above provide clear evidence on which the acquiring 
managements or firms have developed the hubris from their previously successful 
experiences on mergers and acquisitions. The development of hubris with more mergers 
drives down the expectation of investors for better performing in the future of the new 
integration and so lowering the value of the firm. Although the managements of 
acquiring firms are expected to have worse performance after their first deal or second 
deals of mergers due to growing hubris in M&A, this does not mean that the 
management learning effect shall be rejected. The study does show evidence on the 
learning effect that drives up the market expectation for the future improvement of new 
integration if the time interval between the two mergers pursued by the firm is longer. 
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 The short break between the two mergers cannot provide the new integration 
with sufficient time to digest new opportunities and challenges raised from the 
acquisition before a new one starts. The results are consistent and robust across different 
frequencies of mergers: the firm with a longer break for next merger after its last one 
drives up market expectation for the future performance and so the higher value of the 
firm. For a given frequency, the management learning plays a role in performance 
improvement. In other words, the effect of management hubris or agency issue brought 
by more mergers can be mitigated or offset by more learning allowed by the longer 
break between the mergers. In sum, an increase in acquisitions develops more negative 
impact of hubris or agency issue, but the adverse effects of them on performance can be 
offset or weakened by increasing time interval between mergers.  
 
 
Finally, this study also identifies that the hubris effect on performance can be offset 
or weakened by increasing the size of acquisition. The large size exposes the acquiring 
firm to a high risk for devastating business of the acquisition fails. This risk pressure 
leads the firm to be more careful in handling the large deals. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Robustness checks on 3-day cumulative abnormal returns sorted by infrequent, frequent 
and highly frequent acquirers across different comparative controls 
 
Infrequent  Frequent  Highly frequent 
 
CAR[+1,-1] N#  CAR[+1,-1] N#  CAR[+1,-1] N# 
Panel A: By temporal interval         
within sample span 3.59%*** 3994 
 
1.73%*** 5820 
 
0.57%*** 4289 
 
(19.38) 
  
(17.07) 
  
(6.49) 
 within four years 2.34%*** 6831 
 
0.87%*** 5685 
 
0.26%** 1587 
 
(22.17) 
  
(10.12) 
  
(2.25) 
 within one year 1.85%*** 10009 0.73%*** 3818 
 
0.28% 276 
 
(22.98) 
  
(7.50) 
  
(0.67) 
 Timing-specification 
Panel A: By time period 
2000-2005 2.56%*** 2149 
 
1.49%*** 2604 
 
0.61%*** 1255 
 
(16.06) 
  
(11.12) 
  
(3.51) 
 2006-2010 1.53%*** 754 
 
0.83%*** 1621 
 
0.55%*** 919 
 
(6.66) 
  
(6.32) 
  
(4.09) 
 Economic-specification 
Panel B: By regions 
Asia 2.20%*** 1260 
 
1.44%*** 1074 
 
0.28% 348 
 
(9.83) 
  
(6.54) 
  
(0.96) 
 Europe 2.58%*** 561 
 
1.69%*** 1180 
 
1.01%*** 974 
 
(8.05) 
  
(8.54) 
  
(6.73) 
 U.S. 2.83%*** 1573 
 
1.96%*** 2419 
 
0.54%*** 2035 
 
(11.27) 
  
(11.41) 
  
(3.96) 
 Panel C: By economic development 
Developing economies 2.29%*** 540 
 
1.96%*** 314 
 
0.85% 39 
 
(6.95) 
  
(5.40) 
  
(1.14) 
 Developed economies 3.08%*** 3441 
 
1.95%*** 5490 
 
0.60%*** 4237 
 
(17.50)  (16.98)  (6.47) 
 Deal-specification 
Panel D: By target ownership 
Public 0.65%* 673 
 
0.02% 1163 
 
-1.02%*** 963 
 
(1.88) 
  
(0.10) 
  
(-5.79) 
 Private 4.42%*** 1890 
 
2.18%*** 2792 
 
0.62%*** 2160 
 
(14.82) 
  
(14.51) 
  
(5.95) 
 Subsidiary 3.88%*** 1431 
 
2.13%*** 1865 
 
0.68%*** 1166 
 
(13.51) 
  
(12.23) 
  
(4.92) 
 Panel E: By payment method 
Pure cash 1.83%*** 1778 
 
1.38%*** 3148 
 
0.48%*** 2846 
 
(9.65) 
  
(12.31) 
  
(6.11) 
 Pure stock 5.12%*** 1158 
 
1.93%*** 1047 
 
-0.82%*** 533 
 
(11.81) 
  
(6.47) 
  
(-2.82) 
 Combination 4.88%*** 1058 
 
2.29%*** 1625 
 
0.24% 910 
 
(12.42) 
  
(10.48)  (1.20) 
 Note: This table reports three-day (-1,+1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for infrequent, frequent and highly 
frequent acquirers across different comparative controls. The t-statistic is in parentheses. N# reports the number of 
takeovers. ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. **Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at 
the 10% level. 
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Table A2. Robustness checks on 3-day cumulative abnormal returns sorted by infrequent, frequent 
and highly frequent acquirers across deal order 
Deal order Overall  1st  2nd-3rd  >4th 
 
CAR[+1,-1] N#  CAR[+1,-1] N#  CAR[+1,-1] N#  CAR[+1,-1] N# 
Full sample 1.40%*** 10109 
 
1.78%*** 2842  0.94%*** 4353 
 
0.24%** 2914 
 
(18.67) 
  
(13.55) 
  
(9.60) 
  
(2.48) 
 By avg. temporal intervals between deals 
< one year 0.87%*** 6545 
 
1.68%*** 1684 
 
0.97%*** 2565 
 
0.18%* 2296 
 
(11.61) 
  
(10.24) 
  
(7.56) 
  
(1.77) 
 one to two years 2.08%* 2726 
 
2.90%*** 813 
 
1.75%*** 1325 
 
0.53%** 588 
 
(1.78) 
  
(8.77) 
  
(5.03) 
  
(2.16) 
 > two years 2.18%*** 742 
 
2.92%*** 297 
 
1.78%*** 415 
 
0.35% 30 
 
(6.83) 
  
(5.05) 
  
(4.64) 
  
(0.34) 
 Timing-specification 
By time period 
2000-2005 1.30%*** 4637 
 
1.98%*** 2010 
 
1.06%*** 1802 
 
0.10% 531 
 
(14.88) 
  
(13.59) 
  
(7.82) 
  
(0.55) 
 2006-2010 1.13%*** 5472 
 
1.57%*** 1513 
 
0.62%*** 1166 
 
0.34%* 391 
 
(15.06) 
  
(6.70) 
  
(3.06) 
  
(1.71) 
 By regions 
           Asia 0.82 %*** 1422 
 
1.27%*** 488 
 
1.00%*** 694 
 
-0.61%* 240 
 
(5.42) 
  
(4.70) 
  
(4.61) 
  
(-1.96) 
 Europe 1.18%*** 2154 
 
1.81%*** 580 
 
1.10%*** 906 
 
0.74%*** 668 
 
(10.51) 
  
(7.20) 
  
(6.23) 
  
(4.65) 
 U.S. 0.91%*** 4454 
 
1.71%*** 1212 
 
0.85%*** 1876 
 
0.30%** 1366 
 
(9.66) 
  
(8.26) 
  
(5.66) 
  
(2.18) 
 By economic development 
Developing economies 1.81%*** 353 
 
1.51%*** 139 
 
1.82%*** 179 
 
-0.52% 35 
 
(5.52) 
  
(2.59) 
  
(5.53) 
  
(-0.86) 
 Developed economies 1.30%*** 9727 
 
2.73%*** 2695 
 
1.10%*** 4161 
 
0.24%** 2871 
 
(17.32) 
  
(15.23) 
  
(9.87) 
  
(2.53) 
 Deal-specification 
By target ownership 
Public -0.40%** 2126 
 
0.16% 610 
 
-0.32% 908 
 
-1.03%*** 398 
 
(-2.70) 
  
(0.52) 
  
(-1.38) 
  
(-4.10) 
 Private 1.66%*** 4952 
 
3.49%*** 1344 
 
1.35%*** 2099 
 
0.45%*** 1052 
 
(16.18) 
  
(13.73) 
  
(8.83) 
  
(3.32) 
 Subsidiary 1.65%*** 3031 
 
2.61%*** 888 
 
1.66%*** 1346 
 
0.35%* 539 
 
(8.97) 
  
(9.68) 
  
(8.97) 
  
(1.81) 
 By payment method 
Pure cash 1.02%*** 5994 
 
1.94%*** 1413 
 
1.05%*** 2499 
 
0.36%*** 1452 
 
(14.11) 
  
(10.50) 
  
(9.40) 
  
(3.56) 
 Pure stock 1.23%*** 1580 
 
2.96%*** 602 
 
0.67%* 705 
 
-0.93%* 169 
 
(5.19) 
  
(6.91) 
  
(1.94) 
  
(-1.89) 
 Combination 1.72%*** 2535 
 
3.14%*** 827 
 
1.45%*** 1149 
 
-0.29% 368 
 
(10.39) 
  
(9.16) 
  
(6.16) 
  
(-0.93) 
 Note: This table reports three-day (-1,+1) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) sorted by deal order across different 
comparative controls. The t-statistic is in parentheses. N# reports the number of takeovers. ***Denotes significance at 
the 1% level. **Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Cumulative abnormal returns sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
acquirers based time intervals across different regions and economies 
Panel A:By regions 
 
Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Asia 
        
within sample span 2.11%*** 1260 
 
1.37%*** 1074 
 
-0.10% 348 
 
(8.78) 
  
(5.95) 
  
(-0.28) 
 
within three years 2.07%*** 1417 
 
1.07%*** 1098 
 
-0.85%* 167 
 
(9.10) 
  
(5.03) 
  
(-1.68) 
 
within one year 1.87%*** 2001 
 
0.59%** 657 
 
-2.84%* 24 
 
(10.26) 
  
(2.12) 
  
(-1.79) 
 
 Infrequent  Frequent  Highly frequent 
 CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Europe 
        
within sample span 2.14%*** 561 
 
1.62%*** 1180 
 
1.24%*** 974 
 
(6.96) 
  
(7.80) 
  
(7.00) 
 
within three years 1.97%*** 651 
 
1.66%*** 1360 
 
1.11%*** 704 
 
(6.80) 
  
(8.95) 
  
(5.45) 
 
within one year 1.78%*** 1331 
 
1.47%*** 1252 
 
0.79%** 132 
 
(8.87) 
  
(8.65) 
  
(2.01) 
 
 Infrequent  Frequent  Highly frequent 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
U.S. 
        
within sample span 2.55%*** 1573 
 
1.84%*** 2419 
 
0.78%*** 2035 
 
(10.40) 
  
(10.15) 
  
(4.98) 
 
within three years 2.49%*** 1872 
 
1.52%*** 2771 
 
0.85%*** 1384 
 
(11.19) 
  
(9.38) 
  
(4.48) 
 
within one year 2.17%*** 3288 
 
1.09%*** 2491 
 
0.86%* 248 
 
(13.49) 
  
(6.97) 
  
(1.84) 
 
 
Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Panel B:By economies 
 Infrequent  Frequent  Highly frequent 
 CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Developing economies 
        
within sample span 2.57%*** 540 
 
2.26%*** 314 
 
1.29% 39 
 
(6.81) 
  
(5.26) 
  
(1.19) 
 
within three years 2.67%*** 586 
 
1.97%*** 288 
 
0.98% 19 
 
(7.18) 
  
(4.99) 
  
(0.54) 
 
within one year 2.50%*** 780 
 
1.73%*** 113 
 
- - 
 
(8.21) 
  
(2.78) 
  
- 
 
 
Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
 CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N#  CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Developed economies 
        
within sample span 2.58%*** 3441 
 
1.83%*** 5490 
 
0.72%*** 4237 
 
(15.34) 
  
(15.50) 
  
(6.61) 
 
within three years 2.56%*** 4071 
 
1.48%*** 6209 
 
0.81%*** 2888 
 
(16.77) 
  
(13.75) 
  
(6.38) 
 
within one year 2.18%*** 7288 
 
1.09%*** 5373 
 
0.40% 507 
 
(20.14) 
  
(10.35) 
  
(1.26) 
 
Note: This table reports five-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for infrequent, frequent and highly 
frequent acquirers by time intervals across different regions and economies. The t-statistic is in parentheses. N# 
reports the number of takeovers. ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. **Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
*Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table B2. Cumulative abnormal returns sorted by infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
acquirers across different time intervals 
 
Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
Temporal interval CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
within eight years 2.72%*** 4066 
 
1.92%*** 6014 
 
1.32%*** 4023 
 
(19.00) 
  
(18.33) 
  
(2.64) 
 within five years 2.52%*** 4385 
 
1.58%*** 6342 
 
0.81%*** 3376 
 
(17.49) 
  
(15.12) 
  
(6.96) 
 within two years 2.41%*** 5806 
 
1.28%*** 6712 
 
0.41%*** 1585 
 
(19.73) 
  
(13.19) 
  
(4.45) 
 Note: This table reports five-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for infrequent, frequent and highly 
frequent acquirers by time intervals.  The t-statistic is in parentheses. N# reports the number of takeovers. ***Denotes 
significance at the 1% level. **Denotes significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Comparative sample statistics for different definitions of acquirer type sorted by 
payment method, target ownership status and interaction controls 
Merger frequency Infrequent 
 
Frequent 
 
Highly frequent 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
 
CAR[+2,-2] N# 
Panel A: Overall 
 
3.84%*** 6656  1.62%
*** 4228  0.27%
*** 3219 
 
(23.89) 
  
(13.04) 
  
(2.61) 
 
Panel B: By target ownership 
Public 0.78%
*** 1177 
 
-0.41 919 
 
-0.72%*** 703 
 
(2.72) 
  
(-1.60) 
  
(-3.22) 
 Private 4.73%
*** 3133 
 
2.22%*** 2047 
 
0.51%*** 1662 
 
(17.99) 
  
(12.32) 
  
(3.43) 
 Subsidiary 4.17%
*** 2346 
 
2.13%*** 1262 
 
0.64%*** 854 
 
(16.89) 
  
(9.49) 
  
(3.28) 
 
Panel C: By payment method 
Pure cash 2.09%
*** 3147 
 
1.46%*** 2440 
 
0.47*** 2185 
 
(13.02) 
  
(10.85) 
  
(4.45) 
 Pure stock 5.80%
*** 1698 
 
1.54%*** 671 
 
-0.99%** 369 
 
(13.93) 
  
(3.94) 
  
(-2.27) 
 Combination 5.04%
*** 1811 
 
2.02%*** 1117 
 
0.32% 665 
 
(14.98) 
  
(7.15) 
  
(1.16) 
 Note: This table reports five-day (-2,+2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for infrequent, frequent and highly 
frequent acquirers by target type and payment method. Infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidder is defined as 
an acquirer undertaking one to two, three to five and more than five acquisitions during 2000-2010, respectively. The 
t-statistic is in parentheses. N# reports the number of takeovers.***Denotes significance at the 1% level. **Denotes 
significance at the 5% level. *Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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3.  How does frequent acquisition affect the market 
expectation of performance changes after acquisition? The 
role of merger quantity and time interval 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 Previous research on merger and acquisition adopted a univariate approach 
which was widely applied in studies of merger frequency10. The second chapter, about 
univariate analysis, explored how not only Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
decrease with more mergers, but also provided a little clue that how they increase with 
temporal intervals. In this chapter a multivariate analysis is employed to test the joint 
effects of merger frequency from the perspective of inferential statistics. As compared 
to univariate approach, the multivariate one enables a more effective exploration about 
the marginal effect of merger frequency on announcement returns when other effects are 
controlled or isolated in the estimation. Thus, the results of multivariate estimation can 
inform us about how merger frequency affects CARs particularly at the presence of 
other on stock value. 
 
 
 Based on a large global sample of 14,000 takeovers, this chapter shows that 
announcement returns are lower when an acquiring firm takes a more aggressive merger 
strategy. However, this negative impact may not always exist when the time interval is 
long. This suggests that among the managerial behaviours that develop in the course of 
repetitive merger activities, management hubris and, over time, management learning 
                                                 
10 Merger frequency is measured as the quantity of acquisition for a given period. 
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may co-exist. More specifically, if an acquiring firm develops “hubris” from frequent 
acquisitions, then a negative relation between frequency and CARs may be expected. If 
the time intervals between those acquisitions are longer, then there will be a greater 
opportunity for acquiring firms to learn experience from their takeovers. The positive 
impact of learning may reduce the negative effect of hubris and thus weakens the 
negative impact of merger frequency on announcement returns. Consistent with chapter 
2, this study also found that for a given merger frequency the size of acquisition or 
merger is positively related to announcement returns. It can be explained by the effect 
of “risk pressure” on the managerial behaviour of acquiring firms. 
 
 
 This chapter makes three significant contributions to the existing literature on 
corporate merger strategy. Firstly, the study develops a new method of defining the 
merger frequency that interacts the number of mergers with the time that a merger effect 
may last after the event occurrence. Secondly, this study adds to the literature on how 
acquisitions affect the acquiring firm’s stock performance in both the temporal and 
quantitative perspectives. Thirdly, it builds upon studies about the different implications 
to relationship between aggressiveness of merger strategy and market expectation. 
Fourthly, a new argument is posited that a larger deal size produces a more positive 
impact on performance improvement for the acquiring firms due to the risk pressure on 
management.  
 
 
 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the testable 
arguments and surveys existing evidence. Section 3.3 gives a brief review of merger 
activities and stock returns in the past. Section 3.4 describes data and sample. Section 
3.5 presents the estimation model and variables.  In section 3.6, the possible 
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determinates of merger announcement returns are discussed. Finally, section 3.7 
explains the conclusions of the discussion.  
 
 
3.2. Literature review  
 
3.2.1. Theory 
 Consider an acquiring firm which starts performing acquisitions without any 
bias, but develops managerial hubris from its previous acquisition experience. When the 
firm undertakes the first acquisition it will not overpay because the value of the first 
acquisition and the expectation of the value created are not biased by hubris. Once 
managerial hubris is developed, the expectation of the firm about the benefit from 
subsequent takeovers become over optimistic and biased from the real outcomes. In this 
case, the subsequent acquisitions will destroy value for the acquirer. However, if the 
acquiring firm learns from past merger experience about its true ability, the impact of 
hubris may level off and eventually decline with additional experience.  
 
 
 The above arguments lead to the following testable hypotheses on impacts of 
frequent acquisition on announcement returns. Two theories are developed from 
opposite ends of a spectrum. At one end is managerial hubris hypothesis of acquisitions 
driven by managerial optimistic behaviour in corporate decisions. At the other end is 
organizational learning hypthesis that drives better outcomes for current acquisition 
than the prior ones, since firms accumulate experience on acquisition which can 
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enhance management's acquisition expertise (Kusewitt, 1985; Fowler and Schmidt, 
1989; Bruton et al. 1994; Barkema et al. 1996; Ashkenas et al., 1998; Hitt et al., 1998). 
 
 
 If an acquirer’s acquisitive decisions develop hubris, it is expected that the 
management of the acquiring firm will be as equally likely to make frequent 
acquisitions that exceed their acquisitive capability, and thus destroy shareholder’s 
value. It is also expected that the value-destruction would be more serious as acquirers 
are more aggressive in acquisition during a relatively shorter time period. This theory 
addresses the negative effects of over-confident issue with acquirers, yet there is also a 
mechanism for improving shareholders wealth based on the theory of organizational 
learning which is widely discussed by scholars, especially since Argyris and Schon 
(1978). Organizational learning theory emphasizes the role of prior acquisition 
experience in determining the positive outcomes of serial acquisitions. However, 
Hayward (2002) argues that learning does not necessarily benefit acquirers if there is a 
very short temporal interval between two acquisitions since acquirers may be unable to 
learn so meaningfully in such a short time period. From this point of view, an acquirer is 
more likely to generate better inferences suited for subsequent acquisitions from prior 
experience as such experience can take root more successfully in a relatively longer 
time period. 
 
 
To sum up, from the point of view of shareholder valuation, it is expected that it 
may not be suitable for firms making a large quantity of acquisitions in the short term 
since frequent acquisition is harmful to shareholder wealth. Yet, acquirers may be 
feasible in mergers in the long-run as a long time period may result in improvements in 
the effect of learning and thus offset initial hubris. 
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Table 3-1. Summary of early empirical research on merger frequency by using multivariate 
approach 
STUDY SAMPLE KEY FINDING(S) 
KUSEWITT (1985) 
Acquisitions by 138 U.S. firms 
from 1967 to 1976 
Negative relationship 
FOWLER & SCHMIDT 
(1989) 
Acquisitions by 42 manufacturing 
firms from 1975 to 1979 
Positive relationship 
HALEBLIAN & 
FINKELSTEIN(1999) 
449 acquisitions from 1980 to 
1992 
U-shaped relationship between acquisition 
experience and performance 
FINKELSTEIN & 
HALEBLIAN (2002) 
192 acquisitions by 96 acquirers 
from 1970 to 1990 
Second acquisition underperforms the first, 
especially when from a different industry 
HAYWARD (2002) 
214 acquisitions by 120 firms in 
six industries from 1990 to 1995 
Inverted U-relationship between the similarity 
of prior acquisitions and the performance of the 
focal acquisition 
LAAMANEN & KEIL 
(2008) 
A sample of 5,518 U.S. 
acquisitions during the period 
between 1990 and 1999 
They also find that the acquisition rate is 
negatively related to acquirer performance 
BILLETT & QIAN (2008) 
3,795 US acquisitions of 2,213 
acquiring firms during the period 
between 1980 and 2002 
The negative effect of CEO’s merger frequency 
persists in a multivariate context after 
controlling the deal and firm specific 
characteristics 
CONN ET AL. (2004) 
A sample of 4,344 UK 
acquisitions during the period 
from 1984 to 1998. 
Negative relationship 
 
 
3.2.2. Empirical evidence 
 Table 3-1 presents relatively recent research which took a multivariate approach 
for the impact of frequent acquisition. Kusewitt (1985) firstly raised the issue of merger 
frequency related to performance on the basis of investigating a sample of 3,500 
acquisitions by 138 acquirers during the period 1967-1976. Kusewitt (1985) and a 
subsequent study by Conn et al., (2004) show that the merger frequency is negatively 
related to the performance of acquiring firms, which is consistent with the results in the 
previous chapter. 
 
 
 To test this argument, Conn et al. (2004) further examined the difference in 
merger performance among three frequencies: one acquisition, two to three acquisitions, 
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and more than three acquisitions, by using a sample of 4,344 UK acquisitions during the 
period from 1984 to 1998. In the multivariate analysis, Conn et al. (2004) defined a 
dummy variable to present multiple acquirers and found that both the dummy and the 
number of acquisitions are significantly negative in relation to the announcement 
returns after announcement. The finding made by Conn et al. (2004) supports the 
managerial hubris argument rather the managerial learning argument.  
 
 
 Consistent with Kusewitt and Conn’s, Billett and Qian (2008) found similar 
results from individual CEOs’ standpoint by using a sample of 3,795 US acquisitions of 
2,213 acquiring firms during the period 1980 to 2002. Their study defines CEOs as 
infrequent acquirers if they make only one acquisition, and frequent acquirers if they 
make at least two acquisitions of public targets within a five-year period. They argue 
that the negative effect of the CEO’s merger frequency persists in a multivariate context 
after controlling the deal and firm specific characteristics. They argue that CEOs 
become overconfident through prior acquisitions. As a result the CEOs destroy the 
shareholder value, which indicates that CEOs develop more hubris when a firm plans 
high-order deals. 
 
 
 Hayward (2002) 11  introduced another argument on frequency-performance 
issues but from the perspective of temporal interval. He introduced two interval 
measures to explore the effect of temporal interval between deals on investors’ returns. 
Firstly, the average temporal interval between deals and secondly, the temporal interval 
between focal acquisition and prior acquisition. There are two major findings. Firstly, 
                                                 
11 Hayward (2002) focused his research on firms’ learning from the acquisition experience by using a sample of 214 
US acquisitions during the period between 1990 and 1995. The study measures the acquisition experience as the sum 
of recent acquisitions that conduct by acquiring firms, which is similar to Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999). 
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Hayward’s results suggest that acquiring firms with a higher merger frequency perform 
worse for stock returns than those with a lower merger frequency. Secondly, the author 
finds that moderately temporal intervals between acquisitions could benefit the 
performance of acquiring firms. This may be because a very short interval between 
acquisitions may not allow enough time for the acquirers to digest prior experiences; 
and a very long interval means that the prior experiences may become unavailable, 
inaccessible, irrelevant or forgotten (Argote et al., 1990; Huber, 1991; Chang, 1998; 
Ginsberg and Baum, 1998).  
 
 
 Laamanen and Keil (2008) use an acquisition rate12 in order to capture the effect 
of the temporal interval between acquisitions. On the basis of a sample of 5,518 U.S. 
acquisitions during the period between 1990 and 1999, they find that the time of two 
acquisitions is affected by the acquisition rate. They find that the acquisition rate is 
negatively related to acquirer performance. In their study the acquisition experience, 
measured as the number of acquisitions over the sample time, is significantly and 
negatively associated with performance. In contrast, they also find that the interaction of 
merger experiences and an acquisition rate is positively associated with performance, 
which alleviates the negative effects of the frequency on performance. 
 
 
 There also are some counter arguments about the negative relationship between 
merger frequency and investment returns. For example, Fowler and Schmidt (1989) 
extended Kusewitt’s (1985) findings by exploring another set of variables, including a 
more valid measure of acquisition frequency which measures the number of other major 
acquisitions made by an acquiring firm in the 4-year period preceding the year of the 
                                                 
12 Acquisition rate is calculated as the average number of acquisitions over three years 
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tender offer, and they found a significant positive relationship between acquisition 
experience and market-based acquisition performance. 
 
 
 Most existing research predicts positive outcomes to experience (e.g. Lubatkin, 
1983; Hitt et al., 1993). That is, the more the merger experience the better the 
performance for acquiring firms. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) argue that the 
Managerial Learning Theory has a wider variety of conditions than the Learning-curve 
Theory. The authors focus their research on the influence of organizational acquisition 
experience13 on returns to investors in the time span of the merger announcement and 
limit their study to the quantity of acquisitions. Their evidence shows a U-shaped 
relationship between the acquisition experience and cumulative abnormal returns. A 
negative relationship when a firm's current acquisition is dissimilar to its prior 
acquisitions and the relationship can become positive if the focal acquisition is similar 
to prior ones. In addition, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) find that the acquiring firms 
with multiple acquisitions in the same industry outperform others. Their findings 
suggest that acquisition experiences are important for the performance of the new 
integration. 
 
 
 In sum, current studies on merger frequency and announcement returns leave 
unresolved issues. Research presented by Kusewitt (1985), Fowler and Schmidt (1989), 
Conn et al. (2004), Laamanen and Keil (2008), Billett and Qian (2008) and Hayward 
(2002) has three major limitations. Firstly, some samples are geographically biased. 
Secondly, they do not take into account the effect of a time interval in estimation 
(except Hayward (2002)). Thirdly, notably in the case of Conn et al. they employ an 
                                                 
13 The acquisition experience is defined as the total number of acquisitions that sample acquiring firms made from 
1948 up to the acquisition of interest. 
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inappropriate model for estimation. These limitations call for further research on the 
effect of the frequent acquisition.  
 
 
 This chapter aims to extend the existing studies of the frequent acquisition by 
using a more internationally representative sample with control of firm specific fixed 
effects, but also by defining merger frequency in terms of how merger effect can last, in 
the short-term, medium-term or long-term. Splitting frequency into these three terms 
enables interaction between time interval and frequency as a joint effect for estimations 
of how frequency affects stock performance in two dimensions: number and time.  
 
 
3.3. A brief review of merger activities and announcement returns 
for infrequent and frequent acquirers in the past 
 
 To elaborate the trend of mergers made by acquiring firms with different merger 
frequencies, the number of acquisitions for 6,836 acquirers14 from 117 countries from 
2000 to 2010 are plotted. Figure 3-1a demonstrates the number of takeovers undertaken 
by infrequent frequent and highly frequent acquirers during the period 2000-2010. It is 
found that all groups show a similar pattern of growth of acquisitions. The volume of 
acquisitions has a downward trend after the stock market crash of 2000 till 2001 
reaching the first lowest point, gradually increased with the recovery of the stock market 
to a peak in 2007, declines again from 2007 to 2009 (reach the second lowest point) 
following the financial crisis and then grows up with global economic recovery. It is 
                                                 
14 See Section 4.3 for the sample selecting procedure. 
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found that infrequent acquirers have increased in both pre-crisis (2001-2007) period and 
post-crisis period (2007-2009). 
 
 
 Figure 3-1b presents the number of infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
deals as percentage of total deals at a year. It shows clearly that there is a converging 
trend of merger deals for infrequent and highly frequent acquirers: the infrequent 
acquirers rose to almost 40% in 2010 when compared with the declining trend of the 
highly frequent deals dropping from 42% in 2000 to 25% in 2010.  
 
 
Given a decline trend of the highly frequent deals, the cumulative abnormal returns 
for the highly frequent acquirers were lower when compared with the infrequent and 
frequent ones over the decade from 2000 to 2010, see Figure 3-2a. In Figure 3-2b, it 
also shows a clear pattern of decreasing investment returns with increasing the number 
of acquisitions over the sample period. This pattern is consistent with the findings the 
last chapter found.  
 
 
 As shown in Figure 3-2b, the cumulative abnormal returns on average decreased 
with the number of deals completed by an acquiring firm over the sample period. This 
pattern is consistent with the results found in Chapter 2. This comparative evidence 
provides a motivation to investigate the merger frequency nexus with bidder’s stock 
performance through a multivariate analysis. 
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Figure 3-1. Comparison of the number of acquisitions: infrequent, frequent and highly frequent 
acquirers 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Note: This figure shows graphical illustration of the number of acquisitions for infrequent and frequent bidders from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. Figure (a) and (c) reports the comparison of the number of deals made by 
infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidders: the absolute value and as % of year-total acquisitions, respectively. 
Infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidder is defined as an acquirer undertaking one, two to four and more than 
four acquisition(s), respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from SDC, Datastream and Thomson Financial. 
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Figure 3-2. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) across acquirers and number of mergers 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Note: This figure plots distribution of abnormal returns to the shareholders of acquiring firms based on the full 
sample of 14,103 takeovers from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. Figure (a) reports the comparison of 
cumulative abnormal returns between infrequent frequent and highly frequent acquirers. Figure (b) presents 
distribution of CARs against the number of acquisitions. Infrequent, frequent and highly frequent bidder is defined as 
an acquirer undertaking one, two to four and more than four acquisition(s), respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from SDC, Datastream and Thomson Financial. Sample period 2000-2010. 
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3.4. Model specification and variables 
 
3.4.1. Specification of model  
 Modeling the relation between merger frequency and investment returns helps 
understand a question “Are the busiest the best?”. Most of the existing studies15 on the 
question are based on pooled OLS estimation. However, the pooled regression model 
has a disadvantage in that it omits the unobserved heterogeneity across individual firms 
and assumes that the coefficients are the same for all individuals. Consider the pooled 
OLS estimator: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                                            ⑴ 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the random error term.  
 
 
 The above pooled OLS estimator will be problematic if the true mode is the 
fixed effects model. To explore that, rewrite the model as  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + (𝑐𝑖 − 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)                                        ⑵ 
where 𝑐𝑖 represents the unobserved heterogeneity or firm specific effects. In the pooled 
OLS regression, all unique impacts are subsumed in the error term. Yet, there is a fact 
that each individual has time invariant but unique unobserved effects on the dependent 
variable. If it is the case, the pooled OLS regression will lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates since the explanatory variables are no longer uncorrelated with the error terms 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Econometrically, unobservable heterogeneity exists in Eq. (2) if 
                                                 
15 See for example, Fuller et al.(2002), Moller et al. (2004) and Billet and Qian (2008). 
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𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐) ≠ 016. Then the pooled OLS regression of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 on 𝑥𝑖𝑡 can produce a biased 
estimation of 𝛽.  
 
 
 In studies of M&A, the integration of new business changes the firm specific 
effects, such as corporate management style, culture and brand image et cetera. For 
instance, Tischer and Hildebrandt (2013) suggest that changes in corporate image after 
acquisition significantly and positively affect shareholder value. The pooled OLS 
estimation of announcement returns on merger frequency without controlling firm 
specific effects can be biased due to correlation between the firm specific effects and 
frequency. 
 
 
 As a result, to control firm specific effects, the Least Square Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) estimator is applied to estimate the relation of investment returns with merger 
frequency, in which the estimation model is specified as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑀𝑗,𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐹𝑘,𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑘=1
+ 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           ⑶ 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is investment returns value measured by CARs over a 5 days window of the 
merger announcement. Here, freq captures the impact of merger frequencies on 
investor’s value of stocks. 𝑇𝑡 as a time dummy controls macroeconomic shocks. Then 𝑐𝑖 
captures firm specific effects. 𝑀𝑗 captures deal characteristics’ effects and 𝐹𝑘 captures 
the time variant effects of the acquiring firms. Lastly,  𝜀𝑖𝑡  denotes the error term in 
estimation.  
                                                 
16 The correlation implies that the combined error term(𝑐𝑖 − 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) is correlated with the 𝑥𝑖𝑡. 
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3.5. Specification of variables 
 Further detailed specifications of variables for model (3) are discussed below.  
 
 
3.5.1. Announcement returns 
 Andrade et al. (2001) suggest that the most reliable evidence on impact of 
merger and acquisition on shareholder wealth creation for acquiring firm draw on short-
term event studies. The main purpose of the event study is to test the existence of 
information effect and to detect the factors that can explain changes in shareholder 
value around the event date (Prabhala, 1997). Following existing literature, this chapter 
thus estimates cumulative abnormal returns17 (CARs) as the measure of the acquiring 
shareholder valuation on the basis of the event study methodology18.  
 
 
 The last chapter has detailed discussion on specifying this variable. There are 
two elements in evaluating CARs empirically. One is about how to calculate abnormal 
returns after announcement of a merger event and another is about how to specify a 
period of the impact of the merger announcement or “window”. According to Dolley 
(1933), Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969), a change in a stock price after 
the announcement of an event is called “return” and the expected returns generated from 
                                                 
17 King (2002) provides evidence that CAR is commonly used as a measure of stock performance in M&A research. 
Since the CAR reflects well on the information regarding the change of stock price for acquiring firm around the 
acquisition announcement to a benchmark index. 
18 Healy et al.(1992), Kapland and Weisbach (1992) and Harrison and Godfrey(1997) show significant evidence of 
predictive validity, which increases the confidence in using abnormal returns to measure acquisition performance.  
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a market portfolio with an adjustment for a risk in investing in the stock are “abnormal 
returns”.  
 
 
 Later, Brown & Warner (1985) and Fama &French (1992) have simplified the 
calculation of the abnormal returns as the difference between the returns of a stock and 
the returns of the market portfolio or the market average at a same day. This chapter 
follows the mainstream studies and takes the simplified method to evaluate impact of a 
merger announcement. The CAR cumulates the abnormal returns over a “window” 
period or days, which is specified as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1−𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑇1 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡)
𝑡=𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1                              (4) 
 
where T1 is the start date of the event window, T2 is the end date of the event window. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 represents the observed returns on stock 𝑖 for day 𝑡. 𝑅𝑚𝑡 represents returns on the 
market portfolio for day 𝑡. 
 
 
 Choosing a window of an event for equation (4), always raises an issue about 
how to balance between the short window which is usually 3 days and the longer 
window, such as 5 days or 7 days or even longer. The short window may not be able to 
capture complete information on market response to a merger announcement. However, 
the longer window may cause a confounding effect on the evaluation of an event, which 
can reduce predictive power of the stock price change (Mackinlay, 1997).  As a result, 
to balance the two counter effects, this study defines 5-day as the event window (-2, +2) 
for empirical estimation of CARs in (4), which is consistent with existing studies (Cox 
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and Portes, 1998; Fuller, Netter and Stegemolloer, 2002; Faccio et al., 2006; Boubakri, 
Chan and Kooli, 2012; Gaur, Malhotra and Zhu, 2013). By considering the probability 
of capturing confounding events in CAR calculations, the study also applies the 3-day 
window for robustness checks of the estimations (See Appendix A). 
 
 
3.5.2. Merger frequency  
 Kusewitt (1985) is the very first study to measures merger frequency as the 
number of acquisitions that the sample firms made in a given year. Following Kusewitt, 
a number of subsequent studies define merger frequency in this way, despite the fact 
that Kusewitt might not intend to interpret the variable as the measure of the merger 
frequency. In recent research19, most of studies attempt to capture the impact of merger 
frequency by counting the number of takeovers the sample acquirers made over a 
specific time period.  
 
 However, how long shall a specific time period be defined to count a number of 
mergers, one year, three years or five years? It can be argued that investors or stock 
markets respond to a new merger announcement by taking into account the short history 
of merger made by the acquirer. This is because very old mergers in past do not have 
much effect on the new integration of business. To test this argument, this chapter 
defines three types of merger frequency according to the temporal business effect of a 
merger: 
 To assume that the business effect lasts longer: Freq1, the cumulative number of 
                                                 
19 See for example, Croci and Petmezas (2009), Rahahleh and Wei (2012) and Boubakri et al. (2012). 
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acquisitions for an acquiring firm is over the sample span;  
 To assume that the business effect lasts a few years: Freq2, the number of 
acquisitions for an acquiring firm is in a given year plus the three preceding years. 
 To assume that the business effect lasts just over one year: Freq3, the number of 
acquisitions for an acquiring firm is in a given year. 
 
 
 Table 3-2 shows the example of coding the different merger frequencies at each 
year for firm i. If the business effect lasts longer, for instance, from 2000 to 2006, then 
merger frequency (Freq1) is accumulatively higher and higher over time. In contrast, if 
the effect lasts only a year, then the frequency variable measures for 1-year 
accumulative effects (Freq3). Effects of Frequencies which last longer than a year but 
less than the sample span are also defined. Following the existing studies (e.g. Healy, 
1992; Hitt et al., 1998), they are assumed to accumulate a 4-year business effect (Freq2). 
For any given merger earlier or later than the 4-year mark, it is considered to have zero 
accumulative effects.  
 
Table 3-2. Example of serially coding for the three measures of merger frequency 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of mergers ∙∙∙ ∙∙  ∙∙ ∙ ∙ ∙∙ 
Freq1 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10 11 
Freq200-03 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 0 0 0 0 
Freq201-04 0 0 0 1 2  3 4 5 0 0 0 
Freq202-05 0 0 0 0 0  1 2 3 4 0 0 
Freq203-06 0 0 0 0 0  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Freq3 1 2 3 1 2  1 2 1 1 1 2 
Note: One dot presents one acquisition completed during one year. 
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3.5.3. Control variables 
 According to Jensen (1986), Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), Fuller et al. 
(2002), Moeller et al. (2004), Billet and Qian (2008) and Gaur et al. (2013), it can be 
expected that CARs after a merger announcement will be affected by the ownership 
status of target firms, the method of payment for acquisition, takeover attitude, the 
relatedness of acquirers to targets’ business or industry, the relative acquisition size, 
acquirer international scope, and acquirer slack. Note that all monetary data are 
expressed in US dollars in value of a given year. More specifically, each of the variables 
is defined as follows: 
 
 
i. Deal-Specific Variables 
 Method of payment: Cash and Stock, binary variables, where Cash (Stock) equals 
one if target is acquired with 100% cash (stock), zero otherwise.  
 Ownership of target: Public and Private binary variables, where Public (Private) 
equals one if target is publicly (privately) held, zero otherwise. 
 Attitude: Attitude, binary variable, where Attitude equals one if the takeover is 
classified as hostile (friendly) by SDC, zero otherwise. 
 Acquirer to target industrial relatedness: Relatedness, binary variables, where 
Relatedness equals one if target is sharing the same two-digit SIC code as acquirer, 
zero otherwise. This is obtained as the traditional SIC code-based measure of 
relatedness following the same approach as Servaes (1996). 
 Acquirer international scope: Cross border, binary variables, where Cross border 
equals one if the target is a foreign company, otherwise it is zero. 
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ii. Firm-Specific Variables 
 Relative acquisition size: Relative size, the ratio of the deal transaction value to 
acquirer’s market value it 4 weeks prior to the announcement. 
 Acquirer slack: Leverage, the ratio of acquiring firm’s total debt to total assets. 
FCF, the ratio of acquiring firm’s free cash flow to total assets. 
 
3.6. Data 
 
 The acquisition data used for this study are collected from Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC)’s Global Mergers & Acquisitions database which includes deals 
announced and completed from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. The SDC 
Global Mergers & Acquisitions database is a comprehensive database of over 1.9 
million transactions by either public or private acquirers throughout their lifespan 
starting in 1992. This study focusses on transactions with an explicit transfer of control 
that the acquirer must own none or less than 50% of the target’s voting shares prior to 
the merger announcement and yield at least 50% or more of the ownership position of 
the target in post-merger.20 
 
 
 To be included in the sample, takeover deals must further match the following 
criteria. The transaction value of a deal exceeds one million dollars. Acquisitions must 
be completed, and have both announcement date and effective date21 and disclosed 
dollar deal value. The time between announcement date and completion date must be at 
                                                 
20 This research is designed to examine acquisitions where the transaction is a significant change of ownership from 
the target to the bidder. For instance, an acquisition where an acquirer owns 49% nor 2% of target’s voting rights is 
not be included. 
21 SDC database defines the Effective Date as a date when the entire transaction is completed and effective. 
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least zero or less than 1,000 days. Target firms are required to be a public firm, a private 
firm or a subsidiary. Consideration of payment method classified by SDC of a deal is 
one of the four: cash only, stock only, combination of cash and stock and others22. 
Neither the target nor the acquirer is in the financial or utilities industry. 23 Acquirers 
must not purchase more than two targets within ten trading days. Acquisitions are not 
buyback offers, repurchases, or self-tender offers. 
 
 The sample includes a number of deal characteristic items from SDC, such as 
the announcement and completion dates, the acquirer and the target’s name, nation and 
primary SIC code, target listing status, deal value, deal attitude and consideration 
structure (payment method made by the acquirer). Due to the availability of financial 
data for privately owned acquiring firms, the sample is restricted to public acquirers. 
After the filtering process of the data, it ends up with a sample of more than 6,800 
unique firms undertaking over 14,000 takeover transactions throughout 117 countries 
with a total transaction value of $4.49 trillion. Among these acquisitions, 3,994 and 
10,109 deals are made by infrequent and frequent acquirers, respectively. Then the 
financial and stock data of sample acquirers are obtained from Thomson Financial24  
and Datastream25. 
 
Table 3-3 reports the summary statistics of frequency and other related variables for 
period between 2000 and 2010. To avoid sample selection issues, a balanced panel is 
not required; thus, the number of acquisitions differs each year. The sample includes 
both large and small firms. 
                                                 
22 The “Other” category describes a mixture of payment methods including cash, bonds, preferred stock, earn outs, 
assumption of liabilities and the other consideration offered is a form of stock. 
23 firms with a primary SIC code between 4900 and 4999(utilities) or 6000 and 6999 (financial institutions) are 
excluded. 
24 Thomson Financial provides broadest coverage of 51,900 active global companies, representing 99% of the global 
market capitalization. 
25 Datastream offers daily stock prices, trading volumes, and return indices, updated at the end of every trading day, 
for over 100,000 equities in nearly 200 countries around the world. 
91 
 
Table 3-3. Summary statistics of merger frequency and firm characteristics 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A: Mean (median) [standard deviation] of merger frequency variables 
Freq1 1.46 1.72 1.82 2.03 2.51 2.71 2.68 3.04 3.01 3.06 3.39 
 
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) 
 
[1.33] [1.39] [1.66] [1.95] [3.05] [3.45] [3.16] [3.65] [3.15] [4.26] [3.95] 
Freq2 1.92 1.95 2.00 2.22 2.42 2.59 2.43 2.73 2.50 2.22 2.35 
 
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) 
 
[2.16] [1.58] [1.85] [2.13] [2.47] [2.84] [2.31] [2.86] [2.43] [2.00] [2.02] 
Freq3 1.92 1.44 1.36 1.39 1.54 1.58 1.44 1.58 1.39 1.30 1.42 
 
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 
[2.16] [0.89] [0.79] [0.74] [1.13] [1.17] [0.84] [1.17] [0.92] [0.67] [0.88] 
Panel B: Mean (median) [standard deviation] of firm characteristics 
Relative size 37.40% 36.80% 35.40% 45.30% 33.20% 36.30% 32.10% 32.00% 35.10% 44.70% 35.00% 
 
(6.36%) (7.08%) (6.92%) (7.09%) (6.95%) (7.28%) (7.57%) (6.92%) (7.37%) (10.10%) (8.53%) 
 
[1.10] [0.98] [1.03] [1.30] [0.92] [1.07] [0.94] [0.93] [1.00] [1.18] [0.99] 
Leverage 19.80% 21.80% 22.80% 21.20% 21.50% 20.00% 18.30% 20.10% 19.10% 19.40% 22.00% 
 
(10.80%) (16.30%) (16.60%) (18.20%) (17.00%) (15.50%) (13.70%) (15.40%) (14.40%) (12.10%) (16.00%) 
 
[0.28] [0.26] [0.28] [0.24] [0.25] [0.24] [0.22] [0.25] [0.21] [0.27] [0.30] 
Free cash/total assets -0.49% -0.33% 1.56% 2.31% 2.88% 2.73% 2.25% 1.76% 1.05% -0.38% 2.65% 
 
(0.53%) (1.00%) (1.99%) (2.69%) (2.87%) (2.61%) (2.59%) (1.66%) (1.32%) (0.91%) (3.03%) 
 
[0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.07] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.11] [0.08] 
CAR[-2,+2] 2.43% 3.12% 2.48% 3.69% 2.34% 2.19% 2.19% 2.50% 2.36% 3.35% 3.11% 
 
(0.09%) (1.35%) (1.32%) (1.56%) (0.89%) (0.85%) (0.81%) (0.91%) (0.70%) (1.00%) (0.81%) 
 
[0.14] [0.13] [0.10] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [0.10] [0.12] [0.13] [0.11] 
CAR[-1,+1] 2.08% 2.19% 2.08% 2.81% 1.95% 1.94% 1.77% 2.08% 1.85% 2.70% 2.45% 
 
(0.14%) (1.19%) (1.03%) (0.98%) (0.73%) (0.71%) (0.52%) (0.76%) (0.67%) (0.69%) (0.81%) 
 
[0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.10] [0.11] [0.09] 
Number of observations 825 616 765 914 1,259 1,629 1,770 2,010 1,564 1,268 1,483 
Note: The table reports the sample characteristics of merger frequency and firm characteristics regressed and analyzed in the study. The results are tabulated based on a sample of 14103 acquisitions 
made by 6836 unique bidders from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. Freq1 is the cumulative number of acquisitions for an acquiring firm over the sample span. Freq2 is the number of 
acquisitions for an acquiring firm in a given year. Freq3 is the number of acquisitions for an acquiring firm in a given year plus the three preceding years. Relative size is the ratio of the deal transaction 
value to acquirer’s market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement. Leverage is the ratio of acquiring firm’s total debt to total assets. FCF is the ratio of acquiring firm’s free cash flow to total assets. 
Median values are shown in parentheses; standard deviations are shown in brackets. 
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3.7. Empirical evidence and discussions 
 
 The model (4) is estimated by using Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) in 
order to control firm fixed effects on investment returns at presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Instead of Hausman Statistic, Breusch-Pagan (BP) statistic is employed 
to test a presence of heterogeneity in estimation under the expectation of which the 
heteroscedasticity is correlated with explanatory variables. The significance of BP 
statistic implies biased estimates if the firm fixed effects are not controlled. Therefore, 
in following estimations, LSDV is applied when BP statistic is significant.  The results 
of estimation are reported on the basis of clustered standard error in the fixed-effects to 
account for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation at the firm level26. 
 
3.7.1. The impact of merger frequency 
 As the first step of empirical estimation, it starts by examining the degree of 
correlation among dependent and independent variables in Table 3-4. Within the 
independent variables, two highest correlations are at -0.54 and -0.48 found between the 
variables of Cash (5) and Stock (6); Public (7) and Private (8). Therefore, these four 
dummies are replaced by four interaction variables which are interacted the cash and 
share dummies with the target ownership dummies in robustness checks, in order to 
reduce the effect of the potential multicollinearity problem on estimation. In additional, 
Table 3-4 shows a point worth nothing that the correlation between all of merger 
frequency 27  variables and acquisition performance are negative, which suggests 
preliminarily a negative linear link between frequency and CARs. 
                                                 
 
27 For brevity, the results of Freq2 are not presented here, but are available from the author upon request. For freq2, it 
does not appear then potential multicollinearity problem on estimation. 
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Table 3-4. Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) 
CAR[-2,+2] 1                               
(2) 
Freq1 -0.09*** 1                             
(4) 
Freq3 -0.06*** 0.50*** 1                           
(5) 
Cash -0.11*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 1                         
(6) 
Stock 0.08*** -0.12*** -0.03*** -0.54*** 1                       
(7) 
Public -0.11*** 0.01 -0.04*** -0.10*** 0.18*** 1                     
(8) 
Private 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.10*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.48*** 1                   
(9) 
Cash*public -0.05*** 0.06*** 0.00 0.28*** -0.15*** 0.63*** -0.31*** 1                 
(10) 
Stock*public -0.06*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.52*** -0.28*** -0.29*** 0.59*** -0.18*** 1               
(11) 
Cash*private -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.30*** 0.55*** 0.54*** -0.26*** -0.08*** -0.16*** 1             
(12) 
Stock*private 0.13*** -0.07*** 0.04*** -0.33*** 0.61*** -0.15*** 0.31*** -0.09*** -0.17*** -0.08*** 1           
(13) 
Attitude  -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.09*** -0.04*** 0.08*** -0.02*** 0 -0.01 1         
(14) 
Relatedness 0.00 -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 0.00 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02* -0.03*** 0.03*** -0.02** -0.01 1       
(15) 
Cross border 0.01 0.02** -0.01 0.11*** -0.09*** -0.02** -0.01 0.07*** 0.04*** -0.08*** -0.04*** 0.03*** -0.01 1     
(16) 
Relative size 0.24*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.19*** 0.15*** -0.01 0.02** -0.05*** -0.11*** 0.02** 0.16*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.00 1   
(17) 
Leverage 0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.00 0.01 -0.04*** 0.10*** 1 
(18) 
FCF -0.15*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.20*** -0.18*** 0.04*** -0.04*** 0.07*** 0.10*** -0.03*** -0.18*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.02* -0.25*** -0.24*** 
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 Table 3-5 and 3-628 report the results of estimation of model (4) using the full 
sample of 12 thousands observations. The coefficient of merger frequency is 
significantly negative in explaining announcement returns. This finding is consistent 
with Kusewitt (1985) who also finds a significantly negative relation between merger 
frequency and performance using a sample of 155 U.S. companies which had made two 
or more large acquisitions during the 1967 – 1976 period. By comparing with Kusewitt 
(1985), the estimation is further broken down according to the long lasting effects of 
M&A on performance, the medium-term lasting effects of M&A, and the short-term 
lasting effects of M&A.  
 
 
In table 3-5, it is found that the acquisition frequency is significantly and negatively 
strong in affecting the market expectation to the new integration for its short-term 
impacts on business. Furthermore, Panel A of Table 3-6 shows that 62.5% of 
coefficients for Freq2 are significant and all of them are lower than short-term one. This 
suggests that the market expects that the impact of the new integration will last a few 
years longer, resulting in two or three year old frequent acquisitions that are still playing 
a significant role in affecting announcement returns negatively, although the effects are 
getting weaker when compared with the short-term ones. 
 
 
 In column (1) and (3) of Table 3-5, the frequency counted over a sample span 
does not show its significant effect on CARs. There are two possible explanations to 
this finding. One is that the business effect of new integration is not permanent. 
Acquisitions made in 7 or 11 years ago will not be perceived by investors or market for 
their impacts on business improvement that can drive up the value of firm. Another 
explanation is the mixed effects of management hubris developed with frequency and 
the management learning from repeated activities over a certain length of time. The 
longer time helps the growth of the learning effects that allow corporation to digest new 
opportunities on improving business. As shown in the last chapter, the two effects are 
                                                 
28 For full estimation results, see Appendix B. 
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opposite for business improvement after new integration and so the expectation of 
firm’s value. The learning takes time to come effective, which can offset the 
disadvantage brought by managerial hubris. Therefore, in the long run, the M&A 
frequency can be unclear for its overall significant effects on performance when neither 
the hubris nor the learning becomes dominant over each other. This argument is 
consistent with the finding of the last chapter. 
 
 
3.7.2. The impact of control variables 
 
 It is found that the relative size of acquisition matters for performance in the last 
chapter. The findings from the multivariate analysis are consistent with the findings 
from the univariate analysis shown in Tables 3-5 and 3-6. The variable of relative 
acquisition size, measured as the ratio of the deal transaction value to acquirer’s market 
value 4 weeks prior to the announcement, appears significantly positive in affecting 
announcement returns. This finding is consistent with Asquith et al. (1983) who were 
the first researchers to incorporate relative size effects, stating that the larger the size of 
acquisition relatively to acquiring firm in an acquisition results in the greater cumulative 
abnormal returns for acquirer’s shareholders.  
 
 
One explanation is that acquirers will be more careful about dealing with a large 
acquisition as they can expose the firm to a high risk of devastating the business if the 
integration fails, which creates a risk pressure on management.Increasing acquisitions 
size can increase “the risk-driven pressure” on the acquiring firm’s management or 
decision makers. If the size of a merger deal is large relative to the scale of the acquiring 
firm’s business, the acquiring firm will be more exposed to the risk of the acquisition. 
Any failure of the large acquisition may cause a difficulty for the acquiring firms in 
using its existing resources to absorb or digest the large acquisition.  
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 If the difficulty is beyond the capability of the acquiring firm to overcome, it can 
result in the ruination of the existing business of the firm. In considering potential risks, 
any decision maker or shareholder of the firm will be much more cautious and careful in 
pursuing large acquisitions than the small ones, as the risk of the small size of the deal 
could be relatively easier for the acquiring firm to control or absorb. Therefore, this 
study argues that the pressure of the high risk drives the firm to perform better in large-
size acquisitions. This is different from the argument by Moeller et al. (2004) who 
explain the size effect from the point of view of acquirer size. 
 
 
 Turning to other controlling variables, the coefficient on the public target 
dummy is significantly negative, indicating that the market views acquisitions of private 
targets is more favorable than of public ones. This is possibly due to which private firms 
could have more value added up than public targets in the market. By contrast, the 
shareholders of a public firm can be traded with for their shares at a premium price in a 
stock market rather than selling their shares to a potential bidder. In order to make the 
investment opportunity more attractive and more valuable to potential acquirers, private 
firms are generally sold at a price with liquidity discount (Fuller et al., 2002). 
 
 
 Similar result regarding the higher value creation of acquiring non-public targets 
have been found by Moller et al. (2004). Moreover, the interaction variable of public 
targets with the payment method of stock, also, enters with a significantly positive 
coefficient. The results suggest that using equity as the method of payment to acquire 
public targets generates lower returns for shareholders of acquiring firm as compared to 
cash financing. This is possibly due to the dilution of ownership caused by acquisitions 
of large public targets. 
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 With respect to internationalization, the cross border variable shows how 
economic fit between countries of acquiring firm and target firm can determine 
investor’s returns in terms of internationalization. With a significantly positive result in 
each estimation, it suggests that international diversification tends to be value 
destructive. Morck and Yeung (1992) suggest that the positive relation between cross-
border acquisition and investor’s returns could be possibly due to that act of cross-
border takeovers enhances the managerial ability of using the firm’s intangible assets 
and thus benefits investors.   
 
 
 The free cash flow (FCF) as another variable to control financial slack is found 
to be significantly and negatively related to investor’s returns, which is consistent with 
Jensen (1986). This indicates that the increase in free cash flow may result in an 
acquirer making unprofitable acquisitions as the managers of an acquiring firm are 
likely to spend free cash flow for deals which increase their personal utility. Turning to 
the other slack variable, given an insignificant coefficient of leverage, it is found that, in 
line with Laamanen and Keil (2008), financing an acquisition through raising debt does 
not seem to be factor determining the announcement returns for shareholders of an 
acquiring firm.  
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Table 3-5. The effect of merger frequency on stock performance of acquirers 
 
Panel A:Full sample  Panel B:Full sample with interaction variable 
Dependent variable: CAR[-2,+2] (1)  (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Merger Frequency 
     
Freq1 -0.0003 
  
-0.0003 
 
 
(-0.59) 
  
(-0.55) 
 
Freq3 
 
-0.0022* 
  
-0.0021* 
  
(-1.85) 
  
(-1.79) 
Deal-specific variables 
     
Cash 0.0004 0.0004 
   
 
(0.14) (0.14) 
   
Stock -0.0035 -0.0030 
   
 
(-0.86) (-0.75) 
   
Public -0.0187*** -0.0189*** 
   
 
(-5.64) (-5.72) 
   
Private -0.0016 -0.0014 
   
 
(-0.59) (-0.54) 
   
Cash*public 
   
0.0004 0.0003 
    
(0.12) (0.08) 
Stock*public 
   
-0.0231*** -0.0230*** 
    
(-4.68) (-4.67) 
Cash*private 
   
-0.0021 -0.0020 
    
(-0.78) (-0.76) 
Stock*private 
   
0.0068 0.0076 
    
(1.28) (1.45) 
Attitude -0.0225 -0.0233 
 
-0.0321 -0.0329 
 
(-1.06) (-1.09) 
 
(-1.53) (-1.57) 
Relatedness -0.0024 -0.0023 
 
-0.0023 -0.0023 
 
(-0.89) (-0.87) 
 
(-0.87) (-0.85) 
Cross border 0.0049* 0.0050* 
 
0.0055* 0.0056* 
 
(1.66) (1.68) 
 
(1.89) (1.91) 
Firm-specific variables 
     
Relative size 0.0160*** 0.0159*** 
 
0.0154*** 0.0153*** 
 
(9.00) (8.94) 
 
(8.84) (8.77) 
Leverage 0.0139 0.0131 
 
0.0145 0.0137 
 
(1.56) (1.46) 
 
(1.63) (1.55) 
FCF -0.0360*** -0.0359*** 
 
-0.0359*** -0.0358*** 
 
(-5.43) (-5.41) 
 
(-5.49) (-5.48) 
Constant 0.0259*** 0.0309*** 
 
0.0217*** 0.0264*** 
 
(4.38) (4.92) 
 
(4.09) (4.63) 
      
R2-adjusted 32.69% 32.72% 
 
33.07% 33.09% 
Heterogeneity 1.811*** 1.816*** 
 
1.828*** 1.833*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES 
 
YES YES 
F-statistic 11.07 11.22 
 
10.71 10.85 
No. of pooled observations 12968 12968 
 
12968 12968 
No. of firms 6098 6098 
 
6098 6098 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, 
*** represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3-6. The effect of 4-year merger frequency on stock performance of acquirers 
Panel A:Full sample 
 
(1) 2000-2003  (2) 2001-2004  (3) 2002-2005  (4) 2003-2006  
 
βj of Freq2 -0.0014**  -0.0023***  -0.0018***  -0.0015***  
 
 
(-2.52)  (-2.90)  (-2.91)  (-2.80)  
 
          
 
(5) 2004-2007  (6) 2005-2008  (7) 2006-2009  (8) 2007-2010  % of significant β 
βj of Freq2 -0.0009*  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0003  62.5% 
 
(-1.83)  (-1.06)  (-0.80)  (-0.62)  
 
Panel B:Full sample with interaction variables 
 
(1) 2000-2003  (2) 2001-2004  (3) 2002-2005  (4) 2003-2006  
 
βj of Freq2 -0.0014**  -0.0024***  -0.0018***  -0.0016***  
 
 
(-2.44)  (-3.09)  (-3.01)  (-2.89)  
 
          
 
(5) 2004-2007  (6) 2005-2008  (7) 2006-2009  (8) 2007-2010  % of significant β 
βj of Freq2 -0.0009*  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0003  62.5% 
 
(-1.87)  (-1.10)  (-0.81)  (-0.64)   
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. *, 
**, *** represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
3.8. Robustness checks 
 
 In order to see how the findings from estimation of the full sample are robust 
across different economies, the full sample is grouped into four subsamples: (1) 
developed countries, (2) OECD economies, (3) US and (4) EU economies. For 
developing economics, the sample used only consists of 500 firms from the developing 
world, and these firms have pursued 680 international acquisitions over the sample 
period. Apparently, due to the data constraint, on one hand, it will not be efficient from 
an econometric perspective for using LSDV to estimate the developing-sample firms. 
On the other hand, estimation is not very representative since 500 firms with 680 deals 
will not provide much information on merger frequency due to relatively short history 
of M&A in developing economies. 
 
 
 To further examine frequent acquisition effects, economic co-operation and 
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development (OECD) 29countries are extracted from the full sample for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly, at the firm-level, the acquirers from developed and developing 
economies belonging to OECD could be relatively more capable in terms of firm 
operations, corporate governance and structures than others in the world. Secondly, in 
terms of M&A activity, acquirers of OECD members play a pivotal role in the global 
M&A market by performing 12,815 acquisitions during the period 2000-2010, 
accounting for 92.65% of the total deals. 
 
 
 The researches of M&A effects in US and EU are well documented in previous 
studies. With respect to merger activity, the US has been historically the most active 
country in M&A activity in the world. Among OECD countries the U.S. and EU stand 
in the top two position. The US had 5,619 acquisitions and the EU had 2,552 
acquisitions, which accounted for 46.77% and 21.24% of OECD acquisitions, 
respectively. In terms of regulation, the merger regulation of the European 
Commission30 is relatively lenient, and tolerates acquisitions that would be unlawful in 
the United States (Kauper, 2000). According to anti-trust law, the EU rarely brings 
actions against mergers that tend to create or enhance oligopolies, while the US actively 
enforced against oligopolies (Bergman et al., 2010). Also, for illustrative purposes that 
provide a better comparison with prior literature, the US and the EU acquirers are 
therefore separately tested in this section. 
 
 
 Table 3-7 shows estimation results for developed countries and OECD 
economies, which is consistent with findings in Table 3-5. Frequency counted for a year 
interval and frequency counted for a 4-year interval are negatively and significantly 
related to announcement returns. This finding is also shown in the estimation of firms 
                                                 
29 The OECD was established in 1948, including 34 member countries, contributing 80% of trade and investment to 
world economy. In the study, acquirers from 33 OECD countries except those from Mexico are included. 
30 The European Commission is the EU agency charged with enforcing antitrust regulations.  
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from EU economies (see Table 3-8). Moreover, the US sample also shows a consistent 
result for the 4-year or medium-term lasting effect of frequency on CARs that is 
negative and significant. Interestingly, the longer lasting effect of new integration seems 
stronger in the US evidenced by the significant negative relationship between CARs and 
the long-term frequency (see Table 3-8). The result for the US implies that managerial 
hubris grows with merger frequency and it dominates other effects, particularly, the 
learning effects. 
 
 
 The US finding is consistent with Boubakri et al. (2012) who find that acquirers 
experience significant loss from frequent acquisition, using a sample of 4,215 
acquisitions by 397 US acquirers from 1999 to 2010. The EU results are in line with 
Martynova and Renneboog (2006) who examine 2,419 EU acquisitions made across 28 
EU countries and document that the wealth of acquirer’s shareholders reduces as merger 
frequency increases. However, these studies have not looked at the different lasting 
effects of merger frequency, and the unobserved heterogeneity of acquirers is not 
controlled in the estimation. Given insignificant coefficient, the variable of short-term 
measure of frequency is not related to announcement returns in the US sample. In 
contrast to the EU sample, the estimating results indicate that acquirers take much 
stronger negative effects from frequent acquisition in the short-run, suggesting that the 
European acquirers may suffer from more serious corporate indigestion of past merger 
experience in the short-run. Further, the results of medium-term frequency measures 
show that more than 65% of coefficients are significantly negative for US and EU.  
 
 
 Overall, both results for the US and the EU robustly exhibit that frequent 
acquisition is value-destructive regardless of the differences in culture, anti-trust law, 
investor protection, competition of the M&A market and economic system. The 
different lasting effects of mergers is also re-examined in the EU and US samples. For 
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the EU, the key mechanism allowing an acquiring firm to be able to create acquisitive 
capabilities in frequent acquisitions may need more time to enhance learning effects, 
such as drawing adaptive inference from prior experience on subsequent acquisitions. 
Yet, for the U.S., the negative effect of frequent acquisition could possibly be attributed 
to agency issues due to the significant long-lasting effect of the frequency.  
 
 
 Among the controls, the effect of deal size is robustly consistent across different 
samples for its positive relation to announcement returns. Also the estimated effects of 
acquiring public targets and free cash flow are robustly and significantly negative. It is 
noticed that for US acquirers, there is no significant difference in CARs when acquiring 
foreign or domestic targets. This finding is in line with that of Hayward (2002) who 
finds that acquisitions of foreign target are not prone to be different to domestic targets 
for over 100 US domiciled companies during 1985-1995. Although the effect of cross-
border acquisition is insignificant, the experience gained through foreign acquisitions or 
the complementarities of resources and capabilities of the foreign target firms still make 
these transactions at least partially worth the effort (Bertrand and Betschinger, 2012). 
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Table 3-7. The effect of merger frequency on acquirer stock performance across different 
economies 
 
Panel A:Developed economies 
 
Panel B:OECD economies 
Dependent variable: CAR[-2,+2] (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
      
Merger Frequency 
   
    
Freq1 -0.0002 
  
-0.0004 
 
 
(-0.42) 
  
(-0.72) 
 
Freq3 
 
-0.0021* 
  
-0.0020* 
  
(-1.83) 
  
(-1.68) 
Deal-specific variables 
     
Cash 0.0004 0.0004 
 
0.0007 0.0007 
 
(0.12) (0.13) 
 
(0.22) (0.22) 
Stock -0.0045 -0.0041 
 
-0.0055 -0.0050 
 
(-1.16) (-1.05) 
 
(-1.32) (-1.20) 
Public -0.0181*** -0.0183*** 
 
-0.0201*** -0.0203*** 
 
(-5.61) (-5.68) 
 
(-5.80) (-5.87) 
Private -0.0018 -0.0016 
 
-0.0014 -0.0013 
 
(-0.68) (-0.64) 
 
(-0.51) (-0.47) 
Attitude -0.0216 -0.0225 
 
-0.0180 -0.0190 
 
(-1.03) (-1.08) 
 
(-0.81) (-0.85) 
Relatedness -0.0021 -0.0021 
 
-0.0020 -0.0019 
 
(-0.83) (-0.81) 
 
(-0.71) (-0.70) 
Cross border 0.0051* 0.0052* 
 
0.0061** 0.0062** 
 
(1.78) (1.80) 
 
(1.98) (2.00) 
Firm-specific variables 
     
Relative size 0.0177*** 0.0176*** 
 
0.0174*** 0.0173*** 
 
(9.85) (9.79) 
 
(8.85) (8.79) 
Leverage 0.0093 0.0086 
 
0.0148 0.0140 
 
(1.08) (1.00) 
 
(1.61) (1.52) 
FCF -0.0366*** -0.0365*** 
 
-0.0365*** -0.0363*** 
 
(-5.72) (-5.71) 
 
(-5.31) (-5.30) 
Constant 0.0326*** 0.0372*** 
 
0.0214*** 0.0263*** 
 
(5.76) (6.18) 
 
(3.53) (4.07) 
      
R-squared 35.71% 35.74% 
 
32.89% 32.91% 
Heterogeneity 1.945*** 1.950*** 
 
1.876*** 1.880*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES 
 
YES YES 
F-stat 12.52 12.67 
 
10.96 11.07 
No. of pooled observations 12246 12246 
 
12015 12015 
No. of firms 5584 5584 
 
5407 5407 
Note:t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. * ,  * * ,  
* * *  represents the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.. 
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Table 3-7. The effect of merger frequency on acquirer stock performance across different economies - Continued 
Panel C: Medium-term frequency for developed economies 
  (1) 2000-2003 (2) 2001-2004 (3) 2002-2005 (4) 2003-2006 (5) 2004-2007 (6) 2005-2008 (7) 2006-2009 (8) 2007-2010 
  CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] 
Freq2 -0.0015*** -0.0025*** -0.0019*** -0.0016*** -0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0003 
 
(-2.61) (-3.20) (-3.11) (-2.98) (-1.86) (-1.03) (-0.83) (-0.57) 
Deal-specific variables 
Cash 0.0001 0.0035* -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0005 
  (0.10) (1.94) (-0.35) (-0.37) (-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.43) (0.38) 
Stock -0.0030 -0.0052** -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0029* 
  (-1.53) (-2.11) (-1.36) (-1.38) (-1.41) (-1.37) (-1.36) (-1.66) 
Public -0.0082*** -0.0114*** -0.0104*** -0.0103*** -0.0103*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** -0.0075*** 
  (-5.15) (-5.62) (-5.14) (-5.12) (-5.12) (-5.14) (-5.14) (-5.20) 
Private -0.0004 0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0005 
  (-0.35) (0.56) (-0.55) (-0.52) (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.43) 
Attitude -0.0119 -0.0091 -0.0166 -0.0168 -0.0165 -0.0164 -0.0163 -0.0109 
  (-1.15) (-0.69) (-1.27) (-1.28) (-1.26) (-1.25) (-1.24) (-1.17) 
Relatedness 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0005 
  (0.33) (0.12) (-0.24) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.23) (0.46) 
Cross border 0.0020 0.0030 0.0024 0.0024 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0017 
  (1.37) (1.64) (1.35) (1.35) (1.38) (1.38) (1.40) (1.34) 
Firm-specific variables 
Relative size 0.0029*** -0.0001 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0020** 
  (3.18) (-0.10) (5.35) (5.38) (5.36) (5.35) (5.35) (2.48) 
Leverage 0.0056 0.0109** 0.0085 0.0085 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 0.0048 
  (1.31) (2.03) (1.59) (1.59) (1.63) (1.63) (1.63) (1.26) 
FCF -0.0081*** -0.0086** -0.0129*** -0.0130*** -0.0129*** -0.0130*** -0.0130*** -0.0072** 
  (-2.60) (-2.18) (-3.27) (-3.30) (-3.29) (-3.29) (-3.30) (-2.56) 
Constant 0.0124*** -0.0221*** 0.0237*** 0.0236*** 0.0239*** 0.0241*** 0.0241*** 0.0057** 
  (4.34) (-6.27) (6.76) (6.75) (6.81) (6.89) (6.89) (2.27) 
  
        R2-adjusted 31.84% 32.86% 32.44% 32.43% 32.35% 32.32% 32.31% 31.65% 
Heterogeneity 1.206*** 1.266*** 1.333*** 1.331*** 1.330*** 1.330*** 1.332*** 1.172*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 5.91 9.29 7.92 7.88 7.61 7.49 7.48 5.30 
Observations 12246 12246 12246 12246 12246 12246 12246 12246 
No. of firms 5584 5584 5584 5584 5584 5584 5584 5584 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, *** represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 3-7. The effect of merger frequency on acquirer stock performance across different economies - Continued 
Panel D: Medium-term frequency for OECD countries 
  (1) 2000-2003 (2) 2001-2004 (3) 2002-2005 (4) 2003-2006 (5) 2004-2007 (6) 2005-2008 (7) 2006-2009 (8) 2007-2010 
  CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] 
Freq2 -0.0014** -0.0026*** -0.0019*** -0.0017*** -0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0003 
 
(-2.45) (-3.23) (-3.16) (-3.05) (-1.91) (-1.01) (-0.88) (-0.63) 
Deal-specific variables 
Cash 0.0001 0.0032* -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0004 
  (0.07) (1.78) (-0.37) (-0.38) (-0.46) (-0.45) (-0.44) (0.34) 
Stock -0.0028 -0.0050** -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0028 
  (-1.46) (-2.02) (-1.26) (-1.29) (-1.32) (-1.27) (-1.26) (-1.58) 
Public -0.0083*** -0.0117*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0104*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0076*** 
  (-5.20) (-5.75) (-5.20) (-5.19) (-5.18) (-5.20) (-5.21) (-5.25) 
Private -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0005 
  (-0.36) (0.39) (-0.53) (-0.51) (-0.55) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.44) 
Attitude -0.0117 -0.0088 -0.0164 -0.0165 -0.0163 -0.0161 -0.0160 -0.0107 
  (-1.13) (-0.67) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-1.25) (-1.24) (-1.23) (-1.15) 
Relatedness 0.0007 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 
  (0.55) (0.23) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.66) 
Cross border 0.0023 0.0033* 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028 0.0020 
  (1.57) (1.81) (1.48) (1.49) (1.51) (1.52) (1.53) (1.55) 
Firm-specific variables 
Relative size 0.0031*** -0.0003 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0022*** 
  (3.30) (-0.21) (5.50) (5.52) (5.51) (5.51) (5.51) (2.58) 
Leverage 0.0064 0.0121** 0.0095* 0.0095* 0.0097* 0.0096* 0.0097* 0.0056 
  (1.52) (2.25) (1.79) (1.79) (1.83) (1.82) (1.82) (1.47) 
FCF -0.0079** -0.0088** -0.0123*** -0.0124*** -0.0124*** -0.0124*** -0.0124*** -0.0071** 
  (-2.54) (-2.23) (-3.15) (-3.18) (-3.17) (-3.17) (-3.17) (-2.51) 
Constant 0.0113*** -0.0226*** 0.0222*** 0.0221*** 0.0223*** 0.0226*** 0.0226*** 0.0049* 
  (3.99) (-6.41) (6.36) (6.35) (6.41) (6.48) (6.48) (1.96) 
  
        R2-adjusted 31.80% 32.88% 32.43% 32.41% 32.33% 32.29% 32.29% 31.63% 
Heterogeneity 1.204*** 1.267*** 1.324*** 1.323*** 1.322*** 1.322*** 1.323*** 1.171*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 5.75 9.29 7.79 7.76 7.48 7.35 7.34 5.20 
Observations 12015 12015 12015 12015 12015 12015 12015 12015 
No. of firms 5407 5407 5407 5407 5407 5407 5407 5407 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, *** represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 3-8. Empirical results across US and EU countries 
  
Panel A:USA 
 
Panel B:EU countries 
Dependent variable: CAR[-2,+2] 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Merger Frequency       
Freq1 
 
-0.0049** 
  
-0.0026 
 
  
(-2.46) 
  
(-1.29) 
 Freq3 
  
-0.0001 
  
-0.0085* 
   
(-0.04) 
  
(-1.95) 
Deal-specific variables 
      Cash 
 
0.0044 0.0042 
 
-0.0037 -0.0036 
  
(0.79) (0.75) 
 
(-0.75) (-0.74) 
Stock 
 
-0.0013 -0.0017 
 
0.0034 0.0035 
  
(-0.17) (-0.22) 
 
(0.38) (0.39) 
Public 
 
-0.0279*** -0.0277*** 
 
-0.0116* -0.0115* 
  
(-4.51) (-4.48) 
 
(-1.88) (-1.86) 
Private 
 
0.0074 0.0073 
 
-0.0026 -0.0025 
  
(1.55) (1.52) 
 
(-0.59) (-0.57) 
Attitude 
 
-0.0312 -0.0349 
 
-0.0317 -0.0344 
  
(-0.72) (-0.80) 
 
(-0.98) (-1.07) 
Relatedness 
 
-0.0049 -0.0047 
 
0.0039 0.0037 
  
(-1.01) (-0.96) 
 
(0.91) (0.88) 
Cross border 
 
0.0044 0.0037 
 
0.0086* 0.0083* 
  
(0.84) (0.71) 
 
(1.90) (1.83) 
Firm-specific variables 
      Relative size 
 
0.0634*** 0.0634*** 
 
0.0078*** 0.0075*** 
  
(7.14) (7.12) 
 
(2.94) (2.80) 
Leverage 
 
0.0248 0.0241 
 
-0.0177 -0.0192 
  
(1.26) (1.22) 
 
(-1.17) (-1.27) 
FCF 
 
-0.0543*** -0.0546*** 
 
-0.0346** -0.0334** 
  
(-4.84) (-4.86) 
 
(-2.46) (-2.37) 
Constant 
 
-0.0039 -0.0019 
 
-0.0332** -0.0233 
  
(-0.38) (-0.17) 
 
(-2.07) (-1.40) 
       
R-squared 
 
43.63% 43.48% 
 
28.01% 28.11% 
Heterogeneity 
 
2.028*** 2.025*** 
 
1.814*** 1.825*** 
Firm Dummy 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year Dummy 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
F-stat 
 
7.18 6.87 
 
4.04 4.14 
No. of pooled observations 
 
5619 5619 
 
2552 2552 
No. of firms  3377 3377  1065 1065 
Note:t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. * ,  * * ,  
* * *  represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 3-8. Empirical results across US and EU countries - Continued 
Panel C: Medium-term frequency for US 
  (1) 2000-2003 (2) 2001-2004 (3) 2002-2005 (4) 2003-2006 (5) 2004-2007 (6) 2005-2008 (7) 2006-2009 (8) 2007-2010 
  CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] 
Freq2 -0.0019** -0.0019** -0.0014*** -0.0008* -0.0001 -0.0016*** 0.0002 -0.0008 
 
(-2.04) (-2.38) (-2.83) (-1.79) (-0.15) (-3.21) (0.26) (-0.96) 
Deal-specific variables 
Cash 0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0003 
  (0.45) (-0.24) (-0.40) (-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.47) (-0.24) (-0.15) 
Stock -0.0023 0.0006 0.0016 0.0016 0.0018 0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0008 
  (-0.57) (0.18) (0.64) (0.63) (0.71) (0.79) (-0.02) (-0.25) 
Public -0.0149*** -0.0093*** -0.0064*** -0.0065*** -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0110*** -0.0103*** 
  (-4.73) (-3.79) (-3.27) (-3.29) (-3.31) (-3.35) (-4.08) (-4.22) 
Private 0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 
  (0.83) (-0.06) (-0.23) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.03) (-0.21) 
Attitude -0.0021 -0.0167 -0.0167 -0.0170 -0.0172 -0.0173 -0.0144 -0.0114 
  (-0.10) (-0.95) (-1.19) (-1.21) (-1.23) (-1.23) (-0.75) (-0.66) 
Relatedness -0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0008 
  (-0.09) (0.27) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.27) (0.40) 
Cross border 0.0009 0.0013 0.0010 0.0010 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012 0.0009 
  (0.31) (0.62) (0.61) (0.60) (0.68) (0.67) (0.51) (0.41) 
Firm-specific variables 
Relative size -0.0018 0.0024 0.0030** 0.0030** 0.0030** 0.0030** 0.0019 0.0007 
  (-0.91) (1.59) (2.49) (2.48) (2.49) (2.51) (1.17) (0.46) 
Leverage -0.0084 -0.0027 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0036 -0.0032 
  (-1.40) (-0.57) (-0.33) (-0.36) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.71) (-0.69) 
FCF -0.0325*** -0.0214*** -0.0135** -0.0137** -0.0139** -0.0136** -0.0258*** -0.0242*** 
 (-3.56) (-3.01) (-2.37) (-2.40) (-2.43) (-2.37) (-3.31) (-3.44) 
Constant -0.0244*** 0.0046 0.0164*** 0.0166*** 0.0169*** 0.0172*** -0.0001 -0.0037 
  (-4.43) (1.10) (4.89) (4.95) (5.03) (5.12) (-0.02) (-0.89) 
  
        R2-adjusted 35.24% 32.90% 32.90% 32.69% 32.55% 32.61% 32.93% 33.04% 
Heterogeneity 1.292*** 1.252*** 1.277*** 1.273*** 1.272*** 1.275*** 1.250*** 1.207*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 5.84 3.16 3.15 2.92 2.76 2.83 3.19 3.31 
Observations 5619 5619 5619 5619 5619 5619 5619 5619 
No. of firms 3377 3377 3377 3377 3377 3377 3377 3377 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, *** represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 3-8. Empirical results across US and EU countries - Continued 
Panel D: Medium-term frequency for EU 
  (1) 2000-2003 (2) 2001-2004 (3) 2002-2005 (4) 2003-2006 (5) 2004-2007 (6) 2005-2008 (7) 2006-2009 (8) 2007-2010 
  CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] 
Freq2 -0.0030** -0.0025* -0.0021*** -0.0013** -0.0001 -0.0017** 0.0000 0.0001 
 
(-2.14) (-1.94) (-2.99) (-2.04) (-0.21) (-2.17) (0.05) (0.15) 
Deal-specific variables 
Cash -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0035* -0.0036* -0.0035* -0.0035* -0.0033 -0.0025 
  (-1.56) (-1.57) (-1.84) (-1.87) (-1.86) (-1.84) (-1.35) (-1.13) 
Stock -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0012 
  (-0.30) (-0.31) (-0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (-0.28) (-0.31) 
Public -0.0053* -0.0055* -0.0042* -0.0040* -0.0040* -0.0041* -0.0064** -0.0059** 
  (-1.85) (-1.91) (-1.77) (-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.75) (-2.06) (-2.12) 
Private -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0015 
  (-0.95) (-0.94) (-1.16) (-1.15) (-1.22) (-1.23) (-0.95) (-0.78) 
Attitude -0.0227 -0.0234 -0.0181 -0.0176 -0.0168 -0.0166 -0.0260 -0.0256* 
  (-1.51) (-1.56) (-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.61) (-1.76) 
Relatedness 0.0020 0.0019 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 0.0021 0.0021 
  (1.00) (0.95) (0.90) (0.93) (1.03) (1.02) (1.01) (1.12) 
Cross border 0.0027** 0.0028** 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0027 0.0028 0.0028 0.0023 
  (2.16) (2.11) (2.14) (2.17) (1.55) (1.59) (1.22) (1.11) 
Firm-specific variables 
Relative size 0.0025* 0.0026* 0.0023* 0.0024* 0.0024* 0.0024** 0.0027* 0.0020 
  (1.66) (1.72) (1.92) (1.94) (1.96) (1.99) (1.71) (1.40) 
Leverage -0.0158 -0.0153 -0.0099 -0.0104 -0.0110 -0.0109 -0.0186 -0.0176* 
  (-1.44) (-1.40) (-1.10) (-1.15) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.58) (-1.66) 
FCF -0.0005 -0.0013 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0038 
  (-0.05) (-0.12) (0.08) (-0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (-0.23) (-0.39) 
Constant -0.0125 0.0005 0.0109* 0.0107* 0.0108* 0.0109* -0.0035 -0.0061 
  (-0.99) (0.07) (1.72) (1.70) (1.71) (1.73) (-0.42) (-0.81) 
  
        R2-adjusted 34.15% 33.93% 34.34% 34.03% 33.76% 33.85% 33.72% 33.61% 
Heterogeneity 1.315*** 1.231*** 1.247*** 1.241*** 1.240*** 1.252*** 1.231*** 1.201*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 3.02 2.85 3.17 2.93 2.73 2.79 2.70 2.61 
Observations 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 2552 
No. of firms 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 1065 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, *** represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,. 
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3.9. Conclusions 
 
 Does merger frequency affect stock performance? It is evident from this study 
that short-term frequency and medium-term frequency are negatively related to CARs. 
However, long-term frequency is not significantly related to the market expectation of 
performance improvement. This suggests that the effect of merger frequency does not 
last permanently. A distinctive contribution to the literature made by this study is to 
examine the merger frequency impacts on market expectation in both the temporal and 
the quantitative dimensions. 
 
 
 This chapter examines the interaction of the number of takeover events with the 
time of their lasting effect after the event occurrence in order to explore the impact of 
merger frequency on market expectation about the future performance of an acquiring 
firm. The interaction provides the advantage of assessing an argument about which kind 
of managerial behaviour caused by repeated events such as merger frequency are 
stronger or dominant in affecting performance: management hubris or management 
learning? 
 
 
 Firstly, if the number of merger repetitions presents “hubris”, then it is expected 
that the frequency is negatively related to the market performance of acquiring firms. 
Secondly for a given number of mergers, if the length of time after the event occurrence 
reflects the amount of learning time which the management needs to digest 
opportunities and changes from new integrated business for more learning, then the 
longer time of an event repeating is expected to be positively related to performance. 
However, the estimation in this chapter of the interaction of frequency with time shows 
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that the two managerial behaviours co-exist. It is evident that the negative effect of the 
short term and medium term merger frequency decreases over time and may become 
insignificant. 
 
 
 In addition, the study shows that the larger size of a merger has a positive effect 
on performance.  This supports the argument about “risk pressure” on management of 
the acquiring firm. The estimation results are robust in two senses: firstly, controlled 
firm fixed effects in estimation, and secondly, a larger sample provides the consistency 
of estimation across different economies.   
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Appendix A 
Table A1. The effect of merger frequency on acquirer stock performance based on 3-day CARs 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
Panel B: Full sample with 
interaction variable 
Dependent variable: CAR[-1+1] (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
Merger Frequency 
     
Freq1 -0.0002 
  
-0.0002 
 
 
(-0.42) 
  
(-0.41) 
 
Freq3 
 
-0.0017* 
  
-0.0016* 
  
(-1.74) 
  
(-1.65) 
Deal-specific variables 
    
Cash 0.0015 0.0016 
   
 
-0.63 -0.63 
   
Stock -0.0017 -0.0014 
   
 
(-0.52) (-0.42) 
   
Public -0.0165*** -0.0167*** 
   
 
(-6.00) (-6.06) 
   
Private -0.0014 -0.0013 
   
 
(-0.65) (-0.60) 
   
Cash*public 
   
0.0004 0.0003 
    
-0.11 -0.09 
Stock*public 
   
-0.0211*** -0.0211*** 
    
(-5.16) (-5.15) 
Cash*private 
   
-0.0008 -0.0007 
    
(-0.35) (-0.33) 
Stock*private 
   
0.006 0.0066 
    
-1.37 -1.52 
Attitude -0.0310* -0.0316* 
 
-0.0397** -0.0403** 
 
(-1.75) (-1.79) 
 
(-2.28) (-2.31) 
Relatedness -0.0032 -0.0031 
 
-0.0031 -0.0031 
 
(-1.42) (-1.40) 
 
(-1.41) (-1.39) 
Cross border 0.0039 0.004 
 
0.0045* 0.0045* 
 
-1.58 -1.6 
 
-1.85 -1.87 
Firm-specific variables 
    
Relative size 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 
 
0.0102*** 0.0101*** 
 
-7.22 -7.16 
 
-7.07 -7.01 
Leverage 0.0035 0.0029 
 
0.0042 0.0036 
 
-0.47 -0.39 
 
-0.57 -0.5 
FCF -0.0257*** -0.0256*** 
 
-0.0260*** -0.0259*** 
 
(-4.66) (-4.65) 
 
(-4.79) (-4.78) 
Constant 0.0232*** 0.0270*** 
 
0.0203*** 0.0238*** 
 
-4.73 -5.18 
 
-4.6 -5.02 
      
R2-adjusted 33.15% 33.17% 
 
33.61% 33.63% 
Heterogeneity 1.85*** 1.85*** 
 
1.87*** 1.87*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES 
 
YES YES 
F-statistic 8.22 8.36 
 
7.89 8.02 
No. of pooled observations 12968 12968 
 
12968 12968 
No. of firms 6098 6098 
 
6098 6098 
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the 3-day (−1, +1) around the acquisition announcement (day 
0). A modified market-adjusted model:AR𝑖𝑡 = R𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is obtained to estimate the abnormal returns.. Statistical 
significance is marked at 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10 (%) levels, based on robust standard errors. 
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Table A2. The effect of medium-term merger frequency on acquirer stock performance based on 3-day CARs 
  (1) 2000-2003 (2) 2001-2004 (3) 2002-2005 (4) 2003-2006 (5) 2004-2007 (6) 2005-2008 (7) 2006-2009 (8) 2007-2010 
VARIABLES CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] 
Freq2 -0.0012*** -0.0018*** -0.0011** -0.0009* -0.0008* -0.0009* -0.0010* -0.0003 
 
(-2.60) (-2.81) (-2.30) (-1.94) (-1.87) (-1.89) (-1.81) (-0.74) 
Deal-specific variables 
        
Cash 0.0015 0.0044*** 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0018* 
  (1.31) (3.02) (0.41) (0.39) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (1.72) 
Stock -0.0007 -0.0034* -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 
  (-0.44) (-1.74) (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.46) (-0.61) 
Public -0.0062*** -0.0107*** -0.0079*** -0.0079*** -0.0079*** -0.0079*** -0.0079*** -0.0054*** 
  (-4.85) (-6.54) (-4.86) (-4.84) (-4.83) (-4.84) (-4.85) (-4.73) 
Private -0.0004 0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0001 
  (-0.41) (1.28) (-1.10) (-1.08) (-1.11) (-1.10) (-1.07) (-0.16) 
Attitude -0.0197** -0.0203* -0.0229** -0.0230** -0.0229** -0.0229** -0.0227** -0.0184** 
  (-2.42) (-1.92) (-2.19) (-2.19) (-2.18) (-2.18) (-2.17) (-2.51) 
Relatedness 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0002 
  (0.17) (-0.57) (-0.43) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.44) (0.23) 
Cross border 0.0011 0.0021 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0010 
  (0.93) (1.44) (0.99) (0.99) (1.01) (1.03) (1.06) (1.00) 
Firm-specific variables 
        
Relative size 0.0019*** -0.0008 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0013** 
  (2.72) (-0.87) (4.77) (4.78) (4.78) (4.77) (4.76) (2.05) 
Leverage 0.0025 0.0066 0.0041 0.0041 0.0043 0.0044 0.0044 0.0021 
  (0.73) (1.49) (0.93) (0.93) (0.98) (0.99) (1.00) (0.69) 
FCF -0.0053** -0.0047 -0.0097*** -0.0098*** -0.0098*** -0.0098*** -0.0098*** -0.0043* 
  (-2.09) (-1.43) (-2.98) (-3.00) (-3.00) (-3.00) (-3.01) (-1.87) 
Constant 0.0086*** -0.0177*** 0.0190*** 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 0.0192*** 0.0192*** 0.0029 
  (3.75) (-6.14) (6.64) (6.64) (6.65) (6.69) (6.68) (1.45) 
  
        
R2-adjusted 31.46% 33.01% 31.72% 31.70% 31.69% 31.69% 31.69% 31.40% 
Heterogeneity 1.227*** 1.250*** 1.372*** 1.375*** 1.321*** 1.341*** 1.373*** 1.183*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 4.84 10.12 5.70 5.63 5.61 5.62 5.60 4.63 
No. of pooled observations 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 
No. of firms 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the 3-day (−1, +1) around the acquisition announcement (day 0). A modified market-adjusted model:AR𝑖𝑡 = R𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is obtained to estimate the 
abnormal returns. Statistical significance is marked at 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10 (%) levels, based on robust standard errors. 
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Table A3.  The effect of medium-term merger frequency on acquirer stock performance based on 3-day CARs (with interaction variables) 
  (1) 2000-2003 (2) 2001-2004 (3) 2002-2005 (4) 2003-2006 (5) 2004-2007 (6) 2005-2008 (7) 2006-2009 (8) 2007-2010 
VARIABLES CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] 
Merger Frequency 
        Freq2 -0.0012*** -0.0018*** -0.0011** -0.0009* -0.0008* -0.0009* -0.0010* -0.0003 
 
(-2.60) (-2.81) (-2.30) (-1.94) (-1.87) (-1.89) (-1.81) (-0.74) 
Deal-specific variables 
        Cash*public 0.0019 0.0019 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0020 
  (1.33) (0.99) (0.85) (0.85) (0.85) (0.82) (0.83) (1.56) 
Stock*public -0.0097*** -0.0181*** -0.0111*** -0.0111*** -0.0111*** -0.0111*** -0.0112*** -0.0088*** 
  (-5.08) (-7.32) (-4.51) (-4.52) (-4.52) (-4.52) (-4.54) (-5.14) 
Cash*private 0.0002 0.0034** -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0006 
  (0.22) (2.54) (-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.59) (0.68) 
Stock*private 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0000 
  (0.36) (-0.23) (0.17) (0.15) (0.11) (0.16) (0.23) (-0.00) 
Attitude -0.0235*** -0.0266** -0.0273*** -0.0274*** -0.0273*** -0.0272*** -0.0271*** -0.0218*** 
  (-2.88) (-2.52) (-2.61) (-2.61) (-2.60) (-2.60) (-2.59) (-2.98) 
Relatedness 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0002 
  (0.16) (-0.66) (-0.43) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.44) (0.20) 
Cross border 0.0013 0.0027* 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0018 0.0012 
  (1.12) (1.81) (1.15) (1.15) (1.17) (1.18) (1.22) (1.21) 
Firm-specific variables 
        Relative size 0.0016** -0.0013 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0010 
  (2.34) (-1.52) (4.46) (4.47) (4.48) (4.47) (4.46) (1.64) 
Leverage 0.0029 0.0071 0.0047 0.0047 0.0048 0.0049 0.0050 0.0025 
  (0.85) (1.61) (1.06) (1.06) (1.10) (1.11) (1.13) (0.80) 
FCF -0.0055** -0.0050 -0.0100*** -0.0100*** -0.0100*** -0.0100*** -0.0100*** -0.0044* 
  (-2.15) (-1.52) (-3.05) (-3.07) (-3.06) (-3.06) (-3.07) (-1.94) 
Constant 0.0078*** -0.0179*** 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0173*** 0.0173*** 0.0024 
  (3.72) (-6.83) (6.60) (6.61) (6.59) (6.64) (6.63) (1.33) 
  
        R2-adjusted 31.43% 32.60% 31.66% 31.62% 31.61% 31.64% 31.34% 31.35% 
Heterogeneity 1.238*** 1.250*** 1.389*** 1.338*** 1.318*** 1.389*** 1.390*** 1.192*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 4.72 8.71 5.50 5.45 5.74 5.44 5.43 4.47 
No. of pooled observations 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 
No. of firms 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the 3-day (−1, +1) around the acquisition announcement (day 0). A modified market-adjusted model:AR𝑖𝑡 = R𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is obtained to estimate the 
abnormal returns. Statistical significance is marked at 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10 (%) levels, based on robust standard errors. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. The effect of medium-term merger frequency on acquirer stock performance based on 5-day CARs 
  (1) 2000-2003 (2) 2001-2004 (3) 2002-2005 (4) 2003-2006 (5) 2004-2007 (6) 2005-2008 (7) 2006-2009 (8) 2007-2010 
 
CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] 
Freq2 -0.0014** -0.0024*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 
(-2.44) (-3.09) (-3.01) (-2.89) (-1.87) (-1.10) (-0.81) (-0.64) 
Deal-specific variables 
Cash -0.0001 0.0034* -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0003 
  (-0.08) (1.89) (-0.56) (-0.58) (-0.65) (-0.64) (-0.63) (0.22) 
Stock -0.0025 -0.0045* -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0025 
  (-1.30) (-1.89) (-1.05) (-1.08) (-1.10) (-1.07) (-1.05) (-1.44) 
Public -0.0078*** -0.0107*** -0.0100*** -0.0099*** -0.0099*** -0.0100*** -0.0100*** -0.0071*** 
  (-4.95) (-5.40) (-5.03) (-5.01) (-5.01) (-5.03) (-5.03) (-4.96) 
Private -0.0005 0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0004 
  (-0.36) (0.78) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-0.67) (-0.38) 
Attitude -0.0141 -0.0128 -0.0183 -0.0184 -0.0182 -0.0181 -0.0180 -0.0132 
  (-1.39) (-1.00) (-1.44) (-1.44) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.41) (-1.44) 
Relatedness 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0005 
  (0.30) (0.07) (-0.28) (-0.26) (-0.25) (-0.27) (-0.27) (0.45) 
Cross border 0.0016 0.0025 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0014 
  (1.13) (1.38) (1.16) (1.17) (1.19) (1.20) (1.21) (1.07) 
Firm-specific variables 
Relative size 0.0022*** -0.0005 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0015* 
  (2.64) (-0.50) (4.91) (4.92) (4.92) (4.92) (4.92) (1.94) 
Leverage 0.0064 0.0114** 0.0095* 0.0095* 0.0098* 0.0097* 0.0097* 0.0055 
  (1.51) (2.12) (1.77) (1.78) (1.82) (1.81) (1.81) (1.44) 
FCF -0.0080** -0.0086** -0.0126*** -0.0127*** -0.0127*** -0.0127*** -0.0127*** -0.0071** 
  (-2.53) (-2.16) (-3.18) (-3.21) (-3.20) (-3.20) (-3.21) (-2.49) 
Constant 0.0125*** -0.0221*** 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0241*** 0.0243*** 0.0243*** 0.0059** 
  (4.40) (-6.32) (6.86) (6.84) (6.90) (6.97) (6.97) (2.36) 
R2-adjusted 33.12% 32.52% 30.19% 31.32% 34.29% 33.12% 32.09% 31.47% 
Heterogeneity 1.197*** 1.242*** 1.319*** 1.317*** 1.316*** 1.316*** 1.318*** 1.163*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 5.38 8.95 7.35 7.32 7.08 6.97 6.94 4.85 
Observations 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 
No. of firms 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, *** represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table B2. The effect of medium-term merger frequency on acquirer stock performance based on 5-day CARs (with interaction variables) 
  (1) 2000-2003 (2) 2001-2004 (3) 2002-2005 (4) 2003-2006 (5) 2004-2007 (6) 2005-2008 (7) 2006-2009 (8) 2007-2010 
VARIABLES CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-2,+2] 
Freq2 -0.0014** -0.0023*** -0.0018*** -0.0015*** -0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 
(-2.52) (-2.90) (-2.91) (-2.80) (-1.83) (-1.06) (-0.80) (-0.62) 
Deal-specific variables 
        
Cash*public 0.0013 0.0025 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 
  (0.70) (1.10) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.77) 
Stock*public -0.0104*** -0.0157*** -0.0129*** -0.0129*** -0.0129*** -0.0130*** -0.0130*** -0.0093*** 
  (-4.37) (-5.23) (-4.31) (-4.31) (-4.32) (-4.33) (-4.34) (-4.36) 
Cash*private -0.0009 0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0007 
  (-0.75) (1.41) (-1.21) (-1.17) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-0.58) 
Stock*private 0.0001 -0.0019 0.0012 0.0010 0.0011 0.0013 0.0014 -0.0008 
  (0.03) (-0.59) (0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.41) (0.45) (-0.34) 
Attitude -0.0184* -0.0193 -0.0235* -0.0236* -0.0234* -0.0233* -0.0232* -0.0172* 
  (-1.82) (-1.51) (-1.85) (-1.85) (-1.83) (-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.88) 
Relatedness 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0005 
  (0.27) (-0.02) (-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.27) (0.41) 
Cross border 0.0019 0.0031* 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0025 0.0025 0.0017 
  (1.36) (1.74) (1.36) (1.36) (1.38) (1.39) (1.40) (1.33) 
Firm-specific variables 
        Relative size 0.0019** -0.0011 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0012 
  (2.27) (-1.06) (4.59) (4.60) (4.61) (4.60) (4.60) (1.54) 
Leverage 0.0070 0.0119** 0.0103* 0.0103* 0.0106** 0.0105** 0.0105** 0.0060 
  (1.64) (2.22) (1.92) (1.92) (1.97) (1.96) (1.96) (1.56) 
FCF -0.0080** -0.0088** -0.0127*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0072** 
  (-2.55) (-2.22) (-3.21) (-3.23) (-3.22) (-3.22) (-3.23) (-2.52) 
Constant 0.0103*** -0.0232*** 0.0207*** 0.0207*** 0.0208*** 0.0210*** 0.0210*** 0.0041* 
  (4.00) (-7.32) (6.52) (6.52) (6.55) (6.62) (6.62) (1.81) 
R2-adjusted 31.46% 32.27% 32.08% 32.07% 32.00% 31.97% 31.96% 31.27% 
Heterogeneity 1.205*** 1.244*** 1.332*** 1.330*** 1.329*** 1.329*** 1.331*** 1.169*** 
Firm Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 4.82 7.58 6.91 6.88 6.66 6.55 6.53 4.19 
Observations 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 12968 
No. of firms 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 6098 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, *** represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.. 
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4. The effect of merger shocks on firm fundamentals: a 
dynamic estimation 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 Chapters 2 and 3 discussed how a greater merger frequency for an acquiring 
firm results in lower stock returns for investors. However, the announcement returns 
may tell us more about how the stock market or investors reassess the acquiring firm 
than it does about the actual influence on the operation of bidder’s business (Grinblatt 
and Titman, 2002). This raises a question: Is there any consistency between the market 
reaction to an announcement of takeover and how the takeover affects an acquirer’s 
fundamentals afterwards? This chapter seeks the answer to this question. 
 
 
 Existing research is limited because much of it focuses on the effects of 
acquisitions on the shareholders of acquiring firms (e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Fuller et al., 2002; Billett and Qian, 2008). Other extensive empirical studies (e.g. Healy 
et al., 1992; Clark and Ofek, 1994) attempted to explain the causes and effects of 
takeovers on the fundamentals of acquiring firms. They often ignored a fact that a large 
body of acquirers performs frequent acquisitions during a specific period, some of them 
even within the same year. Consequently, scholars know much less about the effect of 
the frequent acquisition activity on the operational performance of acquiring firm. Also, 
the distinction of effects on operational performance between infrequent and frequent 
acquisition has been under-examined in the existing empirical research. 
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 This chapter responds to the limitations in the existing research from an 
operational perspective in a specific research setting: the relation between merger 
frequency or shock, and operational performance. It focuses on how the operational 
performance changes as an acquirer makes a different frequency of acquisition in a 
different time interval. If the acquiring firm can properly digest acquired assets and 
absorb “nutrition” from those assets, then the profitability of the acquiring firm will be 
improved, or at least, not damaged.  
 
 
 Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is applied to the dynamic 
panel data in order to deal with endogeneity (Arellano and Bover, 1995, and Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). By controlling for the firm time-invariant specific effects and general 
market conditions, a large dataset which consists of 2,172 unique worldwide acquiring 
firms undertaking 3,488 acquisitions during a 10-year period from 1st January 2000 to 
31st December 2009, is analyzed. Among 2,172 acquirers, 887 carried out more than 
one acquisition across the sample span. The study then includes accounting data from 
2000 to 2012 to ensure the availability of accounting information about acquiring firms 
for at least three years after acquisition.  
 
 
 Five main findings stand out from estimations. Firstly, the merger frequency is 
significantly and negatively related to acquirer’s operational performance. Secondly, the 
strength of the negative effect is reduced with time. Thirdly, single acquirers outperform 
frequent acquirers. More specifically, the effect of merger frequency on a firm’s 
fundamentals becomes positive in a long-term process: improving profitability of single 
acquiring firms. However, for multi-acquirers, it appears that the performance effect of 
merger frequency becomes weaker over time. Fourthly, the effect of a merger shock 
generally lasts a couple of years after acquisition and therefore the effect of a merger 
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shock is not permanent. Fifthly, Jenson’s agent hypothesis, which predicts a negative 
change that can last in the long run after the merger, is rejected. 
 
 The research design developed in this chapter enables four new contributions to 
the literature. Firstly, this chapter is innovative because it systematically analyzes the 
operational performance implications of the frequent acquisition by employing a large 
global sample of acquiring companies. Secondly, this chapter introduces a new 
argument that the number and time of merger shock matter simultaneously for the 
performance effects of merger shocks or frequency. Thirdly, it contributes to the 
literature by distinguishing effects between frequent acquirers and single acquirers – an 
area neglected in the literature. Fourthly, it extends the existing digesting theory 
(McCarthy, 1963) and the chewing theory (Kusewitt, 1985) into a dynamic context. It 
argues that the effect of merger shocks or frequency changes with time.  
 
 
As a result the existing process “Need to Chew” needs to be followed by a new 
process “Chew to Change”. McCarthy suggests that the presence of the clash of cultures 
and conflicts of objectives between the acquirer and the acquire leads to inefficiency in 
digestion and absorption of the “nutrition”. Kusewitt refers to this indigestion issue as 
“biting off more than you can chew”. Both of these arguments suggest that the negative 
effect of merger frequency is attributable to the number of acquisitions. However, when 
time is taken into account in the process of digestion, the longer process helps the firm 
to gradually absorb the shocks of frequent acquisition, and then allows it to gain more 
corporate synergies for business operation. 
 
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2, discusses related 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 4.3 builds estimation model and lays out the 
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theoretical basis for the biases that may arise in commonly used techniques for 
estimating the relation between merger strategy and performance. The data for empirical 
applications is described in Section 4.4. Section 3.5 provides an empirical analysis of 
the relation between merger frequency and firm performance. Section 3.6 discusses 
robustness checks. Section 3.7concludes. 
 
 
4.2. Literature review 
 
4.2.1. Theoretical background 
 There is much discussion in economics and finance studies about the driver 
behind the positive economic impact of takeovers on acquirer’s operating performance. 
Generally it has concerned the creation of synergy. For example, the empirical results of 
Bradley et al. (1983) suggest the positive effects of the synergy motive on the acquiring 
firms’ operating performance. Based on positive findings drawn from M&A literature, 
scholars developed synergy theory to explain the enhanced performance of acquirers 
after acquisitions. In general, synergy exists when the newly consolidated firm runs 
more efficiently and more effectively than two separate firms that are combined 
(Lubatkin, 1983; Seth et al., 2000). If this was the case, then the entirely new integrated 
firm would be more profitable than the sum of two individual entities (Gaughan, 2005).  
 
 
 The existing literature suggests that takeovers are able to improve the operating 
performance of the acquiring firm through various sources of synergy. One major 
source of acquisition synergy is cost saving (Berger and Ofeck, 1995; Gaughan, 2010) 
which results from economies of scale and scope (Brealey et al., 2006). Economies of 
scale arise for the acquiring firm if the quantity of production increases with reduction 
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in average unit fixed-cost (Seth, 1990).  Conceptually similar to the economies of scale, 
the economies of scope arise when the acquiring firm is able to produce various goods 
at a lower cost than if production are spread across multiple firms (Severiens, 1991). 
Generally, the production-linked economies of scale and scope are considered to be the 
major rationale for cost saving. However, Shepherd (1979) suggests that the benefits of 
economies of scale are not only related to production, but the economies of scale can 
also occur in several areas within a business, such as R&D personnel and facilities, 
distribution, sales, or administrative activities, as fixed costs are spread out over higher 
total output.  
 
 
 Market power is known as another source of synergy (Lubatkin, 1983). Gaughan 
(2005) suggests that the positive impact of acquisition on a firm's performance can 
occur when firms strengthen their financial position by increasing market power. 
Generally, market power refers to gain of economic profits when the market price of a 
good or service exceeds marginal cost and long-term average cost. However, firms may 
perform serial acquisitions to achieve significant market power that is likely to result in 
monopoly and/or monopsony.  This allows an acquiring firm to force buyers to accept a 
higher price and/or suppliers to sell at a discounted price. Then the acquiring firm is 
able to gain a higher monopolistic profit (Porter, 1980; Mueller, 1985; Andrade at al., 
2001). 
 
 
 In line with this notion, Kamien and Zang (1993) suggest that acquirers can 
rapidly expand the range of production and geographical penetration through sequential 
acquisitions and then monopolize an industry or a market to enhance synergy gain. 
More recently, Gugler et al. (2003) state that serial acquirers are able to capture more 
consumer surplus, and be more competitive than rival firms. Furthermore, Chatterjee 
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(1986) points out that such advantage in the form of collusive synergies are much higher 
than production one. 
 
 
 Alternatively, merger-related gains may stem from learning economies that lead 
to a fall in cost since the new consolidated firm has "a sufficiently high level of 
cumulative volume of production to exploit learning curve economies" which may give 
an advantage over independent firms (Capron, 1999). The cost reduction through 
learning economy, which results in higher efficiency and growth in productivity is, on 
the one hand, conducted by reducing the amount of production wasted and increasing 
the synergies from research and development (R&D). On the other hand, cost saving 
may also be achieved when the managers of an acquiring firm become more skilled at 
cost saving through learning as the management of the acquiring firm has developed the 
skills to hold down the expenses of the ‘target part’ of a new consolidation. 
 
 
 On the contrary, the merger activities may lead to value reduction in an 
acquiring firm’s performance. Fowler and Schmidt (1989) find that the number of 
previous takeovers is negatively related to the performance of an acquiring firm and 
attribute this result to corporate indigestion. Later, Caves (1989) suggests that 
ineffective solutions for post-merger integration issues can lead to an increase in 
integration costs and loss of competitive edge, and the ineffective solutions then cause a 
reduction in the profitability of the acquiring firm. Conn et al. (2004) further state that 
this adverse relation may be even more pronounced for serial or frequent acquisitions, 
since the larger organizational challenges and financial constraints need to be faced 
when absorbing or integrating multiple target firms (Kamien and Zang, 1993). 
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 Some of the existing literature considers integration deficiency, which is a major 
concern for frequent acquisition makers, to be attributable to indigestion theory 
(McCarthy, 1963; Terry, 1982; Shrivastava, 1986). The corporate indigestion theory 
predicts that in a short time period, a substantial number of targets are unable to be 
successfully integrated or digested by an acquiring firm and this ultimately brings a 
negative impact on the acquiring firm’s operating performance.  
 
 
 Corporate indigestion may arise from three major sources. Firstly, the clash of 
cultures between the acquiree and the acquirer will be stronger as the number of target 
firms increases. Jemison and Sitkin (1986) suggest that culture is an integral part of the 
merger process. Further, other authors state that a bigger culture gap would result in 
lower commitment to the job for acquired employees (Sales & Mirvis, 1984; Buono et 
al,. 1985), and greater diminishment of relative standing among the acquired executives 
(Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Lubatkin et al., 1998). This implies that the 
effectiveness of the integration would be reduced when integrating a great number of 
subordinate cultures.  
 
 
 Secondly, the contradiction of strategic objectives among different businesses 
will be intensified when the acquiring firm absorbs and integrates multiple target firms. 
It causes more difficulties in the decision-making for business operation, and finally 
leads to a decrease in the acquirer’s operational performance. Some researchers argue 
that the activities of strategic integration are more long-term in different aspects: 
relationship building, joint development activities, and sharing of cost and capability 
information (Narasimhan and Kim, 2002; Swink et al., 2007).  
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 Thirdly, the multiple dealmakers need to spend more time on the adjustment of 
corporate organizational structure than a single acquirer does. Therefore, the large 
organizational challenges that multiple dealmakers face will lead to inefficiency in post-
merger operating and resource allocation (Bertrand and Betschinger, 2012).  
 
 
 Alternatively, the agency theory posits that serial acquisitions may cause great 
agency costs for the acquiring firm. Jensen (1986) indicates that empire-building 
managers tend to acquire firms for their own benefit rather than maximizing company 
wealth, since acquisitions can reduce the likelihood of their own replacement. When the 
agency motive, which is an impure initial motive, is the main motive behind M&As, the 
profit of acquirers would be destroyed. In addition, during the decision-making process, 
irrational decision-makers (hubristic managers) would also reduce the value of an 
acquiring firm since they frequently overestimate the ability to exploit synergies (Roll, 
1986) and thus overpay the target (Hitt et al., 2001). 
 
 
 In summary, operating performance studies present conflicting arguments for the 
effect of takeovers on the performance of acquiring firms. More importantly, research of 
the impact of mergers on firm’s fundamentals indicates that multiple deal makers or 
frequent acquirers are expected, or perceived, to create a more negative impact on 
improving post-merger performance (Conn et al., 2004). However, from an empirical 
perspective, most of acquisition/operating performance studies have failed to consider 
merger frequency sufficiently as an important factor in determining the post-merger 
performance of an acquirer. A failure in controlling merger frequency in estimation of 
post-merger performance can result in a biased result or analysis (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 
2001).  
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 Further, as stated in Chapter 3 and 4, it has shown that single and multiple 
acquirers or infrequent and frequent acquirers differ in their announcement returns to 
the shareholders of acquiring firms. As a result, it is expected that fundamentals or 
operational performance may also differ between infrequent and frequent acquirers if 
the stock market is efficient in reflecting the firm’s fundamentals. Therefore this chapter 
looks at the question: Can market expectation of merger events on the announcement 
date be consistent with what would happen to a firm’s operational performance in a later 
period? 
 
 
 Overall, existing studies provide contradictory arguments about an acquiring 
firm’s operating performance. Apparently, the distinction between infrequent and 
frequent acquirers has been under-investigated, in particular, from the perspective of a 
firm’s operating performance. Therefore, this chapter will build on existing literature 
about the relationship between merger frequencies and operating performance. 
 
 
4.2.2. Empirical evidence 
 What is the effect of M&A on the acquiring firm’s operating performance? This 
has been a question for researchers over many years. There are three major perspectives 
on the question: significant deterioration, significant improvement, and insignificant 
changes in post-merger operating performance. Some scholars found that takeovers 
could lead to a significant decline in the post-acquisition operating performance. 
Hogarty (1970) employs earnings per share and capital gains as measures of a firms’ 
profitability and is one of the earliest studies to document that takeovers have a negative 
impact on the post-acquisition profitability of acquiring firms based a sample of 43 US 
combined firms over the period 1953-1964. Also, Hogarty finds that the impact of 
 125 
 
acquisitions on a firm’s profitability becomes neutral when the target firms are included 
in the analysis.  
 
 
 Clark and Ofek (1994) examine the effect of acquisitions and mergers by 
comparing three years pre and post-merger performance. They find that the operating 
performance declines over following acquisitions during the period of 1981-1988 and 
explain that the declining trend is mainly caused by industry factors. They also give 
some other factors associated with poor post-merger performance: the overpayment of 
bidders and high levels of post-merger leverage. Furthermore, Clark and Ofek (1994) 
suggest that the acquiring firms of financially distressed targets are frequently in the 
same industry. Similarly, Kruse et al. (2002) document significant reduction in the post-
acquisition operating performance of 46 combined firms, and Yeh and Hoshino (2002) 
in 86 combined firms. However, due to the limitation created by a small sample size, the 
finding cannot be generalized to the broader community. 
 
 
 By examining changes of return on assets (ROA) for a sample of 233 UK 
takeovers over the period 1964-1972, Meeks (1977) finds that the post-merger 
profitability of acquirers significantly deteriorates in the post-merger years. It is worth 
noting that in their sample, about two-thirds of acquirers' performances are lower than 
the industry average standard.  Following Meek (1977), Dickerson et al. (1997) explore 
merger effects based on a larger sample of 4430 UK acquisitions over the period 1948-
1977. Consistent with Meeks (1977), Dickerson et al. find significant deterioration in 
the operating performance in the five years following the focal merger, whilst the 
coefficient for acquisition growth is much lower than internal growth. This evidence 
shows that takeovers have a "systematically detrimental" effect on a firm’s performance. 
In addition, they report that the performance of non-acquiring firms significantly 
outperform acquiring firms by 2.4% per annum. 
 126 
 
 
 In contrast, some researchers’ findings suggest significant improvement in post-
merger operating performance. Healy et al. published a study in 1992 which is 
considered to be one of the most influential empirical studies in the literature of 
operating performance. They examine the impact of takeovers on the operating 
performance of 50 largest U.S. acquisitions over the period 1979-1984. The study states 
that various sources can give rise to a 2.8% improvement in industry-adjusted cash flow 
returns on all tangible assets (IACRTA). For instance, the higher productivity of assets, 
and the lower cost of labour and operating margin are improved. They also disclose that 
there is no evidence for the linkage between cash flow performance and payment 
method, as well as a friendly or hostile deal atmosphere. Later, Healy et al. (1997) re-
investigate the same sample of takeovers and find a significantly positive relation 
between takeovers and the asset productivity of acquiring firms.  Healy et al. do not find 
significant improvement in industry-adjusted cash-flow return on all assets.  
 
 
 Using the same performance measure (IACRTA) and industry median control as 
in Healy et al. (1992), Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) investigate the relation 
between acquisition and post-acquisition performance based on 162 Hong Kong 
takeovers over the period 1975-1990. They find that mergers significantly improve the 
operating performance of acquiring firms, which is broadly consistent with both the 
expectation of efficient market theory and empirical evidence suggested by the findings 
of Healy et al. (1992). Further, the sample is divided into those acquisitions which 
occurred before and after 1982. This evidence shows that the improvement in operating 
performance is significant prior to 1982, but insignificant afterwards.  
 
 
 Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) argue that the findings of Healy et al (1992) 
are subject to the period selected. Another influential scholar in operating performance 
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research, Switzer (1996) also argues that the findings of Healy et al (1992) are not 
sensitive to sample size and sample period. By examining 324 pairs of US target and 
acquiring firms over the period 1967-1987, Switzer suggests that the median industry 
adjusted operating performance improves over the five years following the merger, 
which is mainly due to the expected synergies of takeovers.  
 
 
 To avoid the impact of country factors, Gugler et al. (2003) analyse the effects 
of mergers by using a sample of 2,753 worldwide acquisitions over the period 1981-
1998. Their results demonstrate that acquirer's profits increase significantly after the 
merger. However, it is found that sales significantly decline in the post-merger period. 
One possible explanation is that the increasing market power suggests the ability to 
raise the price of its products. Unlike the results for sales, they find that the increasing 
market power could result in the improvement of acquirer's profit. Overall, they find 
that the patterns of post-acquisitions are similar across countries. In addition, the study 
does not consider the effects of industry changes before merger. 
 
 
 Unlike the studies above, other authors do not find any significant change in 
post-merger operating performance. Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987) and Herman & 
Lowenstein (1988) are considered to be the first two papers reporting non-significant 
findings in early studies. However, the investigations of Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987) 
have been criticized for a fault in the research design. The merger period of twenty-
seven years from 1950-1977, is not aligned with the investigation of performance 
change in a single three year period from 1974 to 1977. This results in the comparison 
of acquirers' performance focusing exclusively on the acquired firm’s lines of business 
(Bruner, 2002). The empirical results found by Herman & Lowenstein (1988) have also 
been questioned. Healy et al. (1992) argue that a large portion of post-merger data is 
missing for acquisitions after 1979 (the sample period is 1975-1983) and the authors fail 
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to control the differences in industry shocks. Therefore, the limitations of these studies 
make their findings hard to interpret. 
 
 
 To address the limitations of existing studies, following Healy et al. (1992), 
Ghosh (2001) examines 315 worldwide acquisitions completed over the period 1981-
1995. By comparing the realized performance following a takeover with benchmark 
performance of a sample of non-merging companies, Ghosh finds no evidence that a 
firm’s operating performances are improved in following acquisitions. Using a sample 
of 36 Australian acquisitions over the period between 1986 and 1991, Sharma and Ho 
(2002) compare various accounting measures of acquirer's operating performance and 
do not to find consistent results: cash flow and profit margin show non-significant 
changes between pre- and post-acquisitions, yet return on assets and return on equity 
show a significant decline with following acquisitions. 
 
 
 Furthermore, scholars document that the firm and its deal characteristics have an 
important impact upon determination of merger outcomes (Capron, 1999; Ishii and 
Xuan, 2011; Bertrand and Betschinger, 2013). Switzer and Linn (2000) examine a 
sample of 413 takeovers over the period 1967-1987, and develop  explanations for "why 
cash offers are sometimes selected over stock offers" instead of testing "why cash offers 
outperform stock offers" (Switzer, 2000, Pg 1134). The results suggest that the cash 
offers are significantly associated with the positive improvements in operating 
performance, while there are no significant changes for stock offers. Further, they find 
that changes made in the operating performance of target firms are significantly larger 
when the acquirer offers cash payment instead of stock offers.  
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Similarly, Ghosh (2001) finds that the operating cash flow significantly increases 
after the cash is made for paying acquisitions, but decreases after the stocks are used as 
payment. Sharma and Ho (2002) state that industry relatedness and size of firms are 
insignificantly related to acquirer’s operating performance, and significantly related to 
the declining operating performance of target firms. Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) 
document that a smaller acquirer outperforms a bigger acquirer. Further, they report that 
payment method is not associated with changes in post-merger performance, and 
diversified takeovers exhibit more positive operating performance than industry-related 
acquisitions. In contrast, Powell and Stark (2005) report non-significant results in 
industry relatedness. 
 
 
 Disparities in the operating performance of acquirers may also show up via 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Some existing empirical studies, for example 
Markides and Ittner (1994) document that acquirers derive more benefits from acquiring 
domestic targets than foreign ones, but others find the opposite results, for example 
Morck and Yeung (1992). Other studies of firm and deal characteristics also show 
mixed results about their effects on the operating performance of acquirers, for instance, 
Moeller et al., 2004 about size, Linn and Switzer (2001) about leverage, Martynova et al, 
2006) about industry relatedness, and Burkart and Panunzi (2006) about deal 
atmosphere. 
 
 
4.3. Model specification 
 
 This section first demonstrates a theoretical basis relating to the specific effect of 
endogeneity which may arise from the estimation of the dynamic relation between 
merger frequency and firm performance when using OLS or fixed-effects estimator and 
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illustrate the need of appropriate econometric procedures. Then the system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) for a dynamic panel analysis which makes those biases less 
severe, is discussed. 
 
 
4.3.1. A dynamic panel model for firm operating performance 
 Theoretical argument made by Shaver (1998) and Bertrand and Betschinger 
(2013) models show that an acquisition strategy is a choice variable that arises from a 
process that firms systematically make a strategic choice of acquiring or not acquiring, 
where this choosing process is affected by past performance and their expectation on 
outcomes of the acquisitions. This means that if a firm strategically decides to undertake 
frequent acquisitions today, then the subsequently unanticipated shocks on future 
performance will be related to the historical realization of merger frequency or 
performance. 
 
 
 Therefore, in the examination of frequent acquisition effects on operating 
performance of an acquiring firm, an important factor has to be taken into account: an 
acquisition strategy. As similar as many aspects of a firm's corporate strategies, for 
instance the board size, the acquisition strategy is dynamically endogenous to firm’s 
performance. A choice of a merger strategy depends on expectation of performance 
improvement brought by the intended mergers. Once the merger and merger strategy is 
successfully implemented, then this drives up performance. The interaction of merger 
strategy and performance implies that the strategy of mergers and performance are inter-
related endogenously and dynamically.  
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 On this basis, the inter-related performance and merger strategy are specified as 
follows: 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝒁 + 𝜺𝑖𝑡                                                      ⑴ 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝒁 + 𝜌𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜺𝑖𝑡                                       ⑵ 
 
where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is performance, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a merger strategy that represents a choice of frequency 
in this study. 𝒁 is a vector of other variables than can affect performance and choice of 
frequency exogenously. In estimations of (1) and (2), the residual term is further broke 
down as  
𝜺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑇𝑡+𝑉𝑖𝑡                                                               ⑶ 
 
where 𝑐𝑖  is firm specific effects, 𝑇𝑡  is a market condition at time t and 𝑉𝑖𝑡  captures 
modern shocks with normal distribution and constant variance. 
 
 
 Apparently, estimation of (1) and (2) will be affected by the endogenous 
problem. To overcome the problem and obtain consistent and unbiased estimates, 
following Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed 
the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach in the first-difference form for 
dynamic panel data, which removes the time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity in 
the following model: 
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛽1∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡∆𝑇𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡,    𝑘 > 0  ⑷ 
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 Then to deal with endogeneity, the historical values of explanatory variables 
(levels), for instance, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝,  𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑝,  𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑝, where p>k, are employed as instruments to 
predict ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 and ∆𝑦𝑡−1 with holding strict orthogonality restrictions: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣( 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣( 𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣( 𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0,    ∀ 𝑝 > 𝑘  ⑸ 
 
 However, in terms of transformation, Griliches and Hausman (1986) point out 
that estimations relying on first-differencing GMM estimator may magnify the errors of 
measurement on the dependent variables and thus lead to more serious bias. 
Alternatively, from the validity point of view for instruments, Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Bond (2002) further point that using the lagged levels of endogenous variable as 
instruments for their first-differences may be problematic due to poor prediction power 
when the data closely follows a random-walk process. 
 
 
 To address these issues, Arellano and Bover (1995) proposed an extension to 
improve the estimating efficiency by including the additional equation in levels into the 
first-difference estimating system. In the equation, the explanatory variables in levels 
are instrumented by suitable lags (later than t-1) of their first-differences. Later, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) fully developed this augmented “System” GMM estimator by 
making an additional assumption that the first differences of instrumenting variables are 
uncorrelated with the unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
 
 In sum, the system GMM is applied in the analysis because of its higher 
efficiency when compared to previous version of GMM estimator, while controlling for 
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endogeneity arising from time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and 
correlation between current values of the explanatory variables and the past realization 
of the dependent variable. As suggested in Roodman (2009), all possible lags later than 
t-2 of endogenous variable can be used as instruments for the estimation of model (2) 
where the highest lag of dependent variable is t-1.  
 
 
 Further, the key exogeneity assumption for approach in this study is that the 
firm's past performance and characteristics are exogenous to current shocks in 
performance. Two different tests are carred out for validity of instruments and the key 
assumption required. First, Arellano and Bond (1991) tests are applied to identify first - 
(AR (1)) and second-order (AR (2)) serial correlation of residuals. For GMM estimates, 
the valid instruments should theoretically be incorporated to the first-order 
autocorrelation and the absence of the second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced idiosyncratic residuals. Second, the Hansen-J statistic is calculated which is 
distributed 𝜒2, for the validity of over-identifying restrictions for each regression under 
the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments. Failure to reject the null hypothesis 
suggests the invalidity of the instruments. With a two-step estimation of system GMM, 
the Windmeijer (2005) correction is applied to correct for downward bias of standard 
errors. Overall, application tests listed above, exhibit that the system-GMM method is 
an appropriate approach in estimating the effect of frequency as a merger strategy on 
post-merger performance in a dynamic context. 
 
 
4.4. Variable construction, data source and sample 
 
 In this section, variables employed in the estimation of model (2) are discussed. 
Apart from the concerning variable of merger frequency, this study classifies other 
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explanatory variables according to deal-specific factors and firm-specific factors that are 
discussed below in turn. 
 
 
4.4.1. Merger frequency 
 In previous studies, several measures have been considered to investigate the 
impact of merger frequency. Commonly, a simple dummy variable is employed, in 
which dummy equals one if an acquiring firm is experienced in M&A, otherwise zero 
(for instance, Ismail, 2008). Alternatively, the number of mergers occurred during a 
period of time are taken as a measure of frequency for study of performance-frequency 
nexus. One example is Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) cumulated mergers performed 
over its sample time period. One limit of using sample span as the length of time to 
count mergers happened is unable for the study to compare merger intensities for their 
effects on performance and therefore a role of time in interacting with merger numbers 
can be omitted. For instance, two acquisitions pursued by a firm over a period of two 
years or over five years will make very different impacts on business in post-merger 
integration. 
 
 
 By considering this argument, merger frequency or numbers are counted relative 
to three different lengths of event shocking time: one year, four-year and the whole 
sample span. The three types of shock-lasting time imply three expectations for the 
lasting effects of a merger shock on changing firm performance after the event. How 
long the shock effect of a merger can last on new integration is a question related to the 
pace of a firm in digesting the merger shock. The shock can be positive or negative 
overall, depending on which factor dominates the process of new business integration, 
such as managerial hubris or learning impacts. 
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 With the long span of sample, it enables the study to explore the pace of a 
merger-shock that can be digested by the acquiring firm. The pace can be estimated by 
examining the sample strength of performance-merger nexus for every possible length 
of time that a merger shock is expected to last: one year, two years, three years, four 
years, and consecutively continued to the sample span. The pattern of a change in these 
estimates can demonstrate how the effect of a merger shock on performance can last and 
diminish gradually over time.  
 
 The interaction of time and number decides frequency. In the context of 
discussion here, a frequency for each of sample firm is counted in terms of three 
expectations of merger shock-lasting time, respectively, as follows: 
 
Frequency at time t with expectation of a merger shock lasting 1 year:  
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1 = 𝑚𝑖𝑡,     𝑡 = 1,2,3 … 𝑇    ⑹ 
 
Frequency at time t with expectation of shock lasting 4 years:  
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑡−4
𝑇
𝑡=5
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 𝑇 ≥ 5     𝑡 = 1,2,3 …                              ⑺ 
 
      and 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 0 < 𝑇 ≤ 4       ⑻ 
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Frequency at time t with expectation of a merger shock lasting 10 years: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑡
10
𝑡=1       ⑼ 
 
where, 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑁 is a merger frequency of firm i at time t with expectation that a merger shock 
can last N years on the firm’s integration after the merger event. 𝑚𝑖𝑡 is a number of 
mergers completed by the firm i at time t with a range of value from 0 without any 
merger activity to an indefinite number. Application of (6), (8) and (9) to compute 𝐹𝑖𝑡
1 , 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 and 𝐹𝑖𝑡
10  respectively can be illustrated in Table 4-1 below. 
 
Table 4-1. Illustration of computing merger frequency under different shock-lasting time 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of mergers :  .  :   .   
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1(shock lasts a year) 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4(shock lasts 4 years) 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(shock lasts 10 years) 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 6 6 6 
Note: One dot presents one acquisition completed during one year. 
 
 
 Table 4-1 shows the frequency of merger shocks at each year for firm i. If the 
shock lasts longer, for instance 10 years, then the frequency of merger shocks is 
accumulatively higher and higher over time. In contrast, if the shock lasts only a year, 
then the frequency of merger shocks is lower and has no accumulative effects. 
Frequencies with any shock time longer than a year, but shorter than the sample span 
are dynamically defined. The different measures of frequency according to the time a 
merger shock lasts, enable the study to compare frequency impacts on firm performance 
and so find out a frequency at which its shock can last longest. 
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4.4.2. Dependent variable 
 For performance, Return on Assets (ROA) is used as a measure of a firm’s 
performance because this measure has been widely applied for the study of merger and 
firm fundamentals in many studies, such as Healy et al. (1992), Ramaswamy (1997) and 
Porrini (2004). As argued by Hitt et al., (1998), ROA is one of the powerful accounting 
metrics that can best reflect the effect of synergies obtained from an acquisition. The 
ROA indicates how efficient the management of an acquiring firm is at using the firm’s 
available assets to generate earnings. To calculate ROA, operating income before 
depreciation and amortization rather than the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
is used. One reason is that by excluding depreciation and amortization it could be 
problematic for comparison across firms since it is hard to assume that all sample firms 
face the similar accounting standards, policies and business situations.  
 
 
 For the deflator, the book value of total assets is used. Market value is not used 
for the reason that the market value of an acquiring firm declines systematically over 
three to five years after acquisition, which may lead to upward bias (Agrawal et al., 
1992). Alternatively, the market values are a forward-looking measure relying on the 
assumption of efficient markets that the market can correctly react to the benefits 
brought by acquisitions. This suggests that investor or the market is likely to 
overestimate the expected returns of takeovers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Barber and 
Lyon, 1996). 
 
4.4.3. Control variables 
 Five controlling variables are considered for the estimation of model (2) and 
robustness check. These five variables are assumed exogenously and therefore 
employed as “investment” in estimation. Firstly, “LogSIZE”, represents the size of 
acquiring firm, measured as the nature logarithm of firm’s book value of total assets, 
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which proxies acquirer’s financial and non-financial resources, scope and complexity of 
the firm’s operations. Generally, the effect of acquiring firm size on profitability is 
found to be positive (Hall and Weiss, 1967; Fiegenbaum and Karnani, 1991; Lee, 2009). 
For instance, Hall and Weiss (1967) argues that firm size affects performance in several 
channels; a larger firm may have more diverse capabilities and market power, better 
abilities to achieve economies of scale and scope. Moreover, Barclay and Smith (1995a, 
1995b) argue that larger firms are likely to have a higher degree of agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders than smaller firms. This is possibly because the 
larger the firm size the smaller the percentage of equity held by top managers. 
 
 
 Secondly, the ratio of the total debts to total assets, denoted by “Debt”, is 
employed for estimation. The debts include both short-term and long-term borrowings 
from banks and other institutions. It measures the ability that a firm can generate new 
funds for corporate activities externally. The higher the ratio, the higher the degree of 
leverage, and consequently the greater the financial risk that will be realized in a firm’s 
operation. This in turn reduces the firm’s financial flexibility but creates risk pressure 
on the firm management. These risky debts may cause high agency costs between 
shareholders that can distort strategic decision-making of firm management in terms of 
investment and operation (Fama and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and French 1998). Myers (1977) argues that firms holding risky debt may pass up some 
valuable investment opportunities. Further, the high payment of interest may take away 
corporate funding from business operation. It is, therefore, expected that there will be a 
negative relation between leverage and profitability.  
 
 
 The third variable is the size of acquisition relative to acquirer, measured by the 
transaction value deflated by the total assets of the acquiring firm. If there is more than 
one acquisition completed at time t, then the sum of two or more transaction values 
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divided by the number of transaction as an average value of transaction is taken to 
calculate the relative size of acquisitions. 
 
 
 According to Fuller et al. (2002), this study proxies the target size by transaction 
value of the deal, the relative size of acquisition can also be referred as the relative size 
of a target firm. It will be interesting to see if the size-fundamentals nexus is consistent 
with the size and stock returns relationship. The latter is found positive in the previous 
chapter.  
 
 
 Fourthly, a Liquidity ratio (LR) is used for robustness checks. Following Ofek 
(1993), the variable is constructed as the ratio of current assets and inventories to 
current liabilities as an indication to the ability of a firm in serving its short-term 
financial obligations. Liquidity ratio is expected to have mixed impacts on the 
profitability for the following reason. On the one hand, firms with higher liquidity ratios 
may support better business operations or investment opportunities. On the other hand, 
those unused liquid assets may be spent towards satisfying interest of empire-building 
management. 
 
 
 Finally, to control the market power of an acquiring firm, the price-cost margin 
(PCM) is employed, which is also known as the Lerner index. Collins and Preston 
(1976) argued that theoretically price-cost margins could better measure the degrees to 
which firms (or industries) have monopoly power than other measures. Later, Martin 
(1984), Cairns (1995) and Werden (1998) suggest that this variable is considered to be a 
good indicator of a market power, which measures how competitive a firm is in terms of 
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pricing close to marginal costs. As suggested in Lerner (1934), Feinberg (1980) and 
Gaspar and Massa (2006), price-cost margin is calculated as the net profit as a 
percentage of the sales revenue. A positive relation between price-cost margin and firm 
performance is expected. Due to the direct accounting links between price-cost margin 
and other independent variable and the high correlation with the lagged dependent 
variable 31 , a one-year lagged price-cost margin variable is used in robustness 
estimations.  
 
 
4.4.4. Data and sample selection 
 To investigate the relation between operating performance and merger frequency 
for acquiring firms, a large database of acquisitions across the world drawn from the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) is built up, which is a very comprehensive M&A 
database at the firm level. Following Chang (1998), Fuller et al. (2002) and Officer 
(2007), the study impose the following criteria of M&A sample selection, which is 
essentially similar to those used in Chapters 2 and 3: the announcement date lies 
between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2009. The bidder must own less than 50% 
of the target prior to acquisition and 100% afterwards. The transaction value is equal to 
or greater than one million dollars. The time between announcement date and 
completion date does not exceed 1,000 days. The financing method of a deal can be 
pure cash, pure stock, or a combination of cash and stock. Acquisitions are not buyback 
offers, repurchases and self-Tender offers. Neither the target nor the acquirer is in the 
financial or utilities industry. Further firms with market value lower than $15 million 
are omitted due to problems in the reliability of accounting data.  
 
 The initial M&A sample contains 4,918 takeovers of public, private and 
subsidiary targets made by 3129 global public acquirers over the time period from 2000 
to 2009. To obtain accounting information, the M&A sample match these acquirers in 
                                                 
31 Liebowitz (1982) suggests that about 57% of information included by ROA can be reflected by price-cost margin. 
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the Thomson financials and Worldscope database. Due to some firms exited from 
business or being acquired32 , the sample acquirers are reduced by 1,430. This leaves 
3,488 acquisitions undertaken by 2,172 acquirers which constitute the main sample used 
in this chapter. Following Hitt et al. (1992) and Ghosh (2001), accounting data from 
2000 to 2012 are included into present sample to ensure accounting information to be 
available for acquiring firms at least three-year after acquisitions. Table 4-2 reports the 
summary distribution for the acquiring firms across countries. For each of the following 
country, a particular bidder is represented only once per year, but may be represented 
multiple times over a 10-year period. 
 
 
 Table 4-3 presents the cross-sectional summary statistics of the acquiring firms 
engaged in the takeover for frequency, operating performance and other controlling 
variables in Panel A, B and C, respectively. It is found that for most of years, the 4-year 
merger frequencies (𝐹𝑖𝑡
4) have a mean around 0.6, and reaches a maximum of 0.74 in 
2008. This could be possibly explained as acquirers could easily borrow at low interest 
rate due to over liquidity of the financial market between 2005 and 2007. By comparing 
the merger frequency between single and multiple acquirers, wider variations are 
observed. The multiple acquirers perform 1.3 to 3 merger frequency higher than those 
of single acquirers in terms of either 4-year or the sample span measure.  
 
 
 Table 4-4 shows a correlation matrix for all measures. With the independent 
variables, the maximum correlation is at 0.31 found for firm size (13, Log of Firm size). 
This suggests that there is neither excessive statistic correlation, nor the multi-potential 
multicollinearity problem among selected variables. 
 
                                                 
32 If a firm is dead/inactive or acquired, its past accounting information will be not available in Thomson Financials 
and Worldscope. 
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Table 4-2. Distribution of sample acquiring firms across countries 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Country Total 
Austria 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 
Australia 6 13 8 4 7 11 11 11 14 8 93 
Belgium 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 0 9 
Bermuda 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Brazil 1 0 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 3 12 
Canada 20 27 15 15 15 13 19 22 29 15 190 
Chile 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
China 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 5 8 24 
Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Denmark 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 2 12 
Finland 9 4 4 2 3 5 11 3 6 1 48 
France 12 8 5 2 7 5 8 9 8 3 67 
Germany 10 5 3 1 4 6 9 3 6 4 51 
Hong Kong 5 4 6 4 6 3 3 1 7 4 43 
India 3 2 1 2 1 6 6 4 4 2 31 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Ireland 5 4 0 2 0 2 1 2 3 0 19 
Israel 1 1 1 0 4 0 3 2 2 1 15 
Italy 2 4 2 2 2 2 3 1 5 0 23 
Japan 30 21 26 31 35 55 60 70 62 37 427 
Luxembourg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 4 
South Korea 1 0 1 0 1 0 9 7 1 7 27 
Malaysia 1 3 2 4 13 3 3 2 2 4 37 
Mexico 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 6 
Netherlands 4 8 2 0 1 3 5 4 6 3 36 
New Zealand 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 5 
Norway 2 0 0 1 0 0 6 3 1 0 13 
Peru 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 
Philippines 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 7 
Russia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Singapore 3 4 3 2 3 2 3 3 0 0 23 
South Africa 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 2 1 22 
Spain 4 2 2 1 2 0 4 3 0 1 19 
Sweden 6 3 2 2 2 8 9 5 2 3 42 
Switzerland 5 6 2 3 2 5 2 2 4 3 34 
Taiwan 2 1 3 0 1 1 4 3 1 0 16 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
UK 52 37 21 24 26 39 41 36 37 20 333 
US 186 146 112 96 111 141 151 154 109 83 1289 
Total 384 314 226 206 254 324 379 372 327 215 3001 
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Table 4-3. Summary statistics of mean of merger frequency and firm characteristics 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Panel A: Mean [standard deviation] of 1-year M&A variables 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [0.66] [0.46] [0.38] [0.34] [0.41] [0.43] [0.46] [0.49] [0.45] [0.34] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1 year shock for Single acquirers) 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [0.27] [0.27] [0.23] [0.23] [0.25] [0.28] [0.32] [0.32] [0.31] [0.26] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1 year shock for Multi acquirers) 0.46 0.30 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [0.93] [0.62] [0.52] [0.45] [0.54] [0.56] [0.59] [0.64] [0.58] [0.41] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Panel B: Mean [standard deviation] of 4-year M&A variables 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 0.23 0.40 0.52 0.63 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.70 0.74 0.67 0.48 0.28 0.11 
 
[0.66] [0.87] [1.01] [1.10] [0.91] [0.88] [0.90] [0.97] [0.99] [0.92] [0.77] [0.58] [0.34] 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock for Single acquirers) 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.05 
 
[0.35] [0.38] [0.38] [0.36] [0.36] [0.36] [0.39] [0.42] [0.43] [0.43] [0.38] [0.31] [0.21] 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock for Multi acquirers) 0.19 0.31 0.40 0.47 0.38 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.30 0.17 0.06 
 
[0.63] [0.85] [1.00] [1.11] [0.91] [0.87] [0.90] [0.99] [1.02] [0.93] [0.74] [0.52] [0.27] 
Note: The table contains the sample characteristics of the merger frequency and firm characteristics of the acquirers used in the study. The results are based on a sample of 2,172 firms, 
undertaking 3,488 acquisitions. The frequency variable data come from the SDC database. The firm characteristics come from Thomson financials and Worldscope. 𝐹𝑖𝑡
1 , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 and 𝐹𝑖𝑡
10 counts the 
number of acquisitions of a firm i in year t, year t plus the three preceding years and over the sample span of 10 years, respectively. Moreover, if a firm acquires only one target within sample 
period, it is classified as a single acquirer; if an acquirer makes more than one takeovers, it is defined as a frequent or multiple acquirer. LogSIZE, represents the size of acquiring firm, measured 
as the nature logarithm of firm’s book value of total assets. Debt is calculated as the ratio of the sum of short term debt, current portion of long term debt and long term debt to total assets. The 
size of target (Relative size) is its transaction value relative to the amount of total assets of the acquirer at year t. Liquid ratio (LR) is constructed as the ratio of current assets and inventories to 
current liabilities. Price-cost margin (PCM) is calculated as the net profit as a percentage of the sales revenue. ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and amortization adjusted 
by fiscal year-end book value of total assets. LogLP is the logarithm of sales per employee. COA is defined as operating cash flow deflated by the total assets of acquiring firm. Standard 
deviations are shown in brackets. 
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Table 4-3. Summary statistics of merger frequency and firm characteristics- Continued 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Panel C Mean [standard deviation] of accumulative(10-years) M&A variables 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10 (Frequency of 10-year shock) 0.23 0.40 0.52 0.63 0.76 0.93 1.13 1.33 1.50 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.61 
 
[0.66] [0.87] [1.01] [1.10] [1.25] [1.37] [1.47] [1.58] [1.67] [1.72] [1.72] [1.72] [1.72] 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10Frequency of 4-year shock for Single acquirers) 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
[0.35] [0.38] [0.38] [0.36] [0.40] [0.43] [0.47] [0.49] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10Frequency of 4-year shock for Multi acquirers) 0.19 0.31 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.68 0.81 0.94 1.05 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 
 
[0.63] [0.85] [1.00] [1.11] [1.28] [1.42] [1.57] [1.73] [1.87] [1.95] [1.95] [1.95] [1.95] 
Panel D: Mean  [standard deviation] of firm characteristics 
Relative size (Relative size of target) 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.02 
 [0.45] [0.40] [0.59] [0.81] [0.27] [0.31] [0.17] [0.27] [0.25] [0.22] [0.18] [0.13] [0.31] 
LogSIZE (Total assets of acquirer) 429.80 451.20 469.30 520.80 577.50 597.40 683.60 774.70 794.80 806.30 863.50 91520 952.80 
 
[11713] [12202] [12340] [13115] [13855] [14059] [15187] [16228] [16566] [16946] [17671] [18155] [18646] 
Debt (Debt in total assets) 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.23 
 
[0.40] [0.39] [0.21] [0.21] [0.24] [0.22] [0.22] [0.22] [0.25] [0.33] [0.20] [0.20] [0.19] 
LR (Liquidity ratio) 2.66 2.49 2.40 2.36 2.41 2.27 2.21 2.19 2.09 2.16 2.14 2.21 2.21 
 
[4.74] [3.68] [3.18] [3.17] [3.28] [2.51] [2.43] [2.62] [2.12] [1.98] [1.96] [3.37] [2.45] 
PCM (Profit-cost margin) 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12 
 
[0.60] [0.50] [0.36] [0.28] [0.28] [0.29] [0.24] [0.22] [0.20] [0.20] [0.16] [0.18] [0.20] 
ROA 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 
 
[0.21] [0.20] [0.18] [0.17] [0.14] [0.15] [0.16] [0.17] [0.20] [0.15] [0.13] [0.15] [0.15] 
LogLP 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.70 0.88 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.52 
 
[0.95] [0.84] [0.74] [0.94] [1.28] [1.16] [1.11] [7.56] [9.04] [7.19] [7.12] [5.19] [0.92] 
COA 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
[0.26] [0.17] [0.17] [0.16] [0.13] [0.14] [0.15] [0.18] [0.20] [0.75] [0.13] [0.13] [0.15] 
Number of observations 2,169 2,172 2,172 2,171 2,172 2,170 2,171 2,171 2,168 2,170 2,169 2,171 2,170 
Note: The table contains the sample characteristics of the merger frequency and firm characteristics of the acquirers used in the study. The results are based on a sample of 2,172 firms, 
undertaking 3,488 acquisitions. The firm characteristics come from Thomson financials and Worldscope. 𝐹𝑖𝑡
1 , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 and 𝐹𝑖𝑡
10 counts the number of acquisitions of a firm i in year t, year t plus the 
three preceding years and over the sample span of 10 years, respectively. Moreover, if a firm acquires only one target within sample period, it is classified as a single acquirer; if an acquirer 
makes more than one takeovers, it is defined as a frequent or multiple acquirer. LogSIZE, represents the size of acquiring firm, measured as the nature logarithm of firm’s book value of total 
assets. Debt is calculated as the ratio of the sum of short term debt, current portion of long term debt and long term debt to total assets. The size of target (Relative size) is its transaction value 
relative to the amount of total assets of the acquirer at year t. Liquid ratio (LR) is constructed as the ratio of current assets and inventories to current liabilities. Price-cost margin (PCM) is 
calculated as the net profit as a percentage of the sales revenue. ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and amortization adjusted by fiscal year-end book value of total assets. 
LogLP is the logarithm of sales per employee. COA is defined as operating cash flow deflated by the total assets of acquiring firm. Standard deviations are shown in brackets. 
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Table 4-4. Correlations between measures 
  ROAt-1 LogLPt-1 COAt-1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) 𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) 0.04*** 0.01 0.01* 1.00 
 
      
(2) 𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 0.03*** 0.02** 0.01* 0.53*** 1.00       
(3) 𝐹𝑖𝑡
10 (Frequency of 10-year shock) 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.01** 0.28*** 0.55*** 1.00 
 
    
(4) Relative size -0.12*** -0.05*** -0.02*** 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.06*** 1.00     
(5) LogSIZE 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.16*** 0.23*** -0.08*** 1.00    
(6) Debt -0.09*** -0.01** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.00 0.12*** 1.00 
 
 
(7) LR -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.02*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.03*** -0.21*** -0.19*** 1.00  
(8) PCMt-1 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.05*** 0.00 -0.05*** 1.00 
Note: 𝐹𝑖𝑡
1 , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 and 𝐹𝑖𝑡
10 counts the number of acquisitions of a firm i in year t, year t plus the three preceding years and over the sample span of 10 years, respectively. Moreover, if a firm acquires 
only one target within sample period, it is classified as a single acquirer; if an acquirer makes more than one takeovers, it is defined as a frequent or multiple acquirer. LogSIZE, represents the 
size of acquiring firm, measured as the nature logarithm of firm’s book value of total assets. Debt is calculated as the ratio of the sum of short term debt, current portion of long term debt and 
long term debt to total assets. The size pf target is its transaction value relative to the amount of total assets of the acquirer at year t. Liquid ratio (LR) is constructed as the ratio of current assets 
and inventories to current liabilities. Price-cost margin (PCM) is calculated as the net profit as a percentage of the sales revenue. ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation and 
amortization adjusted by fiscal year-end book value of total assets. LogLP is the logarithm of sales per employee. COA is defined as operating cash flow deflated by the total assets of acquiring 
firm.  
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.5. Estimation results: from “need to chew” to “chew to change” 
 
4.5.1. Effects of merger shocks and frequency on profitability 
 To estimate the model of (2), the system GMM approach is employed for control 
of both firm and year dummies that capture the firm time-invariant specific effects and 
general market condition at each year. The models are estimated dynamically with 
control of the lagged dependent variable of operating performance − returns on assets 
(ROA). As it can be seen in Table 4-5 and 4-6, both the second order autocorrelation 
statistic and Hansen J statistic show statistical legitimacy and validity in using two-year 
(or further)-lagged explanatory or controlled variables as instruments to address the 
problem of endogeneity shocks in estimation. 
 
 
 With the control of endogeneity problems in estimation of more than 20,000 
observations, Table 4-5 and 4-6 identifies how much ROA can drop by adding one extra 
new firm into the existing business of the acquirer. The amount of the drop depends on 
time of a merger shock that can last. The marginal reduction of profitability with respect 
to merger frequency is high immediately after the shock, then the reduction becomes 
lower in subsequent years after the shocks. 
 
 
 However, the shock cannot last forever as shown by 𝐹𝑡
10 in Table 4-5 and Table 
4-6 where the 10-year-lasting impact of the frequency on ROA does not appear. In 
contrast to the long-term impact, the short-term impact of frequency is significant, and 
in the shorter period the impact becomes stronger and higher, see 𝐹𝑡
4  and 𝐹𝑡
1  in the 
Table 4-5 and Table 4-6. A key message of these findings is clear: the accumulation of 
merger shocks diverts effort from profitable activities in the short term, and the shorter 
 147 
 
the accumulation period is, the more the demand is for diverting attention to digest the 
shocks. This message implies that merger shocks impacts profitability adversely and 
dynamically: it is stronger in the short run then it is weakened gradually over time, and 
eventually it disappears or even it turns oppositely in the long run when the synergy 
effects generated by the merger become dominant.  
 
 
 The findings in Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 raise an argument that has two parts. 
The first part is consistent with digesting theory (McCarthy, 1963) and the chewing 
theory (Kusewitt, 1985). McCarthy explains a negative performance impact of merger 
frequency as the firm cannot efficiently and effectively digest and absorb a lot of new 
integrations in a short time period due to the clash of cultures and conflict of objectives 
between the acquirer and the acquired firm. Kusewitt (1985) regards this digesting 
problem or difficulty as “biting off more than you can chew”.  
 
 
 The second part of the argument arises when time is taken into account in the 
process of digestion, the long or longer process helps the firm to gradually absorb the 
merger shocks, and then enables it to release more merger synergies for business 
improvement. Therefore, time matters for changing performance effects of merger 
shocks or frequency, “time helping chew” is important. This part extends the existing 
digesting theory and the chewing theory into a dynamic context in arguing merger 
shocks and frequency: the effect changes with time. Evidence in Table 4-5 and 4-6 
support this dynamic argument. Particularly, in Table 4-6, the first three columns are 
estimation for firms that had only one merger over the sample span. The merger shock 
in the first year of the event affects the acquiring firm negatively, see 𝐹𝑡
1 in column (1) 
of Table 4-6. The negative effect of the merger shock becomes weaker to non-
significant in subsequent years of the occurrence, see 𝐹𝑡
4 in column (2) of Table 4-6. 
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Further, in the long-term process, the shock effect turns to an opposite direction: 
significantly positive on profitability improvement, see 𝐹𝑡
10 in column (3) of Table 4-6.  
 
 
 Clearly, the change of the shock effect with time for the single acquirers 
illustrates the point of the dynamic argument for merger shocks. For multi-acquirers, a 
similar pattern of the change in the performance effect of the shocks and frequency 
appears: from the stronger to the weaker over time, see Column (4), (5) and (6) of Table 
4-6. The different paces of the change between the single and the multi-acquirers reflect 
a number or quantity that matters for the impact of merger shocks on business.  
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Table 4-5. Estimation of effect of merger frequency. (Aggregate sample) 
Dependent variable: ROAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROAit-1 0.467*** 0.473*** 0.483*** 0.473*** 0.480*** 0.473*** 
 
(12.16) (11.46) (11.30) (12.66) (12.62) (9.64) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.012** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.012** 
 
(5.06) (4.35) (2.38) (3.66) (3.28) (2.35) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) -0.058** -0.046* -0.059*** -0.054** -0.049* -0.055*** 
 
(-2.38) (-1.90) (-2.93) (-2.00) (-1.83) (-2.85) 
RSIZEit (Relative size of target) -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 
 
(-0.39) (-1.47) (-1.44) (0.52) (-1.18) (-1.86) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.009*** 
  
-0.008*** 
  
 
(-5.02) 
  
(-4.62) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
 
-0.004** 
  
-0.004** 
 
  
(-2.04) 
  
(-2.05) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(Frequency of 10-year shock) 
  
-0.002 
  
-0.002 
   
(-1.05) 
  
(-1.49) 
LRit (Liquidity ratio) 
   
-0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
    
(-0.59) (-0.88) (-0.50) 
PCMit-1 (Price-cost margin) 
   
0.024*** 0.022** 0.036* 
    
(2.64) (2.38) (1.92) 
Constant -0.439*** -0.327*** -0.190* -0.316*** -0.229** -0.185* 
 
(-4.53) (-3.79) (-1.84) (-2.97) (-2.46) (-1.76) 
       
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.904 0.877 0.667 0.681 0.628 0.618 
Hansen J-stat 0.656 0.337 0.401 0.449 0.290 0.220 
F-stat 46.35 42.96 48.25 39.56 47.91 51.02 
No. of pooled observations 26035 26035 25812 25812 25812 25812 
Number of firms 2172 2172 2167 2167 2167 2167 
Note: Reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the 
firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the P-values of the tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the P-
value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.???? 
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Table 4-6. Estimation of effect of merger frequency on single and multiple acquirers 
Sub-Sample of Acquirers: Single Single Single Multi Multi Multi 
Dependent variable: ROAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROAit-1 0.394*** 0.389*** 0.435*** 0.482*** 0.494*** 0.492*** 
 
(6.99) (6.87) (9.37) (9.31) (10.07) (9.08) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.022** 0.020*** 0.017** 
 
(3.26) (3.21) (4.16) (2.36) (3.88) (2.28) 
DEBTt (Debt in total assets) -0.067 -0.061 -0.041 -0.002 -0.014 -0.008 
 
(-1.26) (-1.16) (-1.35) (-0.05) (-0.38) (-0.21) 
RSIZEt (Relative size of target) -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 
(-0.01) (0.60) (-0.42) (1.20) (-1.49) (0.87) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.004 
  
-0.007*** 
  
 
(-1.31) 
  
(-3.60) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
 
0.010 
  
-0.003** 
 
  
(0.65) 
  
(-2.06) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(Frequency of 10-year shock) 
  
0.026** 
  
-0.002 
   
(2.41) 
  
(-0.99) 
Constant -0.367*** -0.345*** -0.480*** -0.425** -0.385*** -0.321** 
 
(-2.89) (-2.86) (-3.96) (-2.12) (-3.46) (-1.99) 
       
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.557 0.552 0.650 0.521 0.502 0.503 
Hansen J-stat 0.660 0.756 0.987 0.491 0.420 0.587 
F-stat 14.67 15.20 19.03 21.15 19.46 18.96 
Number of pooled observations 15401 15401 15401 10634 10634 10634 
Number of firms 1285 1285 1285 887 887 887 
Note: Reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the 
firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the P-values of the tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the P-
value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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 The dynamic chewing theory developed in this chapter is different from Jensen 
(1986)’s agent theory in predicting the effect of merger shocks on performance. The 
agent theory regards profit reduction after merger shocks as a result of acquisitions 
made by management for its own utility maximization at expense of shareholder value 
and the firm’s profitability. If the agent theory is valid, the performance effect of merger 
shocks will be downward permanently or at least in the long run since the merger is 
intended to maximize management’s personal utility rather than firm’s profitability. In 
contrast, the chewing argument regards the short-run deterioration of profitability after 
merger shocks as “digesting constraint” rather than “management’s intention”. The 
“digesting constraint” expects to change performance once the constraint is removed or 
weakened, but the “management’s intention” expects a difficult to change the intended 
change unless the management is changed.  
 
4.5.2. Effects of controls 
 As shown in Table 4-5 and 4-7, the control variables mostly follow the 
expectations made in Section 4.4.3. Firm size (LogSIZE) leads to a significantly positive 
impact on acquirer’s profitability, suggesting that larger firms have a higher rate of 
returns. This positive relation could be explained by scale and scope efficiencies in large 
firms, which is consistent with Hall and Weiss (1967), Fiegenbaum and Karnani (1991) 
and Lee (2009), but contradictory to Shepherd (1972) who documents economies of 
scale and scope for smaller firms, and diseconomies of scale for larger consolidations. 
The coefficient on the debt ratio (DEBT) is statistically highly significant. With a 
negative sign, it is associated with poorer operating performance which could possibly 
be due to agency issues stemming from risky debt (Fama and Miller, 1972; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and French 1998) and consistent with Taub (1975) and Booth et 
al. (2001). 
 
 The market power of acquiring firms (or price-cost margin, PCM) is calculated 
as the percentage of net profits in firm’s sales revenues. The price-cost margin is 
significantly positive, consistent with Gugler et al. (2003) who state that the increasing 
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market power can lead to the improvement in acquirer's profits. This could possibly be 
explained by the market price of a good or service in excess of marginal cost and long-
term average cost. In the case of liquidity (LR), the impact associated with the 
availability of liquid resources, which can be used for either firm or managerial 
purposes, is ruled out. Finally, RSIZE is insignificantly related to return on assets of 
acquiring firm, which is different from its positive effect on capital market for stock 
returns. 
 
 Further, Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 also report the statistical validity of estimations 
on the basis of the SYS-GMM. The results suggest that there is first-order correlation 
but residuals in second differences (AR (2)) are uncorrelated. The specification tests 
reported also include a Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions (J-statistic) which 
validates the adequacy of the instruments used in the system GMM. The results reported 
in both tables indicate that the null hypothesis of valid GMM instruments for both the 
exploratory and control variables, cannot be rejected. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that GMM is econometrically legitimate for instruments and estimations.  
 
4.5.3. Effect of merger shocks on profitability for different expected 
merger shock-lasting time 
 To further show that shock effects on the business changes with time, the model 
(2) is re-estimated by following the same logic to define merger frequency in section 
4.4.1. The estimated coefficients are sorted by expected merger shock-lasting time, for 
instance 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and consecutively continued to the sample span. 
The pattern of these estimates in Table 4-7 shows how the effects of merger shocks on 
performance gradually change over time. To provide more clearly visual evidence of 
findings, coefficients of estimations from Table 4-7 are plotted in figure 4-1. This shows 
supportive evidence of the “chew to change” argument developed by this study, but 
Jenson’s agent theory which expects a negative change that can last in the long run in 
the merger context.  
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Table 4-7. Estimation of effect of merger frequency over different lengths of expected merger shock-lasting time 
Dependent variable: ROAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ROAit-1 0.4666*** 0.5399*** 0.4676*** 0.4734*** 0.4648*** 0.4661*** 0.4702*** 0.4825*** 0.4635*** 0.4830*** 
 
(12.16) (9.85) (12.11) (11.46) (12.49) (12.46) (12.52) (12.82) (12.73) (11.30) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.0238*** 0.0176*** 0.0229*** 0.0183*** 0.0245*** 0.0251*** 0.0301*** 0.0219*** 0.0305*** 0.0121** 
 
(5.06) (3.93) (4.93) (4.35) (5.34) (5.40) (5.38) (4.77) (5.35) (2.38) 
DEBTt (Debt in total assets) -0.0575** -0.0493** -0.0530** -0.0458* -0.0533** -0.0551** -0.0527** -0.0569** -0.0481** -0.0588*** 
 
(-2.38) (-2.01) (-2.18) (-1.90) (-2.21) (-2.29) (-2.17) (-2.41) (-1.99) (-2.93) 
RSIZEt (Relative size of target) -0.0003 -0.0032*** -0.0022* -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0024** 0.0005 0.0037 -0.0015 
 
(-0.39) (-2.88) (-1.88) (-1.47) (-1.35) (-0.48) (-2.14) (0.73) (1.47) (-1.44) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.0085*** 
  
-0.008*** 
      
 
(-5.02) 
  
(-4.62) 
      
𝐹𝑖𝑡
2 (Frequency of 2-year shock) 
 
-0.0073*** 
  
-0.004** 
     
  
(-4.51) 
  
(-2.05) 
     
𝐹𝑖𝑡
3(Frequency of 3-year shock) 
  
-0.0055** 
  
-0.002 
    
   
(-2.13) 
  
(-1.49) 
    
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
   
-0.0041** 
      
    
(-2.04) 
      
𝐹𝑖𝑡
5 (Frequency of 5-year shock) 
    
-0.0036* 
     
     
(-1.85) 
     
𝐹𝑖𝑡
6(Frequency of 6-year shock) 
     
-0.0029* 
    
      
(-1.80) 
    
Note: Reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent variable, the 
M&A and the firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the P-values of the tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The 
Hansen statistic reports the P-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4-7. Estimation of effect of merger frequency over different lengths of expected merger shock-lasting time- Continued 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
7 (Frequency of 7-year shock) 
      
-0.0028** 
   
       
(-2.03) 
   
𝐹𝑖𝑡
8 (Frequency of 8-year shock) 
       
-0.0026* 
  
        
(-1.66) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
9(Frequency of 9-year shock) 
        
-0.0019 
 
         
(-0.64) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(Frequency of 10-year shock) 
         
-0.0017 
          
(-1.05) 
Constant -0.4388*** -0.3190*** -0.4112*** -0.3194*** -0.4538*** -0.4552*** -0.5695*** -0.3996*** -0.5804*** -0.1903* 
 
(-4.53) (-3.56) (-4.46) (-3.83) (-4.80) (-4.92) (-4.92) (-4.23) (-4.91) (-1.89) 
           Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.904 0.763 0.891 0.877 0.896 0.891 0.883 0.855 0.891 0.861 
Hansen J-stat 0.656 0.381 0.282 0.337 0.602 0.586 0.401 0.433 0.334 0.279 
F-stat 46.35 45.06 44.58 42.96 45.88 46.59 46.02 43.65 45.51 39.68 
Number of pooled observations 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 
Number of firms 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 
Note: Reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent 
variable, the M&A and the firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the P-values of the tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the P-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 4-1. How the effects of merger shocks on performance gradually change over the 
lengths of expected merger shock-lasting time  
 
4.6. Robustness checks 
 
4.6.1. How long will the shock last? 
Based on findings discussed above, the lasting effect of acquisitions is examined 
based on the argument of lasting effect made in Chapter 3, which shows that merger 
strategy is partly a function of accumulation process between the time and the quantity 
and that therefore the impact of an acquisition to acquiring firm may not only appear in 
the current year, but also continue for a period of time. Thus, the lasting effect could be 
seen as a dynamically continuous and declining process. Following earlier papers by 
Healy et al. (1992) and Switzer (1996), the change of a lasting effect is tracked for 
different points of time, the acquisition year, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 years later through fixed 
effects distributed-lag model of the form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼 ∑ 𝑥𝑡−𝑠
5
0 + 𝜃𝒁 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  ⑽ 
where y is firm performance; x is frequency measured by Number of mergers, which 
counts the number of acquisitions that a firm undertakes in year t. and it is lagged from 
t-1 to t-5 in order to see how long a merger shock can last. 
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Table 4-8. The lasting effect of a merger shock 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable (ROA) Full Sample Single Acquirers Multi Acquirers 
t -0.00271* 0.00152 -0.00373*** 
 
(-1.80) (0.83) (-2.74) 
t-1 -0.00084 0.00198 0.00012 
 
(-0.56) (1.15) (0.10) 
t-2 -0.00372** 0.00177 -0.00341*** 
 
(-2.39) (1.08) (-2.76) 
t-3 -0.00314* 0.00274* -0.00244** 
 
(-1.88) (1.77) (-2.00) 
t-4 -0.00039 0.00333** -0.00133 
 
(-0.31) (2.19) (-1.29) 
t-5 -0.00099 -0.00010 -0.00061 
 
(-0.81) (-0.07) (-0.66) 
Constant 0.12197** 0.00664 0.18318*** 
 
(2.26) (0.27) (5.92) 
    R-squared 0.0688 0.134 0.104 
Firm fixed YES YES YES 
F-stat 11.18 8.988 9.226 
No. of pooled observations 17359 10271 7088 
Note: This table reports the results from the Panel OLS estimation of the model: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼 ∑ 𝑥𝑡−𝑠
5
0 +
𝜃𝒁 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,  The dependent variable is operating income before depreciation and amortization 
normalized with total assets. All t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered standard errors. Firm and 
year dummies are included.  
***,** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 As displayed in column (1) of Table 4-8, acquisitions significantly decline the 
profitability of acquiring firm in the acquisition year (t) due to digesting costs incurred 
during that year. The negative effect of acquisitions on acquirer’s ROA reaches its 
highest peak in year 3 (t-2) after the merger shock of year t, and then the effect starts to 
decrease gradually and disappears afterwards. For the clarity of presentation, the results 
of other control variables are not presented here, but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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 Further, the full sample is divided into two sub-samples of single and multiple 
acquirers. The results for the sample of single ones indicate that acquisitions 
significantly improve firm performance in the 4 years after the merger shock (t-3), and 
then the effect reaches peak in year 5 (t-4). In year 6 (t-5), the effect terminates. By 
contrast, the results for multiple acquirers show a very similar picture to that which 
emerged from the full sample.  
 
 
 To provide more clearly visual evidence of these findings, these changes are 
plotted in figure 4-2. These results contribute the corporate indigestion and synergy 
creation explanations in explaining the dynamic effect of a merger shock. It is found 
that the results are showing a similar pattern regardless of how to divide the sample 
according to single and multiple acquirers: acquisitions initially reduce the ROA of 
acquiring firms, then boost it up and the effects finally become neutral over 5-6 years 
after the merger shocks. 
 
 
 In sum, the results suggest a consistent argument that the more acquisitions a 
firm carries out, the lower the efficiency gains are from frequent acquisitions. 
Furthermore, the effect of a merger shock on performance usually last for 5-6 years 
after the merger occurred. 
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 Figure 4-2. How long does the performance effect of a merger shock last? 
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Table 4-9. Estimation of effect of merger frequency on labor productivity 
Dependent variable: LogLPit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LogLPit-1 0.781*** 0.716*** 0.764*** 0.800*** 0.710*** 0.752*** 
 
(9.81) (8.78) (6.56) (9.52) (7.93) (5.94) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.042** 0.039*** 0.038** 0.043** 0.036** 0.043** 
 
(2.46) (2.74) (2.07) (2.48) (2.23) (2.28) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) -0.107 -0.092 0.119 -0.184 -0.114 0.159 
 
(-0.74) (-0.67) (0.82) (-1.16) (-0.74) (1.01) 
RSIZEit (Relative size of target) -0.014*** -0.021*** 0.001 -0.014*** -0.019*** 0.001 
 
(-3.35) (-4.11) (1.59) (-3.61) (-3.38) (0.80) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.066*** 
  
-0.072*** 
  
 
(-7.05) 
  
(-8.09) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
 
-0.024*** 
  
-0.025** 
 
  
(-2.81) 
  
(-2.44) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(Frequency of 10-year shock) 
  
-0.002 
 
 -0.003 
   
(-0.33) 
 
 (-0.51) 
LRit (Liquidity ratio) 
   
-0.023 -0.022 0.015 
    
(-1.33) (-1.37) (0.78) 
PCMit-1 (Price-cost margin)    -0.029 0.041 0.011 
    (-0.41) (0.51) (0.14) 
Constant 1.840** 2.774*** 2.168* 1.662 2.987** 2.175 
 (2.13) (2.80) (1.65) (1.62) (2.49) (1.41) 
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.631 0.994 0.401 0.787 0.597 0.928 
Hansen J-stat 0.296 0.266 0.353 0.287 0.428 0.474 
F-stat 443.0 419.8 45.56 411.7 34.18 406.2 
No. of pooled observations 23881 23564 25945 23845 25727 23563 
Number of firms 2156 2146 2169 2154 2164 2146 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of sales per employee as the measure of organizational productivity. 
Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the 
firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-
value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4-10. Estimation of effect of merger frequency on firm labor productivity for single and multiple 
acquirers 
Sub-sample of acquirers Single Single Single Multi Multi Multi 
Dependent variable: LogLPit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LogLPit-1 0.770*** 0.807*** 0.902*** 0.859*** 0.838*** 0.859*** 
 
(9.33) (10.85) (14.73) (4.95) (5.05) (6.55) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.038* 0.025 0.029 0.040 0.046 0.035 
 
(1.85) (1.35) (1.53) (1.23) (1.36) (1.31) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) -0.048 -0.022 -0.021 -0.180 -0.127 -0.188 
 
(-0.26) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.85) (-0.60) (-0.98) 
RSIZEit (Relative size of target) -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.016** -0.024*** 0.001 
 
(-1.28) (-0.10) (-0.97) (-2.42) (-2.79) (1.62) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.002 
  
-0.060*** 
  
 
(-0.01) 
  
(-6.08) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
 
0.031 
  
-0.023** 
 
  
(0.54) 
  
(-2.11) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(Frequency of 10-year shock) 
  
0.040** 
 
 -0.002 
   
(2.02) 
 
 (-0.36) 
Constant 2.039** 1.830** 0.607 0.966 1.056 1.092 
 
(2.25) (2.01) (0.84) (0.50) (0.65) (0.71) 
 
      
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.379 0.375 0.400 0.823 0.795 0.817 
Hansen J-stat 0.339 0.234 0.321 0.337 0.338 0.653 
F-stat 244.3 274.3 395.5 227.2 203.9 248.7 
No. of pooled observations 13931 13931 13931 9950 9950 9950 
Number of firms 1275 1275 1275 881 881 881 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of sales per employee as the measure of organizational productivity. 
Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the 
firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-
value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.6.1. Labour productivity 
 For further robustness tests, the logarithm of sales per employee is adopted as 
the measure of firm productivity to see if there is a consistent conclusion. 
 
 Table 4-9 reports panel regression results for productivity. The estimation results 
are consistent with findings of Table 4-5. For example, a significantly negative 
relationship between 4-year merger frequency and acquiring firm labour productivity is 
found for the full sample in column (2) of Table 4-9 (-0.024, t= -2.81). However, when 
focusing on the results of 10-year merger shock (Column (3) of Table 4-9), the negative 
effect disappears. Turning to the estimation of merger shock on the productivity for 
single acquirers and multiple acquires (Table 4-10), there is still no change in the 
conclusions.  
 
4.6.2. Cash-based measure 
 Several studies on takeover performance suggest that in measuring the 
performance of an acquiring firm after a merger event, the earning-based measurements 
could be problematic due to the susceptibility of accounting information to managerial 
manipulation through earnings management and change of accounting policies (Stanton, 
1987; Erickson and Wang, 1999; Powell and Stark 2005). In terms of measurement 
selection, Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest that the use of operating cash flow is good 
alternative. 
 
Therefore, a cash-based variable which is widely accepted by existing studies, is 
introduced in later robustness tests: operating cash flow returns. Following Healy et al. 
(1990), operating cash flow is defined as sales, minus cost of goods sold, and selling 
and administrative expense, plus depreciation, goodwill expense and deferred tax, and 
adjusted for changes in working capital. This value is then deflated by the total assets of 
the acquiring firm. The performance measure is therefore less affected by the method of 
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accounting for the merger such as the recognition of bad debts or the accounting 
policies adopted on the valuation of inventories and/or the method of financing the 
takeover (Healy et al., 1990; Powell and Stark, 2005). 
 
Table 4-11 suggests that the results are still consistently robust. For example: The 
relation between 4-year merger frequency and cash flow returns is significantly negative 
(-0.004, t=-1.99). However, when turning to a 10-year measure of merger shock, the 
effect disappears (-0.003, t=-1.63). For single and multiple acquirers in Table 4-12, the 
results are still similar to those found in section 4.5. 
 
4.6.3. Additional sensitive checks 
 The findings are also robust in a wider range of alternative regressions, notably 
in three areas: firstly, following the same logic as Section 4.4.1 to count the merger 
frequency by deal characteristics, namely, payment method, target listing status, 
geographic scope (See, Appendix A.). Secondly, estimating the relation between 
different measure of firm performance and merger frequency with a lag by the 
following model, which reduces the impact of simultaneity since past merger frequency 
and current performance are not determined in the same period33 (See Appendix B): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑡𝑇𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  ⑾ 
where X presents the merger frequency variables and Z includes the control variable. 
Overall, it is found that none of these alternative approaches yielded significantly 
different results, and the inference of the effect of merger frequency on firm 
performance remains unchanged. Thirdly, reexamining the argument on two sub-
samples of US and EU acquirer. The conclusion of the study remains unchanged. In 
addition, it is found that the negative effects of merger shocks for EU and Asian 
acquirers are stronger than the US ones. (See, Appendix C.) 
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Table 4-11. Estimation of effect of merger frequency on firm cash flow returns on assets 
Dependent variable: COAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COAit-1 0.528*** 0.531*** 0.483*** 0.431*** 0.440*** 0.435*** 
 
(9.82) (9.98) (10.17) (6.66) (7.00) (5.92) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.011** 
 
(4.03) (5.10) (3.32) (4.15) (4.96) (2.24) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) -0.027 -0.023 -0.034 -0.058 -0.053 -0.042 
 
(-0.76) (-0.64) (-0.98) (-1.51) (-1.38) (-0.76) 
RSIZEit(Relative size of target) 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.24) (-1.02) (-0.32) (0.28) (-1.21) (-0.25) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.007*** 
  
-0.008*** 
  
 
(-3.68) 
  
(-4.30) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
 
-0.004** 
  
-0.004** 
 
  
(-1.99) 
  
(-2.12) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(Frequency of 10-year shock) 
  
-0.003 
 
 -0.002 
   
(-1.63) 
 
 (-1.51) 
LRit (Liquidity ratio)   -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 
   (-1.38) (-1.54) (-0.70) (-1.38) 
PCMit-1 (Price-cost margin)   0.045** 0.042** 0.036* 0.045** 
   (2.35) (2.19) (1.69) (2.35) 
Constant -0.377*** -0.378*** -0.354*** -0.404*** -0.376*** -0.171 
 
(-3.73) (-4.79) (-3.06) (-3.63) (-4.36) (-1.56) 
 
      
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.339 0.328 0.401 0.641 0.597 0.650 
Hansen J-stat 0.429 0.548 0.353 0.324 0.428 0.317 
F-stat 32.78 33.90 45.56 33.47 34.18 38.68 
No. of pooled observations 25945 25945 25945 25727 25727 25727 
Number of firms 2169 2169 2169 2164 2164 2164 
Note: The dependent variable is defined operating cash flow as sales, minus cost of goods sold, and selling and 
administrative expense, plus depreciation, goodwill expense and deferred tax, and adjusted for changes in working capital, 
then deflated by the total assets of acquiring firm. Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM 
estimations using the two-step estimation including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The 
lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 
and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 
2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4-12. Estimation of effect of merger frequency on cash flow returns on assets for single and 
multiple acquirers 
Sub-sample of acquirers Single Single Single Multi Multi Multi 
Dependent variable: COAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COAit-1 0.496*** 0.532*** 0.525*** 0.434*** 0.421*** 0.405*** 
 
(7.25) (7.54) (7.78) (5.07) (11.30) (4.10) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 
 
(2.68) (3.03) (3.75) (2.72) (4.10) (2.77) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) -0.023 -0.005 -0.008 -0.047 -0.057 -0.018 
 
(-0.40) (-0.10) (-0.16) (-1.14) (-1.22) (-0.87) 
RSIZEit(Relative size of target) 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003* 0.000 
 
(0.64) (0.31) (-0.81) (-0.99) (-1.80) (0.39) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.005 
  
-0.007*** 
  
 
(-1.61) 
  
(-3.09) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
 
0.003 
  
-0.005** 
 
  
(0.16) 
  
(-2.41) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(Frequency of 10-year shock) 
  
0.024*** 
 
 -0.001 
   
(2.77) 
 
 (-1.16) 
Constant -0.363*** -0.361*** -0.537*** -0.147 -0.498*** -0.235** 
 
(-2.59) (-2.96) (-3.73) (-1.18) (-3.85) (-2.53) 
 
      
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.556 0.483 0.504 0.647 0.567 0.681 
Hansen J-stat 0.242 0.437 0.670 0.243 0.318 0.260 
F-stat 25.68 19.23 20.05 12.37 21.30 20.50 
No. of pooled observations 15336 15336 15336 10609 10609 10609 
Number of firms 1283 1283 1283 886 886 886 
Note: The dependent variable is defined operating cash flow as sales, minus cost of goods sold, and selling and 
administrative expense, plus depreciation, goodwill expense and deferred tax, and adjusted for changes in working capital, 
then deflated by the total assets of acquiring firm. Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM 
estimations using the two-step estimation including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The 
lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 
and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 
2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.7. Conclusions 
 
 Is a market response to a merger announcement consistent with what actually 
happens to the fundamentals of the firm after the announcement? Notably, the market 
expectation about a merger effect on changing firm performance is quite consistently 
related to what has been actually changed in the firm after the merger shock. 
 
 
 In previous chapter, it is found that the investors perceive a lower value if the 
acquiring firm is involved in frequent mergers. This is because more mergers are 
expected to attract a considerable amount of management attention away from 
profitable activities in order to digest the challenges of new business integration at least 
in the short run. This “digesting constraint” argument is evident in the estimations 
reported in this chapter. Firms becomes less profitable in the short run after a merger 
shock, and this adverse effect can be more severe if a firm is involved in more frequent 
mergers. 
 
 
 Further evidence shows that, the effect of merger shocks is not static and 
persistent, and it changes with time. The shock adversely affects profitability in the 
short run, usually lasting a couple of years, and then the negative effect on performance 
could be turned either oppositely, if the firm digests the shock successfully, or 
continuously but diminishing over time if the digestion takes longer such as for frequent 
acquisition. This finding implies that the pace of firm resilience to a merger shock can 
be affected by its merger strategies. The pace can be slow if the firm pursues frequent 
mergers aggressively. Overall, the performance effect of a merger shock is dynamic and 
it changes with time. This dynamic view of merger shocks in this study opens a new 
vision for research on mergers. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. The effect of 1-year merger shock on returns on assets by deal-level characteristics. 
Dependent variable: ROAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ROAit-1 0.467*** 0.478*** 0.465*** 0.458*** 0.466*** 
 
(12.35) (12.50) (12.41) (11.55) (12.36) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
 
(5.08) (4.85) (5.08) (4.71) (5.07) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) -0.059** -0.069** -0.059** -0.072*** -0.059** 
 
(-2.43) (-2.26) (-2.45) (-2.78) (-2.41) 
RSIZEit (Relative size of target) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.07) (0.11) (-0.11) (0.20) (-0.11) 
Target listing status 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Public targets -0.026*** 
    
 
(-7.61) 
    
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Private targets 0.001 
    
 
(0.33) 
    
Payment method 
     
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Pure cash deals 
 
-0.094 
   
 
 
(-0.97) 
   
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Pure stock deals 
 
0.021 
   
 
 
(0.16) 
   
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Foreign targets 
  
-0.019*** 
  
 
  
(-5.18) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Domestic targets 
  
-0.008*** 
  
 
  
(-3.87) 
  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Related targets 
   
-0.010*** 
 
 
   
(-4.32) 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Diversified targets 
   
-0.010*** 
 
 
   
(-3.88) 
 
Interactions      
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Cash-public 
    
-0.019*** 
 
    
(-5.09) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Stock-public 
    
-0.025*** 
 
    
(-5.85) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Cash-private 
    
0.002 
 
    
(0.83) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1:Stock-private 
    
-0.005 
 
    
(-1.01) 
Constant -0.495*** -0.488*** -0.494*** -0.460*** -0.489*** 
 
(-4.65) (-4.54) (-4.65) (-4.27) (-4.64) 
 
     
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.898 0.908 0.909 0.925 0.896 
Hansen J-stat 0.466 0.435 0.475 0.893 0.469 
F-stat 44.54 44.26 44.43 42.33 44.54 
Number of pooled observations 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 
Number of firms 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 
Note: Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the 
firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-
value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table A2. The effect of 4-year merger shock on returns on assets by deal-level characteristics. 
Dependent variable: ROAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ROAit-1 0.472*** 0.460*** 0.466*** 0.466*** 0.478*** 
 
(10.53) (10.19) (10.37) (10.25) (10.29) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 
 
(7.62) (6.19) (6.06) (5.90) (5.67) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) -0.049** -0.047** -0.046** -0.046** -0.047** 
 
(-2.27) (-2.14) (-2.08) (-2.11) (-2.15) 
RSIZEit (Relative size of target) -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 
(-4.49) (-4.01) (-4.93) (-4.44) (-3.51) 
Target listing status 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Public targets -0.009*** 
    
 
(-4.37) 
    𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Private targets -0.007*** 
    
 
(-3.07) 
    Payment method 
     𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Pure cash deals 
 
-0.005** 
   
  
(-2.26) 
   𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Pure stock deals 
 
-0.010*** 
   
  
(-3.82) 
   𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Foreign targets 
  
-0.007*** 
  
   
(-3.17) 
  𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Domestic targets 
  
-0.008*** 
  
   
(-4.09) 
  𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Related targets 
   
-0.008*** 
 
    
(-3.09) 
 𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Diversified targets 
   
-0.007*** 
 
    
(-3.63) 
 Interactions      
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Cash-public 
    
-0.005* 
     
(-1.86) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Stock-public 
    
-0.012*** 
     
(-2.83) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Cash-private 
    
-0.000 
     
(-0.14) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4:Stock-private 
    
-0.009** 
     
(-2.06) 
Constant -0.359*** -0.379*** -0.375*** -0.360*** -0.295*** 
 
(-6.86) (-5.54) (-5.40) (-5.20) (-4.96) 
      Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.887 0.911 0.903 0.903 0.869 
Hansen J-stat 0.544 0.455 0.367 0.461 0.242 
F-stat 45.10 44.44 43.18 41.70 37.85 
Number of pooled observations 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 
Number of firms 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 
Note: Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the 
firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-
value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table A3. The effect of 10-year merger shock on returns on assets by deal-level characteristics. 
Dependent variable: ROAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ROAit-1 0.464*** 0.466*** 0.467*** 0.460*** 0.489*** 
 
(12.41) (12.14) (11.94) (11.17) (12.00) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 
 
(4.94) (4.67) (4.74) (3.43) (3.23) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) -0.060** -0.054** -0.048* -0.062* -0.052* 
 
(-2.34) (-2.15) (-1.67) (-1.72) (-1.82) 
RSIZEit (Relative size of target) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.22) (0.05) (0.14) (0.17) (-0.15) 
Target listing status 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Public targets 0.003 
    
 
(0.17) 
    𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Private targets 0.003 
    
 
(1.26) 
    Payment method  
    𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Pure cash deals 
 
-0.002 
   
  
(-0.56) 
   𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Pure stock deals 
 
-0.011 
   
  
(-0.39) 
   𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Foreign targets 
 
 -0.017 
  
   
(-0.45) 
  𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Domestic targets 
  
-0.003 
  
   
(-1.24) 
  𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Related targets 
  
 -0.005 
 
    
(-0.92) 
 𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Diversified targets 
   
0.001 
 
    
(0.02) 
 Interactions      
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Cash-public 
    
-0.003 
     
(-0.59) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Stock-public 
    
-0.011 
     
(-0.84) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Cash-private 
    
0.030 
     
(0.49) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10:Stock-private 
    
-0.039 
     
(-0.95) 
Constant -0.504*** -0.471*** -0.445*** -0.493*** -0.367*** 
 
(-4.30) (-4.01) (-4.21) (-2.64) (-3.01) 
      Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.894 0.890 0.894 0.904 0.827 
Hansen J-stat 0.460 0.453 0.322 0.902 0.457 
F-stat 43.53 48.73 43.07 32.81 38.82 
Number of pooled observations 26035 26035 26035 26035 26035 
Number of firms 2172 2172 2172 2172 2172 
Note: Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation 
including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the 
firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-
value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. The effect of 1-year lagged merger frequency on current firm performance.    
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: ROAit ROAit ROAit LPit LPit LPit COAit COAit COAit 
Dependent variableit-1 0.471*** 0.483*** 0.491*** 0.700*** 0.707*** 0.737*** 0.530*** 0.534*** 0.495*** 
 
(12.31) -11.81 -11.26 (9.12) -9.04 -6.38 (9.52) -9.69 -10.63 
LogSIZEit-1 (Total assets of acquirer) 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.009* 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.042** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
 
(4.51) -4.1 -1.86 (2.73) -2.63 -2.4 (3.86) -4.94 -3.4 
DEBTit-1 (Debt in total assets) -0.047*** -0.039** -0.041** -0.065 -0.068 0.040 -0.025 -0.021 -0.027 
 
(-2.66) (-2.30) (-2.52) (-1.56) (-0.73) -0.37 (-0.94) (-0.81) (-1.02) 
RSIZEit-1 (Relative size of target) -0.002** -0.002* -0.001 -0.033*** -0.018*** 0.001 -0.002* -0.002 0.000 
 
(-2.04) (-1.69) (-1.18) (-3.05) (-4.27) -1.36 (-1.71) (-1.46) (-0.33) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡−1
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.006*** 
  
-0.069* 
  
-0.006***   
 
(-2.68) 
  
(-1.84) 
  
(-2.74)   
𝐹𝑖𝑡−1
4  (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
 
-0.004** 
  
-0.017** 
 
 -0.005**  
 
 
(-2.26) 
  
(-2.54) 
 
 (-2.35)  
𝐹𝑖𝑡−1
10 (Frequency of 10-year shock)   -0.001   -0.002   -0.003 
   (-0.57)   (-0.44)   (-1.63) 
Constant -0.389*** -0.287*** -0.124 3.116*** 2.908*** 2.448* -0.386*** -0.393*** -0.356*** 
 
(-4.08) (-3.52) (-1.30) (3.69) -2.98 -1.84 (-3.56) (-4.64) (-3.13) 
 
      
   
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.995 0.955 0.841 0.486 0.864 0.959 0.341 0.356 0.404 
Hansen J-stat 0.547 0.316 0.330 0.205 0.304 0.200 0.491 0.537 0.458 
F-stat 43.62 41.74 36.25 384.6 411.2 498.0 29.46 30.64 43.16 
Number of pooled observations 26034 26034 26034 23880 23563 23563 25944 25944 25944 
Number of firms 2172 2172 2172 2156 2146 2146 2169 2169 2169 
Note: Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The 
lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Estimation of effect of merger frequency on returns on assets across sub-samples of US, EU and Asian acquirers 
 
US US US EU EU EU Asia Asia Asia 
Dependent variable: ROAit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ROAit-1 0.616*** 0.624*** 0.628*** 0.521*** 0.514*** 0.535*** 0.468*** 0.456*** 0.405*** 
 
(6.77) (6.06) (7.98) (5.90) (12.58) (9.08) (4.72) (4.57) (5.55) 
LogSIZEit (Total assets of acquirer) 0.016** 0.008* 0.013** 0.020* 0.015** 0.014* 0.004 0.025*** 0.009 
 
(2.46) (1.67) (2.26) (1.75) (2.04) (1.91) (0.36) (3.50) (1.37) 
DEBTit (Debt in total assets) 0.051 0.047 0.057 0.048 0.047 0.025 -0.015 -0.016 -0.012 
 
(0.64) (0.59) (1.01) (1.29) (1.52) (0.77) (-1.32) (-0.29) (-1.08) 
RSIZEit (Relative size of target) -0.001 -0.003 0.000*** -0.003* -0.010** -0.000 -0.016** -0.008* -0.000*** 
 
(-0.40) (-1.35) (3.67) (-1.93) (-2.17) (-1.40) (-2.16) (-1.76) (-3.41) 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
1  (Frequency of 1-year shock) -0.011*** 
  
-0.019*** 
  
-0.026**   
 
(-3.47) 
  
(-4.71) 
  
(-2.36)   
𝐹𝑖𝑡
4 (Frequency of 4-year shock) 
 
-0.005*** 
  
-0.018* 
 
 -0.018**  
  
(-2.68) 
  
(-1.94) 
 
 (-2.03)  
𝐹𝑖𝑡
10(Frequency of 10-year shock) 
  
-0.002 
  
-0.002   -0.002 
   
(-0.83) 
  
(-1.02)   (-0.87) 
Constant -0.321** -0.151 -0.244** -0.384* -0.280* -0.262* -0.031 -0.409*** -0.089 
 
(-2.42) (-1.54) (-2.14) (-1.71) (-1.92) (-1.77) (-0.14) (-2.94) (-0.98) 
       
   
Firm fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.693 0.709 0.714 0.245 0.241 0.247 0.533 0.526 0.444 
Hansen J-stat 0.582 0.269 0.845 0.412 0.414 0.179 0.563 0.793 0.395 
F-stat 15.87 14.35 15.29 12.96 32.30 19.35 11.98 11.87 12.84 
Number of pooled observations 10119 10119 10119 5975 5975 5975 6871 6871 6871 
Number of firms 845 845 845 498 498 498 573 573 573 
Note: Results reported in this table have been obtained using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation including the Windmeijer correction to the reported standard errors. The 
lagged dependent variable, the M&A and the firm variables are instrumented. Year dummies are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. Data is for 2000–2012. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.⁎⁎⁎,⁎⁎,⁎ denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
5.1. Findings and contributions 
 
 Many empirical studies have attempted to identify the impacts of mergers and 
merger frequency on the acquiring firm’s performance (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Ismail, 
2008; Billett and Qian; 2008). Most of these studies found that M&A activities have a 
negative effect on a firm’s performance. If this result is true, why do firms still pursue 
takeovers? Why have M&A activities been prevalent all over the world? The 
contradiction between research findings and business activities in the real world 
motivates our study. 
 
 
 The results of this thesis paint a different picture of the effect of acquisitions, 
particularly frequent acquisition, on the performance of acquiring firms in the 
worldwide framework of corporate finance. Merger strategy or merger frequency 
doubtlessly played an increasingly important role in business growth and the success of 
corporations from both the investor and the decision maker’s perspective. Unlike earlier 
studies, the empirical analysis in this thesis shows that mergers and acquisitions have 
not only created wealth but also business failure. 
 
 
 This thesis examined merger effect taking into account the impact of merger 
frequency on the acquiring firm’s performance from both short-term and long-term 
perspectives. It conducts short term univariate and multivariate analysis of the effect of 
merger frequencies on the expectation of investors have about the integration of a new 
business and its effect on performance in the future. Findings from the univariate 
analysis in the Chapter 2 emphasize the distinction of the creation of synergy, and 
division of gains between acquirers with different merger frequencies from an investor 
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perspective. Based on comparative results of announcement returns, acquiring firms 
with a higher merger frequency are found to perform worse than ones with a lower 
merger frequency. This finding is consistent and robust across different time lengths, 
different regions, different time periods, different ownerships of target firms, different 
size of deals and different payment methods made by the acquirers. The chapter also 
shows that announcement returns for acquiring firms decline after the first deal, 
indicating that the market reacts more strongly to the first deal. 
 
 
 These significant findings provide clear evidence of how the acquiring 
managements or firms may develop hubris from their previously successful experiences 
on mergers and acquisitions. The development of hubris with more mergers drives 
down the expectation of investors for better performance in the future of the new 
integration, thus lowering the value of the firm. This result also suggests that although it 
is expected that the performance of acquiring firms will decline after their first deal or 
second deals of mergers due to growing hubris in M&A, this does not mean that the 
management learning effect shall be rejected.  
 
 
 Chapter 3 is about the short-run multivariate analysis extends the research of 
frequent acquisition by examining how frequency affects stock performance in two 
dimensions: number and time. This chapter develops a new method of defining the 
merger frequency that interacts the number of mergers with the time that a merger effect 
may last after the event occurrence. It employs a more internationally representative 
sample with control of firm specific fixed effects.  
 
 
 Based on these research settings, it is found that the negative effect of the short 
term and medium term merger frequency decreases over time and may become 
insignificant. This suggests that two managerial behaviours co-exist. More specifically, 
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the negative effects of hubris on performance of acquiring firm may be offset or 
weakened by positive effects developed from increasingly managerial learning which 
drives up the market expectation for the future improvement of new integration. If the 
time interval between the two mergers pursued by the firm is longer, the learning effect 
is expected to be stronger. These findings also imply that due to the joint effect of 
managerial behaviours the shock of a merger to announcement returns may not last 
permanently. In addition, it is found that the larger size of a merger has a positive effect 
on performance. This suggests that acquirers will be more careful about dealing with a 
larger acquisition as they may expose the firm to a high risk of devastating the business 
if the integration fails. This creates a risk pressure on management because any failure 
of a large acquisition may cause a difficulty for the acquiring firms in using its existing 
resources to absorb or digest the large acquisition. 
 
 
 If the difficulty is beyond the capability of the acquiring firm to overcome, it can 
result in the ruination of the existing business of the firm. In considering potential risks, 
any decision maker or shareholder of the firm will be much more cautious and careful in 
pursuing large acquisitions than the small ones, as the risk of the small size of the deal 
could be relatively easier for the acquiring firm to control or absorb. Therefore, this 
study argues that the pressure of the high risk drives the firm to perform better in large-
size acquisitions. This is different from the argument by Moeller et al. (2004) who 
explain the size effect from the perspective of acquirer size. 
 
 
 The thesis also looks at the merger impacts from a fundamental perspective in 
the long term. Findings from the last chapter show the relation between merger 
frequency and acquirer’s operational performance is both negative and significant. The 
strength of the negative effect diminishes over time. More importantly, the effect of 
merger frequency reverses in a long-term process: improving firm profitability for 
single acquirers. However, for multi-acquirers, it appears that the performance effect of 
frequency changes from stronger to weaker over time. Based on these findings, this 
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chapter extends the existing digesting theory (McCarthy, 1963) and the chewing theory 
(Kusewitt, 1985) into a dynamic context in arguing merger shocks and frequency: the 
effect changes with time.  
 
 
 Part of this dynamic argument is consistent with both existing digesting theory 
(McCarthy, 1963) and chewing theory (Kusewitt, 1985) that the negative effect of 
merger frequency relates to the number of acquisitions. It is so called “biting off more 
than you can chew”. However, when time is taken into account in the process of 
digestion, it is found that the longer process helps the firm gradually absorb the shocks 
of frequent acquisition, and then allows it to create more corporate synergies for 
business operation. This is, “time helping chew”. In addition, these findings also have 
important implications for management strategies related to M&A. To maximize the 
wealth of investors, and companies’ performance, it is optimal or more appropriate to 
consider not only merger quantity of targets but also the time length between 
acquisitions. All in all, a key message of this dynamic argument for merger effects is 
that both merger quantity and time play a role in affecting post-merger performance. 
 
 
5.2. Recommendations for future research 
 
 The findings of this thesis pose a great and complex challenge to researchers in 
the field of M&A studies for a need to continue studying in depth and breadth. Several 
areas of future research are in demand. Firstly, a larger sample is needed to validate the 
findings. For example, the thesis limited the research sample to public companies. It 
would be useful to explain greater variation in performance of frequent acquisition by 
repetition of the research using a sample of M&A deals by private companies. In 
addition, it would be useful to assess the effect of M&A deals with lower value 
comparing to those used in the thesis.  
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 Secondly, the thesis limited the merger dataset to a span from 2000 to 2010. The 
future research could usefully extend this time period because there may be a more 
complex relation between merger actives and firm performance in the longer term. 
When a longer sample period is used, a relation that this thesis has not revealed may be 
found, for instance a U-shaped relationship. 
 
 
 Thirdly, additional research studies should directly examine the relation between 
announcement returns and fundamental performance. This thesis has shown that both 
CARs and operational performance decrease with more mergers. Based on this 
consistent movement, it will be better to develop a more focused and extensive 
investigation of the nexus between cumulative abnormal returns and the fundamentals 
of acquiring firms.  
 
 
5.3. An exception in practice 
 
 For the last twenty years many scholars have attempted to examine the link 
between frequent acquisitions and acquirer’s performance. However, this relation is still 
unclear. Most of researchers and practitioners in various disciplines have stated that 
frequent acquisitions are value destructive. It is interesting to question if more mergers 
really do drive down the performance of acquiring firms in reality. The understanding 
that the world is complex with many and unknown variables should not discourage 
scientific endeavour. Although, the findings of the thesis have found that acquirers are 
generally suffering losses or at best only breakeven when making frequent acquisitions, 
there are still some frequent acquirers that are exceptions in practice. For instance, 
Mittal Steel, the world largest steel company. 
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 To illustrate this point some performance measures for Mittal Steel are plotted 
(See Appendix A). It is found that there are a number of consistent variations for those 
measures along with number of M&As over the time. This suggests that frequent 
acquisitions could be able to drive significant growth for a business. However, based on 
the findings of this thesis, it is clear that the view drawn from this single case study 
cannot be generalized to other cases.  
 
 
5.4. Implications 
 
 Taken together, findings of the thesis suggest clear implications for business 
development. Firstly, acquisition facilitates growth of business but more or frequent 
acquisitions can lead to grow at a higher cost or expense more profits. Secondly, 
acquiring firms should not rush aggressively to acquire their next targets. Thirdly, firms 
should carefully evaluate and select which of merger strategies will provide them with 
the expected growth.  
 
 
 Overall, the thesis highlights the mergers and acquisitions can help and support 
the firm but also can create adverse effect on firm’s performance. It contributes to the 
literature on studies of merger and acquisition and develops new understanding about 
acquisition strategy in relation to firm performance. 
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Appendix A 
Figure A1. A comparison between the trends of market share and merger frequency 
 
Figure A2. A comparison between the trends of return on assets and merger frequency 
 
Figure A3. A comparison between the trends of profit margin and merger frequency 
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